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Covert CIA BVD EC
In the early days of the Cold War, both the
Dutch Security Service (BVD) and
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
regularly mounted operations against members of the
Soviet Union
and its satellites, operating on Dutch territory.
As the CIA was secretly operating in a guest country, it was agreed that
they would seek the BVD's permission for each covert operation. 1
In late September 1958, the BVD was informed 2 that
the Russians had ordered new furniture for their embassy in The Hague,
via the National Procurement Office —
Rijksinkoopbureau or RIB.
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As this offered the possibility to plant bugging devices in some of the
furniture, the Dutch BVD developed plans to install an
EASYCHAIR device (EC)
in one or more pieces of furniture [1]. The EC devices were made by
the Dutch Radar Laboratory (NRP)
in Noordwijk (Netherlands), and had been
developed for the CIA
as part of a top secret project.
As the devices were technically owned by the CIA, the BVD had
to seek their permission first, but given the fact that the CIA
was always keen on monitoring any Russian activity, this was no problem
and permission was granted [11].
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Getting access to the actual furniture turned out to be quite difficult.
The RIB had ordered the items from a supplier, who in turn had them made
by an external Dutch contractor [2].
After contacting
various people at the RIB, the supplier and the manufacturer, an
officer of the R.P. 3 finally managed to persuade someone 4 at the
manufacturer's to provide his assistance [4].
A custom-made desk appeared to be the most interesting piece of furniture,
as it was probably intended for the ambassador himself and would therefore
offer the best eavesdropping potential.
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On Saturday 22 November 1958, the desk was located and appeared to be nearly
finished. It would be sprayed and polished sometime during the following week.
It was agreed that the BVD
would install an EASYCHAIR Mark III Passive Element
the following day, on Sunday the 23rd [4].
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The following morning at 11:00, the BVD got access to the workshop.
After locating the desk, it was confirmed by its drawings that it was indeed
intended for the Russian Embassy. The desk was turned over, and the EC was
carefully installed in its rear left corner,
as shown in the original drawing
on the right, leaving no traces.
The desk was sprayed a few days later on the 26th.
That night, a BVD operative reopened the tiny 1 mm hole for
the microphone that got blocked by the spraying.
He tested the device. The sound quality wasn't perfect, but that was thought to be
caused by the receiver [5].
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A day later, the bug was checked again after the desk has been polished [6],
and finally the BVD received confirmation that the desk would be delivered to
the Russian Embassy on 10 December 1958.
Meanwhile, a suitable Listening Post (LP) had been setup at the
Zorgvliet observation post.
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Zorgvliet
is a rather tall building,
approx. 125 metres from the front
of the Russian Embassy,
at the other side of a canal. Although it is
two streets away from the embassy, it offered a
clear view of the
front of the building and its entrance.
Several years earlier, the BVD had acquired a
small room at the attic
of the Zorgvliet building, which was used to observe
and photograph everyone who went in and out of the Russian Embassy.
As the room offered a clear view of the target building,
it was thought to be a suitable location for the EASYCHAIR antennas
as well.
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Several days after the new furniture had been delivered and installed
at the Russian Embassy, BVD operatives tried to activate the EC bug,
but to no avail. Apparently, the distance between the target and the
listening post was too large, or the device had been discovered by the Russians.
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In order to check the device at a shorter range, an inconsipcuous
lorry with a canvas cover was acquired and parked in front of the Russian
Embassy by BVD operative Herman,
predending to have motor trouble.
Hidden under the canvas hood was a 40 Watt transmitter from earlier NRP
experiments, plus a suitable receiver,
powered by batteries and a noise-proof rotating inverter.
The devices were operated by NRP engineer Thijs Hoekstra
and a CIA operative, who were also in the back of the truck.
After aiming the antennas at
the embassy, the transmitter was turned on.
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The receiver was tuned-in and after some time they managed to pickup
the EASYCHAIR bug.
The first thing they heared was the ambassador's
'big belly laugh' coming through loud and clear. The EC worked and
had not been discovered. This implied that the LP antennas
were insufficient [12].
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Two new antennas were built, each measuring 2 by 2 metres
and providing a gain of 20dB. They barely fitted the narrow space at
the Zorgvliet observation post.
In addition, the isolation between
transmitter and receiver was increased.
Every day, field engineer Thijs Hoekstra
did his experiments at the
attic of the Zorgvliet flat. His findings were then passed to
Gerhard Prins
at the NRP, who spent his evenings improving the system and
developing solutions to Hoekstra's problems. Finally, the work began
to pay off and the EC could be activated reliably from the attic.
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According to Prins [12], the operation lasted for about six months,
after which time the bug had either been discovered, or the Russians
had become wise, as they had built a sound-proof room in the attic
of the embassy. From then on, only the German language classes of the
ambassador and his assistents were picked up by the bug.
By that time however, it had produced sufficient intelligence
to make the covert operation
of the CIA, the BVD and the NRP a successful one.
➤ Historical context
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Although it was agreed that the CIA needed the permission of their host
(i.e. the BVD) before each covert operation — a permission which was
sometimes refused — it is known that the CIA also carried out such
operations outside the view of the BVD and without their consent.
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It is unknown who tipped-off the BVD. It could have been an
informant, but it is also possible that the information came from the CIA.
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We assume that R.P. stands for Rijkspolitie (the Dutch National
Police), which existed at the time. RP officers were often used by the BVD
in covert operations, as the BVD itself had no law enforcement capacity.
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The identity of this person is unknown, but we assume it to be one
of the directors of the company, or someone operating with the consent
of one of the directors, as he had access to the premises,
the workshop, the offices and the files.
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De Correspondent
The story above is largely based on a confidential letter written by
NRP developer Gerhard Prins shortly before his death in April 1993 [12].
The letter was published on 24 September 2015 by the Dutch online magazine
De Correspondent, as part of the article Operatie Leunstoel
(Operation Easy Chair), written by Maurits Martijn and Cees Wiebes [10].
We are grateful for their work.
The story is complemented by the results from our own investigations in
2016 and 2017, in particular the descriptions of the
Zorgvliet listening post
and the actual Easy Chair listening device
that was used in the operation.
The diagrams below show how and where the
EASYCHAIR bug (EC) was built
into the furniture. As part of the order to the
RIB, the Russian Embassy had ordered a large mahogany wooden desk,
which was likely to be used by the ambassador himself.
The desk consisted of two deep cabinets
each containing three drawers, hidden behind a hinged door.
Each cabinet was raised somewhat
by a black wooden pedestal, that was 10 cm high.
The total height of the desk was 76 cm [8].
As the construction of the 10 cm pedestal was separate from the rest of
the desk, it was decided to build the bug into the rear left corner of
the desk, with the microphone picking up the sound in the room through
a tiny 1 mm hole, approx. 6 cm above the pedestal. To understand how the
bug was built into the mahogany desk, we will examine a bottom view of its
rear left corner [9].
In the drawing above, the side and rear panels of the desk have been left
out for clarity. In the corner of the desk, holding the side and rear panels
together, is a mahogany timber (A) to which the rails of the drawers are
mounted. Glued into the corner of the pedestal is a small mahogany block
(B) on which the desk rests. The pedestal is reinforced by two
support battens (C).
The mahogany block (B) and one of the support battens
(C) are removed temporarily, in order to get access to the mahogany
timber in the corner of the desk (A).
Next, a half inch hole is drilled into the timber (A),
which is deep enough to hold the entire EC bug. A 1 mm hole is
drilled
from the side of the desk into the big hole, so that any sound in the room
is guided to the microphone of the EC. Finally, the desk is reassembled
and the EASYCHAIR bug is ready for use.
This example clearly shows that bugging devices do not always have to
be extremely small. In this case, the fact that the bug had a virtually
unlimited life and was difficult to detect, was far more important.
➤ Check out the original drawing of the desk
➤ Detail drawing of the position of the bug
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Instead, the EC was powered by the energy from a strong Radio Frequency
(RF) signal beamed at it from a nearby Listening Post (LP).
In the case of the Russian Embassy in The Hague, the LP was located
at Zorgvliet,
approx. 125 metres from the front of the embassy building, which
implies that a very strong activation signal was required.
By the time the bugging operation at the Russian Embassy took place,
EC was already in its third incarnation, which means that the
EC III Passive Element (PE)
was used. It is shown in the image
on the right and features subcarrier modulation.
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As a result, the EC III was far more difficult to
detect than any of its predecessors
and could not be picked up accidentally by someone
scanning the radio bands. During the operation against the
Russian Embassy, the EC III system
was going through its final stages of development.
In fact, the experiences gained from the operation, were used to improve
the LP and its large Yagi-antennas.
➤ More about the EC III bug
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The Zorgvliet listening post
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The satellite image below shows the position of the
Zorgvliet observation post
back in 1958. The listening post (LP)
was located in a very small room in the
east corner
of the attic of the Zorgvliet building at Alexander Gogelweg,
approx. 125 metres west of the Russian Embassy, which itself was
located at Andries Bickerweg 2, The Hague (Netherlands).
It is still located here today (2022).
The observation room is located in an unused part of the Zorgvliet
appartment building. Behind several
forgotten doors is a
small utility room with a narrow staircase
that leads to a trapdoor in the floor of
the actual observation room.
The room measures approx. 5 x 3 metres and has five narrow windows,
one of which offers a
clear view of the Russian Embassy,
125 metres to the east.
At the time, the room offered a
clear line of sight between the houses at
number 8 and 10, across the small canal, onto the front of the
Russian Embassy. It allowed BVD operatives to watch everyone who entered
or left the embassy. If necessary, visitors were photographed using a
strong telephoto lens. For this reason, the room was also considered to
be suitable for positioning the EASYCHAIR antennas.
The two large 2 x 2 m antennas must have barely fitted the small room.
Today, the observation post is no longer in use. The
room is deserted and no longer offers
a clear view of the Russian Embassy,
as the trees in the line of sight have grown considerably over the years.
Not a single trace in the room reminds us of what took place there during
the Cold War.
The image above was created in 2018 with help of the 3D features of
Google Maps, to illustrate the line of sight between the Zorgvliet
listening post and the Russian Embassy. Apart from the trees — which have
grown considerably over the years — the situation is virtually unchanged.
➤ View the area on Google Maps
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During the Cold War,
the Russian Embassy in The Hague was known to be
a base of spies, all working under the cover of diplomacy. Most of the
'diplomats' were under constant surveillance of the BVD.
In February 1958, three Russian Diplomats had been expelled from The
Netherlands.
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They had been found working for the KGB and kept doing so, even after
several warnings from the authorities. The Soviet Ambassador to The
Netherlands, Stephan Pavlovitsch Kirsanov, had protested againt the eviction,
but to no avail. At the same time, Kirsanov himself had become a BVD target,
due to his contacts with chairman of the Dutch Communist Party (CPN)
Paul de Groot.
S.P. Kirsanov was a high ranking member of the Soviet Communist Party,
and was ambassador in several other European countries before
taking post in The Netherlands on 4 September 1953.
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The BVD became increasingly concerned about Kirsanov's
influence on the CPN and actively tried to
gather intelligence about his activities.
And this is where the EC device proved to
be invaluable. During the first six months after its activation,
it provided the BVD with first class intelligence.
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In January 1959 it was announced that Kirsanov would be replaced.
Leaving the country in July 1959, he was the longest-sitting
Soviet/Russian Ambassador to The Netherlands 1 ever.
Initially, the Russians wanted to
replace him by former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Molotov, but after objections from the Dutch, it was decided
that former General 2
Panteleimon Kondratevich Ponomarenko would take Kirsanov's place.
Ponomarenko took up his post in The Hague on 4 November 1959.
As a Stalinist, he had been an important member of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Between 1953 and
1955 he was considered one of the 14 most powerful people in the USSR [14].
It is currently unclear against which Russian Ambassador the covert
CIA-BVD-NRP bugging operation was mounted. However, given the fact
that Kirsanov's departure had been announced in January 1959 -
whilst the EC device still wasn't operational -
it seems likely that the main target was Ponomarenko. 3
Like his predecessor, he actively tried to influence the Dutch political
scene via the Dutch Communist Party, the CPN.
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On Monday 9 October 1961, Ponomarenko reached the headlines after an
emotional fight with police officers at Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam),
in an attempt to prevent Russian chemist Goloeb and his wife
from obtaining political asylum in The Netherlands [17].
After an 8-hour siege of the Aeroflot office at the airport,
led by Ponomarenko himself, press attaché Popov and diplomat Chibaev, 4
mrs. Goloeb flew back to the USSR, whilst her husband stayed
in The Netherlands. 5
Following the Goloeb-incident [14], the Dutch Government declared
Popov and Chibaev persona non grata on 12 October 1961.
That same day, Ponomarenko left The Netherlands to
attend the 22nd congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU).
On the same flight was a CPN-delegation, consisting of Paul de Groot
and Henk Hoekstra, also on their way to the congress [15].
A day later, Ponomarenko was also declared persona non grata
and never returned to The Netherlands.
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By 1982, Kirsanov was still the longest-sitting Russian Ambassador
to The Netherlands [14].
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Ponomarenko was a General of the Red Army before becoming a Soviet
administrator in Belarus and then Kazakhstan. Between 1952 and 1953 he was a
member of the Soviet Politburo. He was ambassador to Poland (1955-1975)
and Nepal (1957-1959) before becoming ambassador to The Netherlands [16].
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This is corroborated by Gerhard Prins in his letter [10] in which he
recollects that it was in 1960/1961.
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In the Dutch newspapers of the day, Chibaev
is written as Chibaef
and Popov
as Popof
[17].
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Goloeb would later have second thoughts and return to the USSR in March 1962,
claiming that he was held in The Netherlands against his will by American
agents.
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BVD
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Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst
Internal Security Service of The Netherlands
(now: AIVD).
➤ More
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Bug
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Covert listening device
Common name for a concealed listening device, also known as a bugging
device.
➤ More
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CIA
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Central Intelligence Agency
Independent US Government agency for gathering national security intelligence.
➤ More
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CPN
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Communistische Partij Nederland
Dutch Communist Party.
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CPSU
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Communist Part of the Soviet Union
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EC
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EASYCHAIR
Code name of a secret CIA project
to develop passive covert listening
devices (bugs). In the context of this story,
the name EASYCHAIR is used for the
actual bugging device,
whilst the operation to plant a bug in the Russian Embassy in The Hague
was known as Operation Easy Chair.
➤ More
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LP
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Listening Post
Common name for the reception station of an EC bugging device.
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NRP
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Nederlands Radar Proefstation
Dutch Radar Laboratory, responsible for developing the
EASYCHAIR bugs for the CIA.
Also carried out field work for both the BVD
and the CIA, in particular where 'planting' of bugs was involved.
➤ More
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PE
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Passive Element
Internal name for an EASYCHAIR (EC) bug,
used by manufacturer NRP.
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RIB
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Rijksinkoopbureau
Dutch National Procurement Office. Renamed in 1990 to Nederlands
Inkoopcentrum (Dutch Purchasing Centre), or NIC.
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RP
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Rijkspolitie
Dutch National Police from 1945 to 1993.
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The following people are mentioned in relation to the above story:
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Thijs Hoekstra
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Field technician of the NRP, often used in covert operations.
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Gerhard Prins
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One of the key developers of the EASYCHAIR (EC) bugs
and later co-owner of the NRP.
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'Herman'
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Cover name of the rather burly BVD operative who drove the truck
with the mobile listening post to the Russian Embassy in The Hague,
and pretended to have motor trouble.
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S.P. Kirsanov
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Stephan Pavlovitsch Kirsanov was the Russian Ambasssador to
The Netherlands from 4 September 1953 to July 1959.
In January 1959 it was announced that he was to be replaced soon.
For a long time, he was the longest-sitting Russian Ambassador
to The Netherlands ever.
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P.K. Ponomarenko
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Panteleimon Kondratevich Ponomarenko was a former General of
the Red Army and also a former member of the Soviet Union's Politburo.
Between 1953 and 1955 he was considered one of
the 14 most powerful people in the USSR. After being ambassador
in Poland (1955-1957) and Nepal (1957-1959), he became the
Russian Ambassador to The Netherlands on 4 November 1959,
succeeding Stephan P. Kirsanov. On 12 October 1961, following the Goloeb
incident [14], he was declared persona non grata.
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The following events have been confirmed:
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Late Sep 1958
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Russian Embassy orders furniture
The BVD is informed that the Russian Embassy has
ordered new furniture for the Ambassador's office. The BVD develops
plans to place an EASYCHAIR (EC) bugging device
in one or more pieces of this furniture [1].
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18 Oct 1958
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Contact with supplier
Contact is made with the supplier of the furniture.
It appears that the furniture will be made in a factory to which the
supplier has no access. From there, the furniture will be delivered
directly to the Russian Embassy.
This means that the supplier can not cooperate [2].
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7 Nov 1958
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Contact with manufacturer
Contact person at the factory seems to be willing to cooperate [2].
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10 Nov 1958
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Contact at manufacturer declines
The contact person at the factory has had a talk with the head of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and declines as the risks are considered
too high. It is suggested to contact the RIB
[2].
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12 Nov 1958
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Meeting with director RIB
The contact at the manufacturer introduces a BVD officer
to the director of the RIB. Returning the goods to the RIB before
delivery is uncommon and would attract unwanted attention.
He suggest to contact the supplier again [3].
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13 Nov 1958
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Suggestion made to supplier
The BVD asks the supplier again for cooperation. He still doesn't want to
cooperate, but suggests to contact the factory again.
For this he gives his approval. [3]
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20 Nov 1958
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Meeting with RP
BVD officers contact an officer of the RP 1 who thinks he will be
able to persuade 'X' 2 at the factory. 'X' is subsequently contacted
and appears to be willing to cooperate [4].
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22 Nov 1958
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Desk about to be finished
On Saturday 22 November 1958, the desk is nearly complete. It is
known that it will be sent to the finishing shop on Monday (24th) [4].
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23 Nov 1958
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EASYCHAIR bug planted
On Sunday 23 November, at 11:00 in the morning, BVD operatives
are given access to the factory, where an EC is placed in one of
the corners of the desk. A 1 mm hole for the microphone is drilled
into the side of the desk. A delivery form found with the desk,
confirms that it is indeed for the Russian Embassy [4].
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26 Nov 1958
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Desk is painted
On Wednesday (26th), 'X' confirmed that the desk had been finished
by means of spraying. That night, a BVD officer re-opens the 1 mm hole
for the microphone and tests the installation. Sound quality is
not perfect, but this is thought to be caused by the receiver [5].
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27 Nov 1958
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Desk is polished
On Thursdag (27th), the desk is polished, after which a BVD operative
checks the 1 mm hole again [6].
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10 Dec 1958
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Furniture delivered at the Russian Embassy
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In this context, R.P. probably means
Rijkspolitie (National Police).
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It is unknown who 'X' was, and what his profession was, but we assume
he was one of the directors, or someone operating with the consent of
one of the directors, as he had access to the building, the
offices and the files.
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- BVD, Plans for placing bugs in furniture ordered by the Russian Embassy
11 November 1958. Internal memo 1036-0; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Report about contacts with informant
11 November 1958. Internal memo 1036-1; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Report about contacts with director RIB
20 November 1958. Internal memo 1036-2; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Report about meeting with 'X' of the RP
27 November 1958. Internal memo 1036-3; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Report that desk has been painted
27 November 1958. Internal memo 1036-4; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Report that desk has been checked
1 December 1958. Internal memo 1036-5; 1958 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Future cooperation
5 May 1959. Internal memo 1036-2; 1959 (Dutch). 1
- BVD, Drawing of desk
November 1958. 1
- BVD, Detail drawing of location of the bug
November 1958. 1
- Maurits Martijn & Cees Wiebes, Operatie Leunstoel
De Correspondent. 24 September 2015.
- Louis Einthoven, Memoirs
Unpublished (2016), via [10].
- Gerhard Prins, Letter to his heirs
Date unknown, but probably written shortly before his death in April 1993.
Vertrouwelijk (confidential). Published by [10] and reproduced here
by kind permission.
- Google Maps, Satellite image of area around Russian Embassy in The Hague
Retrieved January 2016.
- BVD, Kwartaaloverzicht binnenlandse veiligheidsdienst
1982, first quarter. Nr. 1598.85 (Dutch).
- BVD, Maandoverzicht No. 10 1961
1961, monthly review no. 10-1961 (Dutch).
- Wikipedia, Panteleimon Ponomarenko
Retrieved January 2016.
- Leids Dagblad, Beleg van ruim 8 uur voor Aeroflotkantoor
10 October 1961, newspaper (Dutch). Page 5.
- Nieuwe Leidsche Courant, Twee Russen moeten voor morgennacht het land uit
13 October 1961, newspaper (Dutch).
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Released under the Dutch WOB (FOIA) by the
AIVD on 1 October 2015.
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Friday 15 January 2016. Last changed: Sunday, 20 November 2022 - 14:21 CET.
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![Original drawing of the location of the bug, made by the BVD in 1958 [9]. Click for further information.](img/ec_detail.png)
![Satellite image of the area in which both Zorgvliet and the Russian Embassy are located (obtained via Google Maps) [13]](img/zorgvliet_map.png)
