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Data USA NSA Saville KIV-7 →
The KG-84 measures 38 x 19.5 x 19 cm and weights approx. 10 kg.
Its form factor allows two units to be installed side-by-side
in a single 19" rack space. All controls are at the front,
with the configuration settings hidden behind a hinged lid.
All connections – with the exception of the U-229 key FILL socket –
are located at the rear.
The KG-84 was manufactuered in the United States
by Bendix Communications Division, Pulse Engineering
and E-Systems (now: Raytheon).
The image on the right shows a typical KG-84A
that has been in service at NATO
until at least 1992.
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The KG-84 (A/C) has a wide range of configuration options, most of which
are hidden behind the hinged lid
that covers the upper half of the
front panel. In asynchronous mode, it can handle data rates between
50 and 9600 baud. In synchronous mode – using the internal clock –
it can handle data up to 32,000 baud, and with an external clock connected
it can even go up to 64,000 baud.
Furthermore, the KG-84 is suitable for full-duplex, half-duplex and
simplex communication.
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The KG-84 was developed in 1983 and was first introduced with the US Army
and the US Navy in early 1984.
Following the John Walker Incident
— in which the KW-7 cipher machine had been
compromised for many years — the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
also introduced the KG-84 on its main communications
circuits [6].
In 1988, the improved KG-84C was introduced, which offered several
advantages over the KG-84 and KG-84A, including an improved handling
of synchronisation on unstable HF radio links and the ability to handle the
European telex protocol.
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The device replaced earlier and ageing encryption systems, like the
KW-7,
KG-13,
KG-30,
KG-33
and the KG-34.
The KG-84 was also used by NATO
and, from 6 November 1989 onwards,
by the Government of Australia [8].
The price for a single KG-84A unit in 1988, was US$ 5000.
From the mid-1990s onwards, KG-84 was gruadually replaced
by the smaller and more versatile KIV-7 —
announced as an embeddable KG-84 module —
which has the form factor of a CD-ROM player.
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The diagram below provides a quick overview of the controls at
the front panel of the KG-84A.
The upper half is covered by a hinged lid, behind which the
configuration of the device can be set.
Below the lid is the ON/OFF switch, the INITIATE switch and
a compartment for the backup battery, which is needed for retaining
the keys when the device is not powered externally.
To the right of the battery compartment is the ZEROIZE switch.
Activating this switch — pull out and push it down —
purges the cryptographic keys instantly. As the KG-84 uses the highly secret
SAVILLE cryptographic algorithm, its keys are 128 bits long
(120 key bits plus 8-bit checksum).
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This means that a regular DS-102 compatible FILL device
– such as the KYK-13 – can be used to transfer the keys.
The KG-84 can hold up to four such Traffic Encryption Keys, or TEKs,
selectable with a rotary switch at the bottom left.
The image on the right shows a regular KYK-13 fill device
connected to the U-229 FILL socket at the bottom right of
the front panel of the KG-84. To transfer a key, the MODE selector of the
KG-84 should be set to FILL-V and the desired key compartment should be
selected with the rotary switch at the bottom left of the front panel.
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Next, the corrsponding key compartment on the KYK-13 should be selected,
after which the INITIATE button is pressed to start the transfer.
Up to four keys can be loaded this way. Once all keys are installed,
the MODE selector is set to the desired mode of operation, and the
KYK-13 is removed again. The FILL socket is normally covered by a
rubber cap, to keep its contacts clean.
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- KG-84
Initial version of the KG-84 Dedicated Loop Encryption Device (DLED),
introduced in 1984.
RS-232 serial interface. Single-ended data signals.
- KG-84A
Improved version of the KG-84.
Suitable for use over landlines, microwave links and satellite.
Supports TRI-TAC switched networks,
RS-232 or RS-449 serial interface (strap selectable).
Single-ended or balanced control signals. Addition of X-VAR mode.
Improved remote keying.
The device featured on this page, is of this type.
- KG-84C
Same as KG-84A, but with improved HF capability, out-of-sync detection,
asynchronous ciphertext, plaintext bypass and European Telex protocol.
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The KG-84 is housed in a die-cast aluminium enclosure that mesasures
38 × 19.5 × 19 cm and weights just over 10 kg.
The interior is accessible from the top and from the bottom, by removing the
bolted panels. The case has several
shielded compartments for full RED/BLACK separation.
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At the bottom are two backplanes:
one for the BLACK side and one for the RED side. Printed circuit boards (PCBs)
are inserted into this backplane from the top of the device.
The diagram above gives a clear overview of the PCBs and the compartments
into which they are installed.
The compartments at the rear hold the PSU and the
physical line interface. The compartments at the front hold the controls
and their wiring to the backplane. At the centre are three further
compartments: one for the black side, one for red and one for
the interface between them.
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With the exception of the Power Supply Unit (PSU), all board are
removable and have a metal tag with their ID and serial number at
the upper edge. They can be extracted by folding out the two plastic levers
and lifting the board upwards. Only two boards are marked CCI (in earlier
versions they were marked: CONFIDENTIAL). These boards contain the
custom-made chips that hold the SAVILLE encryption algorithm.
They are identical to the ones found in the
KY-68 crypto phone.
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The simplified block diagram below shows the working principle of the
KG-84.At the left is the black side, which is connected to the outside
world. This is usually an (insecure) telephone line or (microwave) radio link.
At the right is the red side, to which the (secure) equipment is connected.
Each side (black and red) has its own power supply unit (PSU), input/output
circuitry (I/O) and control (CTL). At the centre (the grey area) is the
bridge that connects the red and black sides.
The bridge is also responsible for distributing the clock signals (CLK)
to both sides without loosing the red/black isolation. The (full-duplex)
crypto-logic is located at the red side (CCI).
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Below is an overview of the various plug-in cards of the KG-84a, complete with
a description of their function. Note that two boards are marked CCI, which means
that help hold classified parts. The individual chips (custom-made by RCA) on
these boards are also marked CCI (confidential).
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ID 1
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Part No
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Description
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E-EWA
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?
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RED PSU
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Z-AMW
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?
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Main Power Supply Unit (PSU)
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E-EQA
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ON315904
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Line interface
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E-EQB/1
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?
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BLACK PSU
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E-FNP
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ON278616
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RED I/O board
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E-EQU
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?
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CCI board
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E-FNJ/1
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?
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RED timing board
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E-FNO
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?
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Control No. 1 board
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E-FNN/1
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ON278620
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Control No. 2 board
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E-EQQ
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?
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CCI board
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E-FNM
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ON278624
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RED/BLACK interface (bridge)
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E-FNL
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ON278628
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BLACK timing board
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E-FNK
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?
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BLACK I/O board
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E-EQY
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ON278480
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Central X-tal oscillator at 6.144000 MHz
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This is the ID number printed on the label at the edge of the PCB.
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Device Link encryption device Model KG84, KG-84A, KG-84C NSN 5810-01-146-3260 Developer US National Security Agency (NSA) Manufacturer Bendix Communications Division,
Pulse Engineering,
E-Systems (now: Raytheon) Years 1982 - 1995 (used well after 2013) Successor KIV-7 Algorithm SAVILLE Key 128 bits (120 bits with 8-bit checksum) Keys 4 Speed 50 — 9600 baud (async), 32,000 baud (sync), 64,000 (ext sync) Power 24V DC, 110V AC, 220V AC Temperature 0°C — +55°C MTBF 69,000 hours Dimensions 38 x 19.5 x 19 cm Weight 10.4 kg Cost US$ 3600 per unit (1988) (no longer in production)
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C-11828/U Remote Control Unit (RCU), P/N OM363501-501 ? Remote Indicator Unit (RIU) PWA E-ENK FSK Modem (internal for KG-84A only) - 1990 PWA E-EWW Type 1 modem (internal for KG-84A only) - 1990 FPA Fixed Plant Adapter (19" rack for fitting two KG-84A units) UC Update counter (to be added to the FPA) CAU Crypto Ancillary Unit (out-f-sync detection, resync, verification)
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5810-01-146-3260 KG-84A 5995-01-097-7556 24V DC power cable 5995-01-097-7555 220V AC power cable 5995-01-097-7554 110V AC power cable 5995-01-247-5734 UGC-74/KG-84A interface cable 5995-01-213-9648 UXC-74/KG-84A interface cable
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TM 11-5810-309-10 Operator's Manual TSEC-KG-84A TM 11-5810-309-23 Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance DLED KG-84A TM 11-5810-308-24P Organizational, Direct Support and General Support Repair Parts
and Special Tool List, DLED, TSEC/KG-84A TM 11-5810-377-10 Operator's Manual TSEC/KG-84C TM 11-5810-377-23 Unit and Intermetiate Direct Support Maintenance KG-84C KAO-184/TSEC Operating instructions for TSEC/KG84/KG-84A KAO-210/TSEC Operating instructions for TSEC/KG-84C KAM-410/TSEC Limited Maintenance Manual for TSEC/KG-84/KG-84A KAM-411/TSEC Theory Textbook, TSEC/KG-84/KG-84A KAM-412/TSEC Maintenance Troubleshooting Manual, TSEC/KG-84/KG-84A KAM-504/TSEC Limited Maintenance Manual for TSEC/KG-84C KAM-505/TSEC Maintenance Troubleshooting Manua, TSEC/KG-84C MI-07115B/2 Modification of AN/TYC-5A(V) to accept TSEC/KG-84 equipment
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CCI
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Controlled Cryptographic Item
Expression, introduced by the US
National Security Agency (NSA), for equipment
that handles information, secure communications, or otherwise contains a
cryptographic component which performs a critcal communications security
(COMSEC) function. CCI items are subject to special
accounting controls and required markings.
➤ Wikipedia
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DLED
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Dedicated Loop Encryption Device
General purpose encryption device for the protection of data streams
between two fixed points (point-to-point).
The KG-84 is such a DLED.
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Document obtained from Google.
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- Antonio Anselmi, KG-84 evidences
Blogspot Diario SWL I5-56578 Antonio.
30 January 2016.
- Comandant of the Marine Corps, USMC TSEC/KG-84 Encryption Equipment
Marine Corps Order 2040.8. C2CT-dt. 7 November 1988. 1
- Cryptome, DOE Crypto Equipment Guide
28 October 1997. KG-84A General Purpose Encryption Equipment. 1
- Cryptome, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications
Washington, 2 November 1998. 1
- Cryptome, Detailed COMSEC Procedures
Appendix B of [4]. FOUO. 42 pages. 1
- Cryptome, Letter from CIA officer with a gripe
5 October 1998. Retrieved May 2019. 1
- Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction 2221.3C
14 May 1984. 1
- USA/Australia, Austrialian Treaty Series 1989 No 29
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the USA,
concerning Defense Communications Services. Canberra, 6 November 1989. 1
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Tuesday 24 August 2010. Last changed: Saturday, 04 March 2023 - 15:59 CET.
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