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SBO Cold War Netherlands
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O&I
Operatiën en Inlichtingen
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The Dutch Stay-Behind Organisation during the Cold War
In the Netherlands, a secret
stay-behind organisation (SBO) was formed
just after WWII had ended, in 1946 or 1947. For many years,
this organisation
was known as O&I, the abbreviation of Operatiën en Inlichtingen
(Operations and Intelligence) 1
although it was also known under other names.
Nevertheless, the organisation is often (wrongly) identified as
Gladio,
after the Italian branch of the SBO.
Although O&I had a good relationship with
NATO
and with sister organisations in other countries,
like Germany, Belgium and the UK, it was the only fully autonomous and
fully self-controlled stay-behind organisation in Europe.
It was neither controlled by NATO,
nor by any other foreign agency, including
MI6
and the CIA
[5].
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Each agent had a set of manuals, coded information about agents, transmission
schedules, code material, financial means (e.g. money and gold), a radio
transmitter and receiver (spy radio set)
and sometimes a weapon and ammunition.
These items were usually stored inside one or more containers
that were hidden by the agent, e.g. in the attic or burried in the garden.
Some of this material was also stored in other places, known as caches,
both in The Netherlands and abroad.
In total, between 100 and 200 agents were involved in the Dutch network,
which consisted of a staff and field agents [1].
The staff of ± 20 people was involved with organisational tasks,
administration and instruction and training
of field agents. In the event of a war with the
Warsaw Pact countries,
the staff would be moved to a safe base in the UK, North America
or Canada.
The field agents were divided into organisers and
operators. An organiser was specialised in reconnaissance,
forging ID papers, sabotage, information gathering, psychologic warfare,
organising illegal press, etc. In the event of a war, the organiser
would autonomously built his own clandestine network.
Each organiser was assigned an operator
who maintained contact with the staff abroad.
The operator was specialised in operating the radio equipment,
coding and decoding messages,
sending burst messages
in morse code and
preventing interception and direction finding.
Initially, the agents would operate in pairs (organiser and operator),
but later, when automatic radio stations were deployed, the single-agent
concept was introduced [5].
In 1990, after stories about subversive actions by the Italian SBO
'GLADIO' had reached the press, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
confirmed the existence of a Dutch SBO. He also stated that,
unlike the other SBOs, the Dutch organisation was autonomous and was
not controlled by NATO, MI6
or the CIA.
Less than two years later,
he saw himself forced to dismantle the organisation.
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Although the official name for the Dutch SBO was O&I,
it is sometimes referred to as I&O,
even by people who worked for the organisation [5]
and by government officials [10].
In 1985, the name was changed to A&B,
but the old names O&I and I&O also remained in use.
In the scope of this page we will use O&I.
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Dutch stay-behind radio sets on this website
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During WWII, The Netherlands had two independent intelligences agencies,
both of which operated from England under the authority of the Dutch
Government in exile:
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- BI - Bureau Inlichtingen
This was the Intelligence Bureau.
It was controlled by the Dutch Government in
exile (London) and was similar in nature to the British MI6.
The BI was tasked with gathering military, political and economic
intelligence, mainly on Dutch soil.
- BBO - Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten
This was the Special Operations Bureau.
It operated directly under (and was largely
controlled by) the British
Special Operations Executive (SOE).
The BBO's task was to set up a resistance organisation
and execute sabotage operations in occupied Netherlands.
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BI was led by
Colonel Jan Marginus Somer
who had already developed plans for a secret section of the
Dutch General Staff just before WWII under the name
GS III C. In the event of war, the main tasks of the section
would be active intelligence
gathering (espionage) and stay-behind. By 1939, Somer had successfully
initiated GS III C, but it was too late to be of much use during the war.
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Once the war was over, Somer rejuventated his GS III C section, albeit in
a less ambitious form than he had anticipated. The section was actually the
post-war variant of the wartime BI.
For the stay-behind division of his section, he needed communication equipment.
After using a variety of Army surplus equipment (mainly from Belgian stores),
he managed to secure a budget of NLG 20,000 (EUR 9100), for the development of
the first (and only) Dutch spy radio set:
the ZO-47.
The order for the development was given by Somer in 1946 to Philips/NSF.
Development took most of 1947 and by the end of that year the radio was
ready for its first field test. In early 1948, the first batch of 100 units
was delivered to the BI. By that time, Somer had already been appointed
head of intelligence in the Dutch Indies and was succeeded by
J.J.L. baron van Lynden. This intelligence section (i.e. the former BI)
would later become known as the 'I'-service.
➤ More about Jan Marginus Somer
➤ More about the ZO-47 radio set
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Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten
BBO
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Around the same time (1946), a former secret agent of the wartime BBO,
Henk Veeneklaas,
had developed his own plans for a stay-behind organisation.
With the lessons learned from WWII, for example the now famous Englandspiel
that had cost more than 54 lives, he was convinced that The Netherlands
needed a strong and well-organised resistance in the event of another war.
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When he conveyed his plans to the Dutch Royal Commander-in-Chief Prins Bernhard,
the latter put him in contact with Louis Einthoven, the newly appointed
head of the Dutch Bureau of National Security
(BNV, later: BVD, now: AIVD).
Einthoven was easily convinced and allowed him to setup an effective
operations unit which was actually the post-war varant of the wartime
BBO.
The new organisation did not officially exist and became the direct
responsibility of the Dutch Prime Minister. This secret operations
section would later become known as the 'O'-service.
➤ More about Henk Veeneklaas
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During the first years, the 'O' and 'I' service operated independently
from each other, without each of them knowing about the other's
existence. The I-service was controlled by the Ministry of Defense
and reported directly to the Minister.
The O-service on the other hand, fell under the
Ministry of General Affairs and reported only to the the Prime Minister.
Around 1948, the SBOs in various European countries
formed the Western Union Clandestine Committee (WUCC) in which thoughts
were exchanged about the theoretical structure of a stay-behind organisation.
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After NATO was established in 1949, it took over the military aspects of
the Western Union as well as (in 1951) the tasks of the WUCC.
At NATO's headquarters – known as SHAPE – a Special Projects Branch (SPB)
was established, which was tasked with Unorthodox Warfare (UW).
During peace time, the so-called Clandestine
Planning Committee (CPC) would form the link between the SPB and the
various SBOs. The CPC would later be renamed
Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC)
and eventually to Allied Coordination Committee (also abbreviated ACC).
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In 1961, the first attempts were made to merge the activities
of the O-service and the I-service0. This plan met with strong
opposition from the founder and initial leader of the O-service,
Henk Veeneklaas.
He argued that the two services were too different to be merged.
In his opinion, the I-service was a military organisation
whilst the O-service was purely a civil one. In 1967, the problem
was solved by discharging the heads of both services and appointing
a new coordinator.
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From this moment on, the Dutch clandestine service was known as
O&I (sometimes called I&O by its members), with the two services
working independently, but under supervision of the coordinator.
The main office of the organisation was housed in villa Maarheeze
in Wassenaar (near The Hague) under the cover of the
Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB).
The former BI (by now the I-service) was housed here since May 1945.
The image on the right shows villa Maarheeze in later years (2014).
It is currently used as a high-profile office building and can be rented.
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For critical situations, the agents carried a so-called
Green Card that warranted them from interference by the civil
or military police. If they were discovered, e.g. by the police whilst
'on duty', they were allowed to present the Green Card. The police officer
could then call a special telephone number in The Hague
to verify a password that was specified on a separate card.
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O&I was able to carry out its duties more or less undisturbed throughout
its existence. Nevertheless, some of its caches (hidden storage
places with weapons, money and communications equipment) were discovered
over time. The following incidents reached the Dutch press:
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There were other incidents that reached the press, such as the discovery
of a large amount of weapons with Dutch criminals Sam Klepper en John
Mieremet in Alkmaar (Netherlands) on 29 August 1991. According to some
newspapers, these weapons were robbed from a cache in The Hague (Scheveningse
Bosjes). In 1983/84 the robbery was discovered and reported to the police,
but it was decided not to take any further action. Although it was suggested
that the stay-behind network was involved in this criminal activity,
no proof to support this claim was ever found [5].
In 2007, the Dutch Minister of Defense confirmed to the Dutch Parliament that
the weapons cache had indeed been robbed but that
a recent investigation had revealed that the weapons found with the criminals
were of a different brand and/or model than those taken from the cache [10].
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From the beginning of the clandestine network, the organisation had used
a wide variety of radio equipment, mainly from Dutch, UK, US
and German origin.
This equipment is described in detail further down this page.
While suitable for communication between agents and
the government in exile, it was largely incompatible with the
equipment used by SBOs in other European countries.
In the early 1980s, the Allied Clandestine Committee, or ACC —
attached to NATO headquarters SHAPE in Mons (Belgium) — approved the
development of a pan-European communication system for all
European stay-behind organisations,
including some neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland.
The new clandestine radio station
was developed by manufacturer
AEG Telefunken in
München (Germany) —
in close cooperation with
MI6 in the UK — under the codename HARPOON.
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As the Dutch O&I urgently needed a replacement for the ageing
FSS-7,
and the new HARPOON radio sets were not expected any time soon,
the Racal PRM-4150 (TITHE)
was choosen as an intermediate solution.
It was already in use
with the British Armed Forces, the Diplomatic Wireless Service (DWS) and
stay-behind, and had a proven track record. It became known
as the DZO-81; Data Zend-Ontvanger
(data transceiver) 1981.
It consisted of a transmitter, a receiver, an automatic antenna tuner
and a coding device, mounted together in a Samsonite briefcase.
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The DZO-81
no longer required the ability to send and receive messages
in morse code, as the coding unit could automatically send and receive
messages at pre-determinded time schedules. As a result, separate radio
operators were no longer required and the organisation adopted the
single-agent concept, in which the intelligence agent
(i.e. the organiser) also operated the radio.
By the late 1980s, the new HARPOON system,
developed by AEG Telefunken,
was ready to replace all existing clandestine radio sets in Europe.
By this time, the Berlin Wall
had already fallen (1989) and the
Soviet Union
was about to collapse (1991). As a result, HARPOON would be the final
set.
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The official designator of the HARPOON system was
FS-5000, but in the
Netherlands it was known as AZO-90, short for: Automatische
Zender-Ontvanger (automatic transceiver) 1990.
The AEG-Telefunken designator was
SY-5000.
In total, The Netherlands received 110 HARPOON
units between 1988 and 1990.
The initial five units were received in November 1988. Two of these
were used for training operators. The next shipment of 35 units was received
in December 1988 [4].
The remaining 70 were received in the 2nd half of 1989 and in the 1st quarter
of 1990.
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In 1990, the first international Long Range (LOR) tests were carried out,
and the results with the FS-5000 sets were promising. By March 1991, all sets
ordered by the various countries had been delivered.
As the Dutch organisation had already developed a computer system
and software for secure message processing — back in 1989 —
the Netherlands became the first country with a fully automated FS-5000
store-and-forward message handling system [4].
The LOR tests and the software deveopment took place at NEBAS,
the Dutch base station at Villa Maarheeze
in Wassenaar (near The Hague) where O&I had been located
since the beginning, under the cover of the
Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service
(Inlichtendienst Buitenland, or IDB).
In December 1991, NEBAS was moved to a more convenient location
with less public exposure in Utrecht
where a completely new building had been erected at the premisis of the
KMar, the Royal Dutch Military Police, at Fort De Bilt.
Here they were able to install a large Log-Periodic antenna.
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In 1985, after the discovery of the weapons caches near Heythuysen (1980)
and Rheden (1983), the organisation was reorganised. It was decided
that the caches would be cleared and would only be refilled when there
was actually a clear threat of war. In the meantime, the weapons and explosives
were under control of the Dutch Military Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee,
or KMar).
At the same time, the organisation was renamed to A en B (A and B),
with A being the former O (Operations) and B being the old I-branch
(Intelligence). Nevertheless, most people kept using the old name O&I.
In order to avoid confusion, the tasks of the two branches were
reconfirmed by (then) Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers as follows:
A-service (Operations) B-service (Intelligence)
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- Psychological warfare
- Mental resistance of the population
- Sabotage
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- Intelligence gathering
(military, political, economic) - Infiltration and exfiltration
of people and goods
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Despite the various incidents with caches in the 1980s,
the existence of the organistion remained secret for a long time.
All that changed when in 1990 the Italian SBO 'GLADIO' started appearing
in the headlines.
Gladio was suspected of involvement with some ultra right-wing
incidents and terrorist attacks. As a result, (then) Italian Prime
Minister Guilio admitted on 3 August 1990 the existence of a secret SBO
– named Gladio – and revealed that it operated under NATO control.
The indicents raised international public awareness of the secret
organisations, and resulted in a series of public hearings and investigations
in countries like Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and The Netherlands.
On 13 November 1990, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers publicly confirmed the
existence of a Dutch SBO, but emphasized that it was completely
independent and was not (and had never been) under control of
NATO,
MI6,
the CIA
or any other foreign organisation.
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After the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989 and the subsequent collapse
of the Soviet Union (USSR)
in 1991, the threat of a possible Soviet
invasion was no longer deemed realistic and the necessesity for a
secret stay behind organisation had more or less disappeared.
Meanwhile, in 1990, the new European
HARPOON radio system (AZO-90, FS-5000)
had become available and The Netherlands was the first country to
to have implemented a fully automated message handling system.
In 1991, it became evident that the existing premises in Wassenaar
attracted too much attention. In December of that year the Dutch base
station NEBAS was moved to a more convenient location at Fort de Bilt
(near Utrecht).
Despite all this, Prime Minister Lubbers felt he had no other option than
to shut down the entire operation. In 1992, he sent a personal letter to
the agents of both services in which he thanked them for their
loyalty and insisted that any details remained secret.
Members of the A-service (the former 'O') also received a personal
letter from Prins Bernhard who said he had warm feelings for the
organisation and had followed them with great interest from 1942
until now (1992). The administrative closure took until 1994, but
once that was handled, the secret Dutch SBO was history.
The former members receive a small pension for their services,
which is handled by the Quia Oportet Trust. 1
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'Quia Oportet' is Latin for 'Just in case'.
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Eye witness: Herman Schoemaker
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Former stay-behind radio instructor, 15 December 2013
For obvious reasons, members of the network had to maintain strict
secrecy during the operational years of the organisation (1946-1992).
This continued after the network was dismantled in 1992. Although
it is now over 25 years ago, the network has not been declassified
by the authorities yet. Nevertheless several former members have
decided to break their code of silence.
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An example of such a former agent is Herman Schoemaker from Soest
(Netherlands). He was a radio instructor at O&I – the Dutch SBO –
and worked for the network from the early 1960s right until the
end in 1992.
In June 2013 he graduated at the University of Utrecht with a thesis
on the Dutch stay-behind O&I [5].
On the last opening day of our
special exhibition Secret Communications,
in Duivendrecht (near Amsterdam) in November and December 2013,
we had the honour of meeting Schoemaker and listen to his
exiting Cold War stories first hand.
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To our surprise, he was accompanied by two other former agents
who were involved in the same type of work. Although one of them
was an old friend of Schoemaker, he only learned about his involvement
in the network when he accidently recognized his voice during a training.
Schoemaker was trained as a radio specialist and he in turn trained other
agents in the use of the various radio sets. During the early days
(i.e. in the early 1960s) this involved using
morse code
and the use of the FSS-7 (SP-15) spy radio set
and its burst encoders.
Especially the use of morse code, the transmission frequency schedules
and the use of the cryptographic code material,
required a long and intensive training, something that
was greatly reduced when the automatic DZO-81
and later the fully digital AZO-90 (FS-5000, HARPOON)
radio sets were introduced.
➤ Review of Herman Schoemaker's visit
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Over the years, the Dutch stay-behind organisation used a variety of
radio sets, ranging from wartime valve-based British spy radio sets,
to fully automatic digital long-range radio stations with built-in
encryption.
Below is an overview of all radio sets that are known to have been
used in this context in The Netherlands.
Please note that not all O&I personnel will have used
all of these radios in an operational context.
The use of the following sets has been confirmed.
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The Type 3 Mark II, commonly known as the B2, is arguably the most
well-known spy radio set of World War II. It was developed in 1942 and was
used throughout the war by many agents that were dropped over occupied
territory. It is heavy and is housed in an 'unobtrusive' travel suitcase.
After WWII, the B2 was used for several years in some European countries
(e.g. the Netherlands)
by the stay-behind organisation (SBO) [12].
➤ More information
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The Type A Mark III, commonly known as the A3, was much smaller than
the B2, but was suitable for short to mid-range communication only.
Like the B2 is was a left-over from WWII, but unlike the B2, it was much
smaller.
The radio was usually installed inside a small children's evacuee suitcase,
such as the ones that were issued during WWII in the UK
[12].
➤ More information
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The Mark VII, commonly known as the Paraset, was developed
in the UK around 1941, and was used during WWII by agents that were
dropped over occupied territory. It is either housed in a metal or a
wooden enclosure, and required the valves (tubes) to be removed before
transport.
The Paraset was one of the most dangerous radio sets produced
by the British. In reception mode, the signal from its local
oscillator was strong enough for the Germans to locate the agent by
means of Radio Direction Finding (RDF).
➤ More information
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The S-Phone was a short-range full-duplex UHF radio system,
developed in 1942 in the UK for use by the SOE
and by resistance fighters, during air drops and landings
on occupied territory.
As the radio only worked in the line-of-sight (LOS), it was
relatively safe against interception. In the early years of
the Dutch SBO, it was used during infiltration and exfiltration
exercises [12].
➤ More information
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Another left-over from WWII that was used by the Dutch SBO, is the
British Mk.119. It was developed in late 1940 by
HMGCC
(now: GCHQ)
at Hanslope Park (UK), and was also used by Special Forces (SF) and by
the British Diplomatic Wireless Service (DWS) for communication with the
British Embassies overseas.
The radio was available in two versions: a three-piece solution in which
transmitter, receiver and power supply unit (PSU) were each housed in a
separate container, and a single-piece variant in a wooden case,
shown in the image on the
right.
The B2, A3 and Mk.119 were the last
wartime long-range radio sets that were used by the Dutch SBO, before
moving to newly developed post-war equipment from Dutch, German and
American manufacturers.
➤ More information
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It was decided to replace the leftovers from WWII by a
new spy adio set that would be developed in the Netherlands.
In 1946 the order was given by
Colonel J. Somer
of GS III C (foreign intelligence)
to Philips
for a total of NLG 20,000
(EUR 9100).
Designated ZO-47, the first 100 units were delivered to O&I
early in 1948, followed by the slightly improved ZO-47/01
a couple of years later. The radio is suitable for sending
messages in morse code on a limited
number of channels.
➤ More information
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In the late 1940s, it was decided to make the switch to foreign
equipment, such as the RT-3 shown in the image on the right.
Designated RS-1, the set was
developed for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and is housed in three watertight containers.
As the RS-1 (RT-3) was produced for the CIA in large quantities,
it was cheaper for The Netherlands to buy it 'off-the-shelf',
rather than to develop its own spy radio sets.
➤ More information
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the older radio sets were
gradually replaced by the German
SP-15 spy radio station, which was known
in The Netherlands as FSS-7.
The station consisted of a crystal-operated transmitter, a very sensitive
receiver and one or two power supply units, all stowed in a watertight green
container.
In a midlife upgrade the set was enhanced with a synthesizer and
an electronic burst encoder.
➤ Dutch version of the FSS-7
➤ Standard SP-15
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In 1981, O&I selected the British PRM-4150
as a gap-fill solution between the ageing FSS-7 and the
forthcoming FS-5000 (HARPOON),
which was expected for 1990. The PRM-4150 was already in use in other
European countries for diplomatic and military communications.
In The Netherlands it was known as DZO-81.
➤ More information
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The official designator of the HARPOON system was
FS-5000, but in the
Netherlands it was known as AZO-90, short for: Automatische
Zender-Ontvanger (automatic transceiver) 1990.
The AEG-Telefunken designator was SY-5000.
In total, The Netherlands received 110 HARPOON units between 1988 and 1990.
The initial five units were received in November 1988. Two of these
were used for training operators. The next shipment of 35 units was received
in December 1988 [4].
The remaining 70 were received in the 2nd half of 1989 and in the 1st quarter
of 1990.
➤ More about the AZO-90 (FS-5000)
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The Dutch stay-behind organisation was commonly known as O&I, which was
the abbreviation of Operatiën en Inlichtingen (Operations and Intelligence).
The organisation was only known to the Prime Minister and on some occasions the
Minister of Defense. It was offcially part of the General Staff of the Dutch Army
and operated from Villa Maarheeze in Wassenaar (Netherlands), under the cover
of the Foreign Intelligence Service — Inlichtendienst Buitenland (IDB).
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Organisation I
Intelligence
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At the height of the Cold War,
the I-service counted some 200 people.
Between 20 and 30 of them were responsible for the organisational tasks,
the administration and training (the staff). In the event of a war, the
staff would be moved to a safe country. The rest were the agents that
would stay behind in the occupied country. The following 17 bureaus were known:
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Bureau
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Dutch
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English
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I.
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Secretariaat en transport
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Administration and transport
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II.
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Lijnen
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Escape routes from occupied Netherlands
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III.
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Inlichtingen en netwerken
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Intelligence and networks
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IV.
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Radioverbindingen
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Radio communication
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V.
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Reproductie
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Reproduction
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VI.
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Radiotechniek
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Radio engineering
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VII.
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Inlichtenoperaties via IDB
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Intelligence via Foreign Intelligence
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VIII.
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Codezaken
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Cipher issues
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IX.
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Veldveiligheid
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Field safety
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X.
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Luchtfiltratie
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Air infiltration and exfiltration
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XI.
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Zeefiltratie
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Sea infiltration and exfiltration
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XII.
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Speciale netwerk
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Special network
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XIII.
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Short-term netwerk
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Short-term network
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XIV.
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Comptabiliteit
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Accountancy
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XV.
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Financiële netwerken
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Financial networks
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XVI.
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Meteo netwerk
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Weather reports
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XVII.
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Documentatie/falsificatie
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Counterfeit documents, micro-photography, etc.
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Organisation O
Operations
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This part of the organisation was responsible for the operational field
work, such as sabotage, raids, liquidations, etc. In case of war, the
organisation had access to weapons and explosives that were stored in
hidden locations, the so-called caches. Approximately 40 such caches
were present in the Netherlands, but these were dismantled after
discoveries in 1980 (in Heythuysen) and 1983 (near Rheden).
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The Dutch stay-behind organisation was known under the following names:
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O&I Operatiën en Inlichtingen (Operations and Intelligence) I&O Inlichtingen en Operatiën (Intelligence and Operations) I/O Alternative notation for I&O O/I Alternative notation for O&I A en B New name since 1985: A and B A&B Alternative notation for 'A en B' NCS National Clandestine Service
Clandestine Organisatie in Nederland
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International trainings and exercises
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PACKAGE II International ACC exercise, Jan 1976 (UK) ORIGAN I International ACC exercise, May 1977 (UK) ORIGAN II International ACC exercise, May 1988 (USA) STOVER Training program (radio), June 1980 (Italy)
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Below is an attempt to create a timeline of events that are
related to the Dutch stay-behind organisation. For this timeline,
information is used from the sources listed below [1], but
in particular from the PIVOT report by Dick Engelen [1]
and the 2013 thesis of Herman Schoemaker [5] the latter of whom
was a radio instructor for the organisation for many years.
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1945
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End of WWII
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1946
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Plans for stay-behind organisation in The Netherlands.
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1947
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Development of ZO-47 radio set
Philips/NSF develops the first clandestine radio sets
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1948
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First 100 radio sets
The first radio sets are delivered early in 1948.
These are probably ZO-47 manufactured by Philips/NSF.
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1949
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Founding of NATO.
4 April 1949.
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1966
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Compromise
Discovery of weapons cache in the Wieringermeerpolder.
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1980
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Compromise
Discovery of weapons cache in Heythuysen (Limburg).
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1981
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Introduction of the DZO-81 transceiver.
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1983
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Compromise
Discovery of weapons cache near Rheden.
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1984
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Weapons stolen from a cach near The Hague (Scheveningse Bosjes)
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1985
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O&I renamed to A&B
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1989
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Fully automatic radio system AZO-90 (Harpoon)
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1989
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Fall of the Berlin Wall
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1990
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Italian stay-behind, known as Gladio, uncovered
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1990
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Dutch stay-behind uncovered
13 November 1990.
After questions in parliament, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers confirms
the existence of a Dutch stay-behind organisation.
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1991
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End of Warsaw Pact
The Warsaw Pact falls apart, which is effectively the end of the Cold War.
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1991
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Move to new location
In December 1991, the organisation is moved from Wassenaar to Fort de Bilt,
near Utrecht. Here a large Log-Periodic antenna is erected.
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1992
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Compromise
Discovery of weapons and communications equipment in
an abandonned house at the Parkstraat in Utrecht.
Among the many weapons and ammunition found, were two
ZO-47 radio sets.
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1992
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Shutdown
The Dutch stay-behind organisation O&I is officially dismantled by
Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. In 1994, all administrative tasks have
been completed and the network is officially closed down.
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Timeline of radio equipment
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The diagram below shows which radio sets and burst encoders were used
and (on average) when they were introduced. Only the ZO-47
was developed and built in The Netherlands, all other sets came from
the USA, Germany and the UK. At the launch of the network, around 1946,
leftover spy radio sets from WWII were used, such as the
Type 3 Mark II (B2), Type A Mark III (A3),
S-Phone, Mark VII (Paraset) and
Mk 119. They were abandonned as soon as the
ZO-47 became available.
Note that the RS-6+
is an upgraded version of the RS-6, in which
the vibrator pack s replaced by an electronic circuit. In the same
vein, the FSS7+
is an upgraded version of the FSS-7 (SP-15) in which a
frequency synthesizer, developed exclusively for The Netherlands,
replaced the crystals.
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- H.J. Bekker, Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken
History of the Section General Affairs (Dutch) (uncensored).
31 December 1981. #CM302703.
- Dr. D. Engelen, De Nederlandse stay behind-organisatie in de koude oorlog 1945-1992
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, Ministerie van Defensie & Rijksarchiefdienst/PIVOT
The Netherlands, National Archives, Institutional Investigation (Dutch).
The Hague, 2005. ISBN 90-5909-0489.
- Herman Schoemaker, Een geheime organisatie in beeld
De Nederlandse stay-behind-organisatie, geheim, onafhankelijk en zelfstandig?
The Dutch stay-behind organisation, secret, independent and autonomous?
(Dutch).
Thesis under supervision of Prof. Dr. Bob G.J. de Graaff,
Utrecht University. 7 June 2013.
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- Dr. D. Engelen, De Nederlandse stay behind-organisatie in de koude oorlog 1945-1992
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, Ministerie van Defensie & Rijksarchiefdienst/PIVOT
The Netherlands, National Archives, Institutional Investigation (Dutch).
The Hague, 2005. ISBN 90-5909-0489.
- Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken, Hoofdstuk VI, Consolidatie
History of the Section General Affairs, Chapter 6, Consolidation. (Dutch)
Describing the period May 1970 - December 1981.
Dutch National Archives. Top Secret. 1
- Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken, Hoofdstuk VII, Voortgang
History of the Section General Affairs, Chapter 7, Progress. (Dutch)
Describing the period December 1981 - May 1987.
Dutch National Archives. Top Secret. 1
- Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken, Hoofdstuk VIII,
Van Stroomlijning tot Ofheffing
History of the Section General Affairs, Chapter 8,
From Streamlining to Dissolution. (Dutch)
Describing the period May 1987 - January 1994.
Dutch National Archives. Top Secret. 1
- Herman Schoemaker, Een geheime organisatie in beeld
De Nederlandse stay-behind-organisatie, geheim, onafhankelijk en zelfstandig?
The Dutch stay-behind organisation, secret, independent and autonomous?
(Dutch).
Thesis under supervision of Prof. Dr. Bob G.J. de Graaff,
Utrecht University. 7 June 2013.
- Frans Kluiters, personal correspondence.
November-December 2008.
- Wim Kramer, Mysterie in Utrecht
RAM Magazine 136, Oktober 1992. pp. 17-19. 2
- Wim Kramer, Mysterie in Utrecht na jaren opgelost
RAM Magazine 191, Oktober 1997. pp. 32-35. 2
- Museum Verbindingsdienst (Royal Dutch Signals Museum)
Retrieved February 2009.
- W. van Middelkoop, Antwoord op Kamervragen 2060725030 en 2060725260
Answers by the the Dutch Minister of Defense to questions raised by Dutch Parliament.
9 November 2007 (Dutch).
- Bart Olmer, Ex-instructeur onthult bestaan ondergrondse verzetsgroep...
Interview with Herman Schoemaker at the event of the presentation of his Thesis [5].
De Telegraaf (newspaper, Dutch), 9 November 2013. p. TA1.
- H.J. Bekker, Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken
History of the Section General Affairs — uncensored version of [2].
31 December 1981.
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Partly declassified and released in 2007 under the WOB
— the Dutch equivalent of the FOIA.
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Reproduced here by kind permission from the author Wim Kramer.
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Wednesday 08 April 2015. Last changed: Thursday, 01 August 2024 - 17:56 CET.
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![Front side of the 'green pass' with serial number 259, held by Herman Schoemaker [5].](img/groene_pas_259_0.jpg)
![Rear side of the 'green pass' with serial number 259, held by Herman Schoemaker [5].](img/groene_pas_259_1.jpg)
