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Wanted item
The Spendex 40 was the last of a series of crypto-based phones,
developed by Philips Usfa around 1980.
It was a high-grade cipher system that allowed the secure transmission of
voice, fax and computer messages over standard telephone lines. Approved for use
by NATO, the Spendex-40 was used, for example, by the Dutch Army and Government.
It was also used by the major Dutch telecom operator PTT
(now KPN), until it became obsolete in the 2000s.
As of 2009, Spendex-40 has been declassified.
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The image on the right shows a typical Spendex-40 unit. It is housed in
a very robust military-grade case that is completely TEMPEST-proof.
The handset is placed on top of the unit and connects to the telephone
with a metal DIN connector on the left. Just below that connector is
a 25-way D-type connector for the connection of the fax unit.
Telephone numbers are entered on the black keypad, located on the right.
Just above the keypad is a red 8-digit numerical LED display. The photographs
below clearly show the TEMPEST screen in front of the display.
A large black button, to the left of the keypad, allowed switching between
secure and non-secure communication.
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The Spendex-40 features a high-grade advanced crypto-algorithm that takes
its message keys from two sources: a pre-loaded set of keys, plus a so-called
Crypto Ignition Key (CIK). The pre-loaded keys were entered using a
so-called fill device or filler, which connected to the
Fill-socket on the front panel.
The CIK acted as a personal and group key and was connected to the CIK-socket,
also on the front panel of the unit (not shown in the picture).
The ZEROIZE-key, hidden behind a small panel, was used to clear all
keys immediately in case of an enemy-attack.
At the rear of the unit are the connections for mains power and the telephone
line (9-pin sub-D). Also present at the rear is a 25-way sub-D for the connection
of an analog modem, allowing secure computer connections over a standard telephone
line (PSTN). A backup battery, to retain the current keys, is hidden behind a small
lid at the right.
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This rather unique image shows the Spendex-40 with the
Crypto Ignition Key (CIK) present at the front panel.
This was the normal operating condition.
The CIK contained a very complex electronic pseudo random number
generator and each unit had its own built-in unique ID number.
This was done to guarantee the authenticity of the sender of a message,
and to allow the phone to be used in an authorised group.
In most cases, the CIK was a rather large black cylindrical 'blob' that
was plugged into the front of the Spendex-40. In some cases the CIK was
red (see the 5th image below).
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Key material for the Spendex-40 was produced by an external military-grade
key sequence generator. The keys were then distributed and downloaded into
the relevant Spendex units, using a military key filler (or: key fill device).
The image on the right shows a typical KYK-13 key filler attached to the
Spendex-40. Several keys (for a longer period of time) could be pre-loaded
this way. The appropriate key was selected from the keypad of the Spendex.
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This image shows a standard Canon matrix printer of the early 1980s
connected to the 25-way sub-D socket on the left of the Spendex-40.
This way, digital information or fax images could be transmitted
directly.
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The basic Spendex-40 unit is an unclassified item (UNCLASS).
It becomes a restricted item as soon as the keys are loaded
(with a fill device) and the CIK is present.
In the event of an enemy attack, the user would use the ZEROIZE
key to flush all keys.
For security reasons, Philips supplied Spendex-40 units with different
cypto algorithms to different customers. Spendex unit used by, say the
Dutch PTT, would not communicate with the units supplied to the Army.
As of November 2009, Spendex-40 is no longer a secret device.
At present we have no further information about the Spendex-40.
If you have one of these machines available of if you have access to a
user manual, please contact us.
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