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Deliberate weakening of a cipher system

Deliberate weakening of a cipher system, commonly known as a backdoor, is a technique that is used by, or on behalf of, intelligence agencies like the US National Security Agency (NSA) – and others – to make it easier for them to break the cipher and access the data. It is often thought that intelligence services have a Master Key that gives them instant access to the data, but in reality it is often much more complicated, and requires the use of sophisticated computing skills.

In the past, intelligence services like the NSA weakened the ciphers just enough to allow it to be barely broken with the computing power that was available to them (e.g. by using their vast array of Cray super computers), assuming that other parties did not have that capability. Implementing a backdoor is difficult and dangerous, as it might be discovered by the user — after which it can no longer be used — or by another party, in which case it can be exploited by an adversary.

Below is a non-exhaustive overview of known backdoor constructions and examples:

Weakening of the algorithm
One of the most widely used types of backdoor, is weakening of the algorithm. This was done with mechanical cipher machines – such as the CX-52 – electronic ones – such as the H-460 – and software-based encryption. NSA often weakened the algorithm just enough to break it with the help from a super computer (e.g. Cray), assuming that adversaries did not have that capacity.

This solution is universal. It can be applied to mechanical, electronic and computer-based encryption systems. One of the first known examples is the weakening of the Hagelin CX-52 by Peter Jenks of the NSA, in the early 1960s [1].

The Hagelin CX-52 had the problem that it was theoretically safe when used correctly. It was possible however to configure the device in such a way that it produced a short cycle, as a result of which it became easy to break. Jenks modified the CX-52 in such a way that it always produced a long cycle, albeit one that he could predict.
CX-52 with open lid

The modified product was designated CX-52M and was marketed by Crypto AG as a new version with improved security, which customers immediately started ordering in quantities. He repeated the exercise in the mid-1960s, when Crypto AG moved from mechanical to electronic designs.

The first electronic cipher machines were built around (non)linear feedback shift registers – LFSR or NLFSR – built with the (then) newest generation of integrated circuits (ICs). This part is commonly known as the crypto heart or the cryptologic. Jenks manipulated the shift registers in such as way that it seemed robust from the outside. Nevertheless NSA could break it, as they knew the exact nature of the built-in weakness.

Manipulating the cryptologic, or actually the cryptographic algorithm, requires quite some mathematical ingenuity, and is not simple at all.

During the 1970s, the weaknesses were discovered by several (unwitting) Crypto AG employees and even by customers. Crypto AG usually fended them off with the excuse that the algorithm had been developed a long time ago, and that an improved version would be released soon. It should be no surprise that hiding the weaknesses became increasinly difficult over the years.

The same principle can be applied to software-implementations of cryptographic algorithms as well, but it has become extremely difficult to do that in such a way that it passes existing tests, such as NIST entropy-tests, and can with­stand the peer review of the academic community.

Weakening the KEY
Another popular method for weakening a cipher system, is by shortening the effective length of the crypto KEY. The length is typically specified in bits, and in the 1980s, the keys of military cipher systems were typically 128 bits long, which was about twice the length that was needed.

The DES encryption algorithm – that was used for bank transactions – had a key length of 56 bits. It had been developed by Horst Feistel at IBM as Lucifer and had been improved by NSA.

In 1983, the small Dutch company Text Lite, introduced the small PX-1000 pocket terminal shown in the image on the right. It had a built-in text editor and an acoustic modem, by which texts could be uploaded in seconds. The device used DES encryption for the protection of the text messages, which was thought to be useful for journalists and business men on the move.
Original PX-1000 made in 1983

DES was considered secure at the time. Although it might have been breakable by NSA, doing so would cost a lot of resources (i.e. computing power). With DES available in a consumer product for an affordable price, NSA faced a serious problem, and went to Philips Usfa for assistence.

Philips bought the entire stock of DES-enabled devices and shipped it to the US. The product was then re-released under the Philips brand, with an algorithm that was supplied by NSA.

The new algorithm was a stream cipher with a key-length of no less than 64 bits. This is more than the 56 bits of DES, and suggested that it was a least a strong as DES, and probably even stronger. By reverse engineering the algorithm, Crypto Museum has meanwhile concluded that of the 64 key bits, only 32 are significant. This means that the key has effectively been halved.
Original ROM (with DES) and replacement EPROM (with NSA algorithm)

Does this mean that it takes only half the time to break the key? No, as each key-bit doubles the number of combinations, removing 32 bits means that it has become 4,294,967,296 times easier to break the key (232). For example: if we assume that it takes one full year to break a 64-bit key, breaking a 32-bit key would take just 0.007 seconds. A piece of cake for NSA's super computers.

Hide the KEY in the ciphertext
It is sometimes suggested that the cryptographic key might be hidden in the output stream (i.e. in the cipher text). Not in a readable form, of course, but when you known where to look, the key will reveal itself. Although this method is prone to discovery it has in fact been used in the past.

A good example of this technique is the Hagelin CSE-280 voice encryptor, that was introduced by Crypto AG in the early 1970s. The product had been developed in cooperation with the German cipher authority ZfCh (part of the BND), and used forward synchro­nisation, to allow late entry sync.

The key was hidden in the preample that was inserted at the beginning of each transmission. If one knew where to look, the entire key could be reconstructed. A few years after the device had been introduced, Crypto AG's chief developer Peter Frutiger suddenly realised how it was done.
CSE-280 in metal frame

It was only a matter of time before customers would discover it too. In 1976, the Syrians became aware of the (badly hidden) key in the preamble, and notified Crypto AG, where Frutiger provided them with a fix that made it instantly unbreakable. NSA was furious and Frutiger got fired for this.

Another example of hiding hints in the output stream, is the T-1000/CA, internally known as Beroflex, that was the civil version of the NATO-approved Aroflex, a joint development of Philips and Siemens. It was based on a T-1000 telex.

Whilst the Aroflex was highly secure, Beroflex (T-1000/CA) was not. With the right means and the right knowledge, it could be broken. This was not a trivial task however, and required the use of a special purpose device – a super chip – that had been co-developed by experts at the codebreaking division of the Royal Dutch Navy.
Philips Aroflex

The exploit was based on redundancy in the enciphered message preamble. It caused a bias which was an unnecessary shortcoming by design. It involved solving a set of binary equasions, an exponentially large number of times, for which the special purpose device was developed.

 More bout Aroflex

Rigging the manual
In some cases, the cipher can be weakened by manipulating the manual. This was done for example with the manuals of the Hagelin CX-52 machine. Although the CX-52 was in theory a virtually unbreakable machine, it could be set up accidentally in such a way, that it produced a short cycle (period), which was easy to break.

By manipulating the manual, guidelines were given for 'proper' use of the machine, but in reality the user was instructed to configure the machine in such a way that it generated a short cycle, which was easy to break by the NSA.

C-52 and CX-52 manuals

Key generator with predictive output
Many encryption systems, old and new alike, make use of KEY-generators – commonly pseudo random number generators, or PRNGs – for example for the generation of unique message keys, for generating private and public keys, and for generating the key stream in a stream cipher.

By manipulating the key generator, it is theoretically possible to generate predictable keys, weak keys or predicatable cycles. Examples are the mechanical key generator of the Hagelin CX-52M, but also the software-based random number generators (RNGs) in modern software algorithms.

Creating this kind of weaknesses is neither simple nor trivial, as the weakened key generator has to withstand a variety of existing entropy tests, including the ones published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Nevertheless, various (potential) backdoors based on weakened PRNGs have been reported in the press, some of which are attributed to the NSA.

In December 2013, Reuters reported that documents released by Edward Snowden indicated that NSA had payed RSA Security US$ 10 million to make Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG) the default in their encryption software. It had already been proven in 2007, that constants could be constructed in such a way as to create a kleptographic backdoor in the NIST-recommended Dual_EC_DRBG [3]. It had been deliberately inserted by NSA as part of its BULLRUN decryption program. NIST promptly withdrew Dual_EC_DRBG from its draft guidance [4].

 Wikipedia: Random number generator attack
 Wikipedia: Dual_EC_DRBG

Using a Master Key
It is often thought by the general public, that intelligence agencies have something like a magic password, or master key, that gives them instant access to secure communications of a subject. Although in most cases the backdoor mechanism is far more complex, it is technically possible.

An example of a possible master key, is the so-called
that was found in a Microsoft operating system in 1999. The variable contained a 1024-bit public key, that was similar to the cryptographic keys that are used for encryption and authentication. Although Microsoft firmly denied it, it was widely speculated that the key was there to give the NSA access to the system.

There are however a few other possible explanations for the presence of this key — including a backup key, a key for installing NSA proprietary crypto suites, and incompetence on the part of Microsoft, NSA or both — all of which seem plausible. In addition, Dr. Nicko van Someren found a third – far more obscure – key in Windows 2000, which he doubted had a legitimate purpose [5].

 Wikipedia: _NSAKEY

Key escrow
Although most backdoors are covertly built into equipment without the user's consent, there is one category in which the backdoor is known and approved by the user, and that is KEY ESCROW. It requires the user to surender the cryptographic keys to a trusted third party: the escrow agent.

A good example of KEY ESCROW is the so-called Clipper Chip, that was introduced by the NSA in the early 1990s, in an attempt to control the use of strong encryption by the general public.

It was the intention to use this chip in all civil encryption products, such as computers, secure telephones, etc., so that everyone would be able to use strong encryption. By forcing people to surrender their keys to the (US) government, law enforcement agencies had the ability to decrypt the communication, should that prove to be necessary during the course of an investigation.
Close-up of the Clipper Chip inside the TSD-3600

It had to be assumed that the (US) government could be trusted under all circumstances, and that sufficient mechanisms were in place to avoid unwarranted tapping and other abuse, which was heavily disputed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and other privacy organisations.

The device – which used the Skipjack algorithm – was not embraced by the public. In addition, it contained a serious flaw. In 1994, shortly after its introduction, (then) AT&T researcher Matt Blaze discovered the possibility to tamper the device in such a way that it offered strong encryption whilst disabling the escrow capability. And that was not what the US Government had in mind.

 More about the Clipper chip

Side channels
Encryption systems are often attacked by adversaries, by exploiting information that is hidden in the so-called side channels. This is known as a side channel attack. In most cases, side channels are unintended, but they may have been inserted deliberately to give an eavesdropper a way in.

Side channels are often unwanted emanations – such as radio frequency (RF) signals that are emitted by the equipment, or sound generated by a printer or a keyboard – but may also take the form of variations in power consumption (current) that occur when the device is in use (power analysis). In military jargon, unwanted emanations are commonly known as TEMPEST.

An early example of a cryptographic device that exhibited exploitable TEMPEST problems, is the Philips Ecolex IV mixer shown in the image on the right, which was approved for use by NATO.

As it was based on the One-Time Tape (OTT) principle, it was theoretically safe. However, in the mid-1960s, the Dutch national physics laboratory TNO, proved that minute glitches in the electric signals on the teleprinter data line, could be exploited to reconstruct the original plaintext. The problem was eventually soved by adding filters between the device and the teleprinter line.

 Wikipedia: Side-channel attack

Unintended weaknesses
Backdoors can also be based on unintentional weaknesses in the design of an encryption device. For example, the Enigma machine – used during WWII by the German Army – can not encode a letter into itself: the letter 'A' in the plaintext, will never yield the letter 'A' in the ciphertext.

This and other weaknesses greatly helped the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, and allowed the cipher to be broken throughout World War II.

Unintended weaknesses were also present in the early mechanical cipher machines of Crypto AG (Hagelin), such as the C-36, M-209, C-446 and CX-52. Although they were theoretically strong, they could accidentally be setup in such a way that they produced a short cycle, which could be broken much more easily. Similar properties can be found in the first generations of electronic crypto devices that are based on shift-registers.
Enigma I with top lid and flap open

In some cases, the safety doctrine that is intended to make the device more secure, actually makes the cipher weaker. For example: during WWII, the German cipher authority dictated that a particular cipher wheel should not be used in the same position on two successive days. Whilst this may seem like a good idea, it effectively reduces the maximum number of possible settings.

By far the most common of the unintended weaknesses is operator error, such as choosing a simple or easy to guess password, sending multiple messages on the same key, sending the same message on two different keys, etc. Here are some examples of unintended weaknesses:

  • Weak keys
  • A letter can not encode into itself (Enigma)
  • False security measures
  • Operator mistakes
  1. Crypto Museum, Operation RUBICON
    February 2020.

  2. Wikipedia, Backdoor (computing)
    Retrieved February 2020

  3. Wikipedia, Random number generator attack
    Retrieved February 2020

  4. Wikipedia, Dual_EC_DRBG
    Retrieved February 2020

  5. Wikipedia, _NSAKEY
    Retrieved February 2020
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Crypto Museum. Created: Monday 24 February 2020. Last changed: Thursday, 23 April 2020 - 18:56 CET.
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