EUROPEAN AXIS SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II
AS REVEALED BY "TICOM" INVESTIGATIONS
AND BY OTHER PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS
AND CAPTURED MATERIAL, PRINCIPALLY GERMAN

VOLUME 7--GOERING'S "RESEARCH" BUREAU

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Chapter I - Introduction

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1. Short summary of the history, organization, and operations of the FA. Goering's Research Bureau, called "Goering's" by TICOM because of its final responsibility to Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, was composed of about 2000 persons. The main office, under the direction of a Gottfried Schapper who held the civil service rank of a Ministerial Direktor, was divided into six main sections (Hauptabteilungen) indicated by Roman numerals, and fifteen sections (Abteilungen) indicated by arabic numerals. In addition there were one branch office and at least four Regional Offices besides an undetermined number of intercept stations. Main Section IV, of about 180 persons, was the cryptanalytic branch and handled that portion of the raw material (possibly 20%) which was in code or cipher. Goering's Research Bureau was charged with providing the Nazi state with reliable diplomatic, economic, and political information to be derived from monitoring all internal German telephone, telegraph, and wireless communications (including such communications from within Germany to foreign countries); foreign wireless communications of a commercial and diplomatic nature; foreign press and news broadcasts and speeches of politicians; and from the study of available newspapers and periodicals. To secure the raw materials for this project it operated its own intercept and monitoring service. The Research Bureau collaborated with the Abwehr and Gestapo in censoring all communications in Germany and in German occupied territory. The information produced was distributed in the form of finished reports (of various types) to Goering and Hitler and to the top Nazi officials and interested departments of the government. The home location of Goering's Research Bureau was Berlin, Charlottenburg 2, Schillerstrasse Nrs. 116-124.

2. The discovery of the FA by TICOM. The Research Bureau appears to have been the Nazi Party Cryptanalytic Agency. The existence of this intelligence agency was unknown to British and American sources prior to its discovery by TICOM. TICOM Team 3 learned of the existence
of such an agency while questioning members of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section at Burgescheidungen on 28 April 1945 and on 9 May 1945 Team 1 discovered the abandoned quarters of this organization in the barracks near the airfield at Kaufbeuren, 50 miles southwest of Munich. A file of administrative papers, including a directive, signed by Gottfried Schapper, the head of the bureau, were found which gave the organization at that time and served as a basis for further investigation.

3. Scope of this paper and indication of sources used. This report is an historical description of the RLM/FA and an evaluation of its operations. For convenience the abbreviation FA will be used in this paper whenever Goering's Research bureau is mentioned. (This is the standard reference used by the Germans themselves for the organization.) It will be seen that the FA was founded by Goering and protected under the cover name of Reich Air Ministry Research Bureau (Reichsluftfahrtministeriums/Forschungsamt) although the FA was actually not an operational division of the Air Ministry but was the Nazi Party rival of the military signal intelligence agencies. In Appendix I details of its cryptanalytic successes are given. Appendix II is a translation of the Kaufbeuren directive which sets forth the organization of the FA at the end of the war and indicates the content of other papers. Appendix III is an autobiography of Schapper, the last head of the FA. Tab A contains all known personnel of the FA, names of all other persons mentioned, identification of all places, terms, titles and abbreviations used, and a bibliography of references consulted in this paper. It is intended to present the details of its organization and to indicate the nature and success of its operations in as objective a manner as possible. The report is based on the various TICOM/Interrogation Reports1 and as such is considerably subjective in that the interests of the interrogators and the opinions of the informants are reflected. Objective check of the statements elicited in the interrogations is possible from miscellaneous TICOM Documents.

1. For convenience, these TICOM/Interrogations will be referred to as I in the footnotes.
which reveal details of cryptanalytic success and liaison with other agencies\(^2\); press reports\(^3\), various non-TICOM Prisoner of War Interrogations\(^4\), related entries in Intelligence reports\(^5\), and in particular by various administrative memoranda found at Kaufbeuren\(^6\). Since the primary commitment of the TICOM Teams lay with German cryptanalysis their investigations properly covered German methods, successes, techniques, and equipment in that field. In the case of the FA, however, cryptanalysis was but one of several activities and, as the following pages will show, by no means the major


\(^3\) IF 188. Four stories based on telephone conversations between high German officials at the time of the Anschluss by an Associated Press reporter, Daniel De Luce, appeared on 4, 5, 6, and 7 November 1945 with a Berlin dateline. These stories not only revealed the extent of the telephone monitoring carried on by the FA but also indicated its success in reading a French diplomatic system at that time. An effort has been made to secure the original documents on which these stories were based. TICOM representatives in Europe, however, have reported 21 May 46 that the De Luce material "did not indicate any French Code as having been broken nor did it give any information on cryptanalytic techniques nor did it indicate any successes with Allied Ciphers".

\(^4\) Both the CSDIC (Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Center) and regular PW Interrogations have yielded considerable information and opinion on the Forschungsamt. Information so obtained must be carefully controlled with consideration of the informant's probable reliability. The opinion expressed is often tinged with jealousy or based on rumor and as such is of slight value even as gossip.

\(^5\) The Weekly Intelligence Summary (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater) has reported on the FA (Number 12 of 4 October 1945), IF143, and referred to its wire-tapping activities (Number 15 of 25 October 1945), IF132.

\(^6\) Ticom Document 240 (FILM 34).
one. It happened that the FA personnel available for questioning did not give the impression of having been exceptionally competent cryptanalysts. The grandiose claims made by Goering and Schapper are balanced by the generally low opinion of the FA appearing throughout the Interrogations. A final evaluation of the FA's cryptanalytic work lies somewhere between these extremes. Such presentation, with the FA cryptanalysis placed in terms of the overall operations of the FA, constitutes the following report.

71. 108 and 143.

8Final Report of Team 1, Appendix 2, (I 15).
Chapter II - The History and Organization of the FA

A. The History of the FA.

The Founding of the FA..............................................4-5

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The FA as a Nazi organization (relations with
Himmler through Schellenberg of the Reich
Main Security Office - RSHA)..................................6-10

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4. The Founding of the FA. The establishment of the
FA was brought about by Göring, himself, although the actual
conception of the role of such an organization seems to be
due to Schapper, the last head of the FA, and his predeces-
sors, Schimpf and von Hesse. Independent statements by
Göring and by Schapper are available which are in agree-
ment on the details of the planning and founding of the FA.
Confirmation and slight supplementation is found in the
interrogations of ex-members of the FA and of individuals who
had dealings with it.

9I 108 I 143 pp 12 ff.

10 Final Report of Team 1, Appendix 2 (I 15)

11 Members of the FA include senior specialist Dr. Martin
Paetzel, specialist Otto Fingerhut, specialist Hoeckley
Oden, Dr. Heinz Klautschke, principal specialist Seifert
(I 25 and 54) and Lother Guenther (GSDIC, MU 500, HQ 7th
Army, Ref. No. 708, 29 January 1945; I 46). Various members
of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section gave an outline
of the organization of the FA (I 1) and Mettig (I 131)
of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces was acquainted with its outline--
Mettig to a surprising degree.
The first interrogation of Goering is of a general nature and is filled out by the second interrogation. The opinion of the Interrogators that Goering talked readily and reliably but had no mind for details appears to be correct in so far as his statements can be checked.

The first interrogation summarizes Goering's statements as follows:

This name (Forschungsamt des Reichsluftfahrt Ministeriums-German Air Ministry Scientific Research Office) is merely camouflage as this office was not concerned with the Air Ministry in any way. It was conceived and founded by Goering in 1933 for the purpose of a central control over the collection and dissemination of vital information of military, commercial, and political nature. This information was obtained by the monitoring of all communications systems such as domestic and foreign radio, cables, etc.

Previous to 1933 the Foreign Office had established a similar monitoring system, for intercepting wireless messages, and the police had monitored telephone conversations etc. but Goering wanted an organization of his own which could handle all phases under one central control. By various means he was able to obtain the services of some of the most able men in Germany for the construction and administration of this project. Goering was responsible authority, issued all directives, and dictated the policy. Under-Secretary Paul Koerner was second in command while the actual managing director was Ministerial Director [Gottfried] Schapper.

12I 108, ii: "FW Goering cannot be considered a strictly truthful character when discussing personal relations, possessions, etc. and when an investigation of his income and fortune is made. At the same time he has been considerably shaken in his bloated belief in his own grandeur. He talks readily and, if is believed, reliably on questions about the Nazi state, personalities, the Air Corps, conduct of the war, etc. He is a drug addict. He has no mind for details and apparently considered such beneath him."

In fairness to Goering it should be noted that, according to an Associated Press story in the New York Times of 23 November 1945, Goering possesses the highest "I.Q." of the Nuremberg War Criminals (138) and is assuming "leadership" in their deportation at the trials.
The main office was situated in Berlin . . . . Employees were civilians, at least in the responsible positions but the total number of employees, distribution etc. were minor details with which source did not concern himself.

The information was collected, decoded, classified and disseminated. All ministries were recipients of the finished product, receiving however, only that material which concerned their own particular province. . . . . Goering's group was most successful due to the outstanding ability of his experts and technicians.\textsuperscript{13}

This is expanded in the second interrogation where Goering is quoted to the effect:

That Signals Intelligence had been of very great value, and particularly so as regards the product of the RLM/Forschungsamt. He had personally founded the FA in 1933; it had never in actual fact been a part of the Luftwaffe or of the RLM, but as some sort of camouflage was desirable for an organization of this nature it had been nominally attached to the German Air Ministry for the purpose of "cover". In 1933 he had discovered to his astonishment that no organization existed within the Reich to deal with cryptanalysis on anything approaching a broad general basis. In its early days the FA had covered all fields of traffic—economic, political, diplomatic, private, military, etc.

The work of the FA comprised two almost completely separate activities, firstly, that of telephone monitoring, and secondly that of interception and cryptanalysis. . . .

He was very satisfied with the FA, which was a first class organization employing the very best cryptanalytic staff and with intercept arrangements for taking all available traffic. He thought that they were able to deal with 32 different languages. The virtues of the organization lay in the fact that they did not

\textsuperscript{13} I 108 pp 2 and 3.
confine themselves to any particular field of intelligence and had no political axe to grind, nor ideology to follow; they were just given the technical requirements to intercept and break traffic and to disseminate intelligence.

He did not control the work programs of the cryptanalysts; they had a general directive to take everything and to read everything; further detailed direction was left to the head of the FA. If it was a question of needing additional staff they applied to State Secretary Koerner who also dealt with all of their higher administrative matters. The first head of the FA had been Kapitanleutnant Schimpf; he had been succeeded by Prince Christoph von Hessen, who had eventually returned to the Luftwaffe; the post had then been taken over by Herr Schapper who had always belonged to the organization and who was probably the best technical man of them all. Goering used to visit them only once every year because the organization worked so well on its own. The high level channel of responsibility was from Schapper to Koerner and from him to the Reichsmarschall himself.14

Schapper, in the outline of the FA which he prepared for Team 1 at Augsburg on 1 June 1945, presents essentially the same facts as does Goering, although Schapper claims a greater role for himself:

The Forschungsamt.

1) Founded: April 1933

2) Reasons for the foundation: My work in the cipher bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry (1927-1933) had shown me the incompetence of the methods employed there so that I, with several of my colleagues, resigned from it and proposed to Goering the formation of an Intelligence Bureau for the Reich Government that should be free of departmental ties and extraneous influence.

14I 143 pp 12-13
3) Name: Goering consented, and only requested the camouflaging of the bureau under the name Reichsluftfahrtministerium-Forschungsamt. My request, that we should, however, be independent of the Air Ministry, was granted: the bureau became independent, with its own administration and establishment; it was also not subordinated to the Reich Air Ministry (Staatssekretär Milch), but allocated for supervision to Staatssekretär Koerner of the Prussian Ministry of State; finance was regulated directly from the (Prussian) treasury (Finanzhof).

4) The nature of the bureau: The bureau was consequently a civilian institution. For reasons of security a small number of its officials was put into German Air Force uniform as Armed Forces Officials for the duration of the war. This was done only with those officials who had to cooperate with outside authorities.

The research bureau restricted itself to intercepting and processing signals that could not [ sic] be intercepted by technical means. "15

Schapper, as will be seen from his autobiography (Appendix III), had served in an administrative capacity as a Signal Intelligence Officer during the First World War. His position in the Defense Ministry is not clear although he stated that it was administrative. His record as a Nazi is perhaps even more significant. He stated that he knew Goering well from the First World War. He was a member of the "National Society of Berlin to Rescue the Reich from the Revolution," and as such took part in the Kapp-Ludendorf Putsch. Because of trouble with "communists" he migrated to Munich where he joined the Nazi Party in 1920, resigning after the 1923 Putsch but rejoining in 1931. From 1933 to 1937 or 1938 he admits to membership in the Allgemeine SS (General Elite Guard). All of these facts are significant for an understanding of the position of the FA and Schapper's role in it.

The statement of Seifert, Principal Specialist in charge of Evaluation in the FA, indicates that the first head of the FA, Schimpf, was also responsible for its formation:

15Schapper, IF 15 Appendix 2.
The bureau was founded in 1933 at the instigation of a certain Kapitän (?) Schimpf in order to provide diplomatic and commercial intelligence of an absolutely reliable kind by the monitoring of telephone, cable, and wireless links from the Reich outward and in the case of wireless from all countries, and to insure by the setting up of a new and independent organization the elimination of all bias which might have resulted from association with the old established ministries. The objective of the department was the production of a purely objective and scientific picture of the worldwide political and commercial situation.16

And again Seifert and Paetzel, Senior specialist in charge of Cryptanalytic Research for the FA:

Q. When was the Forschungsamt founded?
Seifert: In 1933

Q. Who initiated it?
Seifert: It was started by Korvetten Kapitän Schimpf who committed suicide.

Q. Who was the driving force behind your organization?
Seifert: It was started under the Air Ministry with the intention of its being an inter-service organization.

Q. Where did Goering fit into the Organization?
Seifert: The Fuehrer directed Goering to run this organization. I do not know more as I only joined at the end of 1933.
Paetzel: I joined at the end of July 1933. The organization had then been running for two or three months.17

Still another interrogation may be cited which associates the FA with the Nazi Party:

With the advent of the Nazis came the creation of the Forschungsamt which was directly responsible to Göring. This was placed under the command of a Kapitän-Leutnant Schimpf who had previously been Naval Liaison Officer

16 I 54 p 3.

17 I 25 p 3. It should be pointed out that the Air Ministry was established by a decree of 5 May 1933 (RGBI. I, p.241). The "two or three months" of Paetzel, and Schapper's "April" are not a discrepancy but furnish additonal evidence that the FA was separate from the Air Ministry ab initio.
at OKH/Chi. Forschungsamt was really concerned with the interception of all communications - including telephones, telegraphs, postal correspondence, television (sic) and radio - which might help the Nazi Party to perfect its hold on life within Germany.\(^\text{18}\)

5. **Relations of the FA with other cryptologic agencies.** From the reports cited above it seems clear that the FA was created by Goering at the suggestion of Schapper and Schimpf. (As Schimpf was the first head of the organization his influence with Goering was probably greater than that of Schapper.\(^\text{19}\)) In spite of the cover name, the FA was not a part of the Air Ministry and the chain of command from Goering through Prussian State Secretary Koerner (rather than Milch of the Air Ministry) to the head of the FA emphasizes this independence. The first head was Kapitaen-Leutnant Schimpf, formerly liaison officer for the cipher section of the Defense Ministry (Reichswehrministerium/Referate G?) to the Navy cipher section, whose full name is unknown and who is reported to have committed suicide.\(^\text{20}\) His successor was Prince Christoph von Hesse, who is only known as head of the FA.\(^\text{21}\) Gottfried Schapper, the final head of the FA, became director in the fall of 1944. Both Lt. Col. Mettig and Dr. Puttenhain, Senior Specialist, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), refer to the recruiting of Defense Ministry cryptanalytic personnel by the FA and imply that this was the cause of some ill feeling between the two

\(^{18}\) I 85 p 2 (This is a joint interrogation of Specialist Flicke, Technical Inspector Pokojewski, and Staff Inspector Hatz of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

\(^{19}\) Schapper, IF 15, refers to "Goering, whom I knew well from the first world war." There is no evidence of Schimpf's relations with Goering.

\(^{20}\) Seifert, I 25, says that he committed suicide. Goering, loc.cit., merely states that he died.

\(^{21}\) Quenther, IF 46 p 3, states that Schapper's predecessor was "Prince von Hesse, who died in the fall of 1944". Goering, loc.cit., states that he returned to the Luftwaffe, and gives his Christian name.
organizations. Schapper had served under Fenner, the head of the "Language Division" of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), the successor of the Defense Ministry and Seifert had also been a member of the senior organization although his position there is not known. The FA was the last entrant into the cryptanalytic field and it had the reputation of paying its employees "exceptionally well."

Relations between the FA and the cipher section of the Defense Ministry and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) were always strained. A letter of Dr. Paschke of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers 23) of 19 February 1934 is available which discusses plans for liaison between the cipher section of the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Office and specifically excludes the FA:

On 19 II Capt Oschmann called on me to talk over with me technical details concerned in our (proposed) collaboration.

22Mettig, I 131 p 3: "The FA was a part of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium and was directly subordinate to Staatsekretar Koerner, and through him, to Reichsmarschall Goering. The head of this department was Ministerialdirigent Tschapper [sic] who, prior to the establishment of the FA, had worked in OKW/Chi and served under Ministerialrat Fenner. Another former official of OKW in the FA was Regierungsrat Seifert. Collaboration between the FA and OKW/Chi was poor. This well may have been due to the personal differences between Ministerialrat Fenner and his former subordinate Tschapper." Huettenhain, I 21 p 1, refers to "some personnel transferred to the FA from OKW/Chi. This was not well received in the latter organization as they were regarded as people who has 'deserted the ship'." Also cf. Schapper's own statement, supra, that he left the service of the Defense Ministry because of his dissatisfaction with their antequated methods.

23Werther, I 121 p 12. Werther was company commander of 7 Ln REGT 353.
In the course of the conversation he mentioned an utterance by his chief, Corvette Capt. Patzig, to the effect that all cryptanalytic connections with the FA should be dropped since cryptanalytic work did not belong in the province of the FA.

Details of the collaboration were then drawn up in broad outline.

Berlin, 19 II 1934

Draft (The draft of the proposed collaboration then follows)

signed: Paschke

There is no evidence that liaison on cryptanalytic matters was ever achieved between the two organizations. As will be shown below, however, the FA did supply the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Signal Intelligence Agency with intercepted traffic and was represented on that agency's committee on cryptographic security. Huettenhain reveals that this lack of cooperation extended to the IBM machinery developed by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) which was offered to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA), the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command (OKL/LN Abt 350), the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command (OKM 4 SKL/III) but not to the FA:

Owing to personal friction, political considerations (Nazi "taint") and other unsavory matters there was no liaison with the FA and they were not offered the machinery developed by OKW. Fenner was particularly prejudiced against Goering's party - in any case the general impression was that they achieved very little--they employed no mathematicians?

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24 DF 17. This is a translation by Dr Pettengill of T 3273, a series of letters by Paschke and other Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section personnel.

25 I 31 p 10. Actually Paetzel of the FA was a mathematician.
Mettig stated that the FA attempted to take over the radio broadcast monitoring carried out by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and there were rumors that the "empire building" policy of the FA had resulted in an attempt by the FA to take over the entire agency after the disgrace of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) in the 20th of July 1944 plot.27 (Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS -Elite Gaurds- actually did take over the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) through Walter Schellenberg, the head of Amt VI of the Reich Main Security Office-Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA).28 The members of the FA who were interrogated gave no hint of any such intention of the part of the FA. There was necessary exchange of information on official keys and key changes used for intercommunication between the FA and section X of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces at least in 1945.29 The FA was also reported to have received a copy of all traffic intercepted by all other agencies.30

For further details of the relations between the FA and the other cryptologic agencies the concluding chapter on liaison, under the specific agency, may be consulted. In general the best relationship existed with the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section but there is evidence of technical exchange with the Navy, Army, and Air Force Signal Intelligence Agencies. Finally, the relationship between the FA and the Abwehr (the German Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) and with the Gestapo can only be mentioned. The point of contact came

26 Mettig I 86 p 2
27 Mettig I 86 p 2
28 I 86 p. 2. Cf. IF 164 and discussion in following paragraphs.
29 Ticom Doc 240, Items 33, 38, 39, 40, 43 and 44, contain the messages from OKW/WNV/Chi to the FA with key changes for January through May 1945.
30 I 82, P. 5, Flick, Pokojewski and Hatz of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
in the field of telephone monitoring. The official regulations for German war time censorship of all communications are available. In them the war time responsibility is given to the Abwehr but the peace time role of the FA and of the Gestapo are indicated and it is apparent that the monitoring stations of the FA continued in operation.31 There is insufficient evidence, however, to show the location of FA telephone monitoring stations. It appears that they cooperated with the Abwehr Wehrkreis organization throughout all of Germany and occupied territory. Evidence to be presented below shows that the Gestapo eventually took over the telephone monitoring of the Abwehr and of the FA in the middle of 1944. It is probable that the existing organization continued with the reports being routed to Amt IV of the Reich Main Security Office.32 Finally, among the administrative papers found at Kautbeuren was a handwritten rough draft of a letter which appears to have been a cover letter for material to be forwarded, possibly from FA-9, to the Stapleit in Prague. The material was an undetermined number of "Czech messages". It is not known if these messages were read through cryptanalysis on the part of the FA but an additional instance of liaison between the FA and the police is afforded.33 The messages were for the attention of a Herr Rummel.

31 Die Überwachung des Nachrichtenverkehrs im Kriege, TF 29. Ticom Document 240 contains various administrative memoranda of the FA, among them orders from Abwehr Wehrkreis VIII (at Breslau) warning of an increase in Russian Agent activity with the approach of hostilities to Breslau. Also contained in these memoranda is indication that the telephone monitoring stations in Prussia and Poland were operating at the end of 1944. However, it should be noted that they were still controlled by the FA.

32 This is to be assumed from Goering's statement that the Gestapo took over telephone monitoring, confirmed by Goering and by Schellenberg, who differ only as to the date at which this occurred. Fuller discussion of this point is to be found in the following section which deals with the relations between the FA and the Reich Main Security Office. See also the discussion of the FA field stations in the section on the Operational Organization of the FA.

33 Ticom Document 240 item 42.
6. The FA as a Nazi organization. From consideration of the evidence it seems proper to regard the FA as the Nazi party signal intelligence agency and it seems reasonable to assume that it was created by the party to provide a counterpart for the various service Signal Intelligence Agencies and that of the Foreign Office on whose loyalty the Nazi's could not rely at the date the FA was erected (1933). This is supported not only by the definite suspicions expressed in the interrogations but by the history and organization of the FA. It has been seen that the original founding of the organization was due to friendship between Goering and Schapper, probably between Goering and Schimpf, and presumably between Goering and Prince von Hesse. Besides the statement of Flick et al, attributing the creation of the FA to the Nazis there is support from Goering who relates the assignment of all telephone monitoring (within the Reich) to the FA by Hitler at the end of 1933; reference to coordination by the Regular Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo) of telephone monitoring with the FA; evidence that the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) referred cryptanalytic problems to the FA; and indication that Himmler tried to

\[34\text{It is known that other members of the von Hesse family were friendly with Goering and other Nazis and held high diplomatic positions. Cf IF 188.}
\[35\text{See above Para 4. (I 85).}
\[36\text{I 143 p 13.}
\[37\text{I 91 p 2 Robert Schlaka (General-Major), the chief of communications in the main office of the Ordnungspolizei, reported coordination with the FA in 1935-1937. Also see Sauerbier, I 162, for Orpo-FA liaison on Agents.}
\[38\text{I 54 p 4, the interrogation of five members of the FA captured at Flensburg, reports that: "None of the five knew anything about a cryptanalytic section of the Waffen SS. Seifert thought that there couldn't have been such a thing as he had seen intercepted cipher telegrams sent to them from the RSHA which RSHA had no facilities for deciphering. Paetzell, on the other hand, remarked somewhat dryly that from what he knew of the stubborn independence in this matter of the various services and the Foreign Office he would not be at all surprised if such a thing did in fact exist. However, he had no knowledge of it". Sauerbier, I 162 pp 3-4, states that the Ordnungspolizei sent him Russian agent traffic. Werther, I 121 p 13, confused the FA and the Elite Gards and seemed to think that an Elite Ggard Officer had attempted to recruit his services for a cryptanalytic agency headed by a former Naval officer (Schimpf?).}
take over control of the FA.\textsuperscript{39} (As will be shown, Himmler, through Schellenberg's arrangements with Koerner who controlled the FA finances in the Prussian State Ministry, had achieved some control of the FA in 1945). On 24 January 1945 the Gestapo (Amt IV of the Reich Main Security Office), sent an agent's message to Section 9 of the FA (the section dealing with Slavonic languages) with a request that it be deciphered.\textsuperscript{40} According to Mettig, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme command of the Armed Forces was originally a part of the Abwehr "Defense", actually the espionage and counter intelligence agency of the Defense Ministry, subsequently incorporated in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and eventually taken over by Himmler):

\begin{quote}
\ldots in the days of the Reichswehr, OKW/Chi was organically part of the Abwehr and the liaison had been maintained. The directives given by Keitel's Office were very general, they were amplified and made more specific by Canaris and Hanson (heads of the Abwehr), who briefed the head of OKW/Chi. He then decided cryptanalytic details. After the 20th of July 1944 the Abwehr was taken over by the RSHA. (This chronology is not correct, see discussion below). Briefing was then done by Schellenberg. At one time there was a row with the FA, provoked by the empire building policy of that body. The FA wished to take over OKW/Chi. It was emphasized that Schellenberg had no control over the FA and (perhaps for that reason) would have preferred to take over OKW/Chi himself. The RSHA or the SS did not maintain any cryptanalytic bureau of their own.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

The exact form which Schellenberg's control of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) took is not certain and need not be gone into at any length here. As will be seen from the interrogation of Schellenberg given next, the acting heads of that agency expressed agreement with his views and appeared

\textsuperscript{39} Guenther, IF 46.

\textsuperscript{40} Ticom Document, Items 11 A & B, (Film 34).

\textsuperscript{41} I 86 p 2
to model their evacuation plans on his.\footnote{42} Schellenberg's evidence concerns both his efforts to take over the FA and to control the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.\footnote{43}

VIII. Deciphering.

24. The deciphering department of the OKW under Colonel Kettler supplied daily great quantities of deciphered messages which were called ever since the time of Ludendorff "V.N" (Verlaesliche Nachrichten). They were printed on thin white paper and carried a broad red edge. Schellenberg had established relations with the deciphering department at the OKW in 1942, because he wanted to exploit the experiences of the Wehrmacht both in "W/T Abwehr" as also in the development of German coding "methods" for his own use. Schellenberg made very early contact with General Fellgiebel, chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as General Thiele, department chief under Fellgiebel. Both these men were killed in connection with the 20th of July. Schellenberg's relations with Theile were very good. They had come close to one another through their joint work in the Board of Directors of the Standard Electric company (the former American Holding company). Theile, after the arrest of Fellgiebel had become Fellgiebel's successor. In this capacity he wanted to bring a long discussed plan to fruition, i.e. unite all deciphering services of the Reich in one hand and to put them at the exclusive disposal of the Geheime Meldedienst for systematic interpretation and use.

25. Apart from the German Foreign Office which possessed an extensive deciphering service, the Forschungsamt was above all the organization which had not only

\footnote{42}{For discussion of the relations of the Abwehr, the RSHA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces see Vol. III Para. 2.}

\footnote{43}{IF 164. This is a long and rambling report of an interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, SS Brigadefuehrer in charge of Dept VI of the RSHA, SD Amt VI Ausland.}
an extensive - one could almost say 100% - telephone monitoring service, but also a very large deciphering department. It also monitored normal broadcast services. (This was done too by the Foreign Office, the Propaganda Ministry, and the OKW!) The Forschungsamt also embraced an extensive press and publication interpretation department as well as one of the best existing archives. Schellenberg maintains that apart from the obvious reasons of saving personnel and other grounds of economy, the Amt Ausland together with the deciphering department of the Forschungsamt was really a domain of the Geheime Meldedienst. Schellenberg also saw that there was no need for the telephone monitoring service to be independent, but that it really belonged to the domain of Amt IV. Since 1942 Schellenberg insisted that Himmler should speak with Goering who had reserved the Forschungsamt as his purely personal field of work and to insist that he (Schellenberg) should take the Forschungsamt over.

26. Himmler always refused this. He declared that Goering would never do it as he believed that he would thereby make him (Himmler) and the SS too strong. Another very strange argument was added to this: Himmler said Goering should bear vis-a-vis Hitler the responsibility for all telephone monitoring, for if he, Himmler, would do this Hitler might suddenly conceive the idea that his own telephone conversations were overheard. Schellenberg thereupon acted independently. He needed the results both of the Forschungsamt as a whole and of the work of the deciphering department of the OKW. At the beginning of 1943 Schellenberg had come to a working agreement with Secretary of State Koerner (Prussian State Secretary, in charge of FA financial matters) and at the end of 1944 Koerner was prepared to concede to Schellenberg the Forschungsamt with the exception of the telephone monitoring, which since the middle of 1944 belonged to Amt IV. Sandberger and Rapp began in February 1945 to take the Forschungsamt over. Owing to the general development of the situation, however, this move did not take practical shape. After the arrest of Theile, a general, whose name Schellenberg has forgotten, was appointed chief of the Wehrmachtsnachrichtenverbündungen. A general called Gimmler was put in charge of the Amtsgruppe (deciphering and W/T Abwehr). Colonel Kettler during
the time when Theile was in prison had continued to seek close contact with Schellenberg. Schellenberg put Kettler in touch with Dr Schmitz who entered and remained in close relationship with him. Kettler modelled his evacuation measures on those of Schellenberg because he had always thought, just as Gimmler had done, that Schellenberg by taking over the Forschungsamt would acquire decisive influence over the deciphering department.

A brief review of Nazi history with particular attention to the Elite Guards of Heinrich Himmler will clarify the position of the Reich Main Security Office of that organization and, it is hoped, indicate the integral role of the FA. The Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) was organized in 1936 as a single headquarters for the Party Security Service (Sicherheitspolizei, SIPO). The Security Service was in its origin a purely party organization. It was in fact the intelligence army of the Elite Guards whose origin and history are relevant. The Elite Guards were organized in 1925 to act as the bodyguard for the leading men of the Party. In 1929 Himmler was appointed by Hitler as Reichsfuehrer SS and under his guidance the SS (Elite Guards) grew into the watchdog of the whole Party and the formations controlled by it. In June of 1934 the Elite Guards served as the executive agency in the purge. At this time the Elite Guards were made independent of their parent body, the Storm Troops (Sturm Abteilung, SA), whose head, Röhm, was one of the leading victims. At this time it was decreed that the Security Service alone should be responsible for Party political intelligence. In June of 1936 Himmler was appointed as chief of German Police and reorganized the police services, organizing the Party security services in a single Main Office, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, paralleled by a similar main office for the regular police, the Ordnungspolizei (or ORPO - Constabulary), the Ordnungspolizeihauptamt.

44 The account given in the above paragraph is taken from IF 216 B, Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst, Ultra/Zip/Pal 4 of 1/1/44. For details of the Ordnungspolizei organization see in Tab A. Note that the Ordnungspolizei are not a Party organization and were independent of Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg. This independence is seen in reported rivalry with both the Gestapo and the Abwehr and Radio Defense Corps (OKW/WS/Ag WNV/Fu III) in counter measures against Allied Agents (IF 176; and Volume 8 of these reports).
The RSHA, which now (April 1945) controls the whole German Secret Service for intelligence, sabotage, and security, both inside and outside Germany, is the GHQ of the Sipo and SD whose head, (Chef der Sipo und SD, abbreviated CDS), SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, reports directly to Himmler. Of the main German police, security, and special services, only the Orpo, or uniformed constabulary, is outside its control. The Sipo and SD between them comprise three services:

1) Geheimestaatspolizei (Gestapo)  
2) Kriminalpolizei (Kripo)  
3) Sicherheitsdienst (SD)

The SD is further subdivided into two departments, one collecting intelligence from outside the Reich, the other from inside Germany and occupied territory. The SD, both inside and outside Germany, is a fact finding department which takes no official action and tries to be as little known as possible.

The RSHA is divided into seven departments (Amtter) with the following official functions:

Amt I Personnel  
Amt II Administration  
Amt III HQ of SD within the Reich  
Amt IV HQ of Gestapo  
Amt V HQ of Kripo  
Amt VI Foreign Intelligence (Amt Ausland, head, Schellenberg)

As has been shown in the previous discussion, Amt VI took over the Abwehr, the intelligence agency of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, in 1944. This control was strengthened by the 20th July 1944 plot which marked the failure of the military to throw off the increasing dominance of the Party and Himmler.

The FA was created in 1933 when the Party first came into political control of the Reich. The emphasis laid by Goering, Schapper, and others on the supply of reliable "political" intelligence seems to imply that the FA was

created because the Party could not rely on the existing Service and Foreign Office organizations. Goering received the responsibility for this organization while Himmler directed the Elite Gaurd. Schellenberg's testimony to Himmler's unwillingness to infringe upon Goering's field even in 1942; evidence of collaboration on cryptanalytic matters, coupled with the lack of evidence that the Elite Gaurd organization possessed a cryptologic unit of its own; and the importance placed on the FA in Schellenberg's plans for a glorified intelligence service after the Party had completed its domination of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Intelligence (OKW/ABW and HR) and Signal Intelligence Agencies (OKW/Chi) indicate the real position of the FA within the Nazi organization. Additional evidence of the close relationship between the Elite Gaurds and the FA may perhaps be inferred from Schapper's admission that he joined the Allgemeine SS (General Elite Gaurds as distinct from the Waffen SS, Armed Elite Gaurd) in 1933, the time at which he left the cipher section of the Defense Ministry and cooperated in the formation of the FA.


Only a sketchy outline of the FA's operational history can be drawn. It was created in April 1933 and by the end of that year had been assigned the task of monitoring all telephone circuits within the Reich. It is rumored to have been concerned in the "blood purge" of 30 June 1934. At the time of the Anschluss (March 1938) the telephone monitoring and deciphering activities of the FA were in operation. A series of Associated Press despatches reveal monitoring of the conversations of Goering with various German diplomats and officials in Austria. Apparently the FA prepared a special copy of these records and presented them to Goering. The file containing this material was found in the ruins of the Air Ministry and a newspaper "story" based on them. Also indicated in the newspaper columns was FA success in reading messages from the French foreign Office to all ministers. It is probable that these messages were not read through cryptanalysis as Goering refers to the ciphers of the French Foreign Office at the Quai d'Orsay having been

46 See his "Curriculum Vitae" in Appendix 3.

47 Flicke, Pokojewski, and Hatz, I 85 p 2.

48 Cf note 3, Chapter 1, P. 3.
In September 1941 the FA produced a book containing the names of all foreign diplomats in Berlin, their partners in all conversations, and summaries of these conversations. The FA continued its work on available diplomatic and commercial material and press broadcasts throughout the war. Operations were hampered by bombing. On 1 November 1943 and again on 7 July 1944 the Schillerstrasse quarters of the FA were heavily bombed and after each bombing a part of the FA was evacuated. An administrative nucleus remained in Berlin at least until the closing of the Russian siege lines around that city. The Berlin offices seem to have always included the administrative and personnel sections and during the last months of the war special arrangements in addition to the normal liaison channels were necessary. As is to be expected, the organization fluctuated considerably during the final months of the war and only the paper organization, learned from the administrative directives found at Kaufbeuren, can be described. The move to Breslau seems to have left Main Section I

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50 This is an article from the Weekly Intelligence Summary #15, HQ, United States Forces European Theater containing information available from interrogation of a Major Johannes Gaenzer who was a member of Section III F of Abwehrstelle Berlin.

51 Faetzell and Oden, I 25: "The whole establishment was completely destroyed by bombing (in November 1943)." Schapper, IF 15, p. 22, stated that the FA moved to Breslau in December 1943. Guenther, IF 46, and Rentschler, IF 15, p. 18, stated that the move to Breslau was forced by the bombing of 7 July. It appears, therefore, that after each bombing further evacuation was necessary. Sauerbier, I 162 p. 4, stated that the move of Hauptabteilung IV to Breslau took place early in 1944 and remarked that working conditions in Breslau were poor and the work suffered in consequence.
and Schapper (or his predecessor, von Hesse) in Berlin. There is a directive dated 30 September 1944 at Breslau which is signed by Schrappler and is directed to all of the Main Sections except I. The directive itself is of passing interest as it contains a memo from the Abwehroffizier of Wehrkreiskommando VIII warning of the danger of enemy agent activity with the approach of the Eastern front to Breslau.

Various directives are available concerning the evacuation of Breslau. Evacuation was completed and the various offices in that city were closed down as of 26 January 1945. It seems from the evidence that the FA was organized into at least three Office-Branches (Amtesbereiche) in Berlin, Luebben (51°56' N 13°54" E, also the site of an FA intercept station) and Jueterbog, (51°59' N 13°40" E), the successor of the Amtesbereich Breslau. The Jueterbog branch was under the direction of Seifert and included Main Sections III, IV and V (Sections 4-13). It should be noted that Jueterbog was the last location of the FA known to the personnel of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section. As Jueterbog was also a location of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command it is possible that information held by various Army personnel about the FA was gained at this time. Luebben was the location of Main Section II and was responsible for administration of the various out stations. As Main Section I is not specifically mentioned it is to be inferred that it remained in Berlin, especially as Section I, charged with all security matters, is stated to be located there. Schapper, who signed the directives referred to above, dated them from Luebben. By early March a further movement of the FA had been effected and all of the Main Sections (less Section 15) had been reassembled at Kaufbeuren (47°53' N 10°37" E) with the organization indicated on the chart and from Kaufbeuren a small remnant of the FA moved on to Rosenheim (47°52' N 12°04" E). Within this

53 Ticom Document 240, item 37A.
54 Ticom Document 240 items 22 and 29.
55 I I, p 18.
56 IF 15, p.1. Kaufbeuren is approximately 50 miles southwest of Munich and Rosenheim is approximately 25 miles southeast of Munich. The air-line distance between Kaufbeuren and Rosenheim is roughly 75 miles.
period, either at the beginning of 1944 or the beginning of
1945, the telephone monitoring of the FA was given to the
Gestapo (Amt IV of the Reich Main Security Office). However,
the documents providing for the closing down of the Breslau
outstations reveal that telephone monitoring stations were
then (January 1945) still controlled by the FA. The
Breslau/Kaufbeuren/Rosenheim party was under the direction of
Schapper and this party remained the central body of the FA.
A document found by Team 1 in the FA quarters at Kaufbeuren
and signed by Schapper gives a reliable picture of the final
organization of the FA. The liaison officers responsible
for passing FA materials to the other ministries remained
in Berlin and a special section for evaluation was set up
under Seifert. A Berlin Branch Office and the Berlin Out-
station also continued to function. Five members of the FA
were transferred to OKM S SKL III (The Signal Intelligence
Agency of The Navy High Command) on 16 May 1945 where they
worked until arrested on 23 May 1945. These five men
were the departmental heads left in Berlin and it is obvious
that a carefully coordinated split into both a northern
and southern section of the FA had been arranged just as
had been done for the Signal Intelligence Agency of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi). Hopp and
Sandberger, the two men named by Schellenberg as "taking
over the FA" in February 1945, were last known by Schellen-
berg to have been in Flensburg and Marquardstein (near
Rosenheim) respectively. However, this is not necessarily

57 Ticom Document 240 item 22. Schellenberg, IF 164, stated
that all FA telephone monitoring was taken over in 1944.
Schapper, IF 15, stated that it was in 1945.

58 Ticom Doc. 240, Item 34, A-D. This document is translated
in appendix 2 of this report. It is clear from this direct-
ive that the Kaufbeuren group was the controlling body but
it is also clear that special arrangements for continued
service in Berlin had been made under the direction of
Seifert and that an adequate functioning organization had
remained there. As Rentschler is concerned in the directive
found at Kaufbeuren and was one of the last to leave Schapper
he was undoubtedly fully aware of the final organization and
deliberately misled the interrogators.

59 T 25; I 54; I 93, P 18.

60 The interrogators of these five members of the FA also
failed to discover that they had formed a special section
left in Berlin. This point only becomes clear from the docu-
ment found by Team 1.
due to any continuing connection with the FA. Rapp is stated to have been in charge of a "northern" section of Amt VI when the officer of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) were divided into northern and southern sections. 61 Sandberger was one of the key AMT VI officials and may be assumed to have accompanied the southern section.

The FA was originally located in Berlin, Charlottenburg, Schillerstrasse, 116/124, occupying a large building. 62 On moving to Breslau it took over the Hartlieb Barracks in Klettendorf. 63 At Kaufbeuren the FA was found by Ticom Team 1 to have been located in "six blocks" of a barracks near the Kaufbeuren airfield. 64 In the moves from Berlin the number of personnel decreased from the estimated 1500 to 2000 employed there. 65 Only some 450 persons continued on to Kaufbeuren and a mere 100 odd were left with Schapper at Rosenheim. 66 The administrative documents referred to previously contain evidence of a constant shuffling of personnel in the closing months of the war.

61 IF 164 p 35.
62 IF 15 p 18, Guenther, IF 46 p 1.

Guenther, IF 46, states that the FA occupied a "Flakkaserne" and the Pers Z.S. interrogees, I 1, state that the FA was in the Hartlieb Barracks.

D 21, the translation of a document giving distribution of work among the different cryptanalytic bureaus of the other German Armed Forces and Civil Departments, taken from a German Admiralty 4/SKL III folder entitled "Research Progress 1/12/43 - 1/11/44 "(Ticom Document No. T 519) gives as" #4 RLM/Forschungsamt at Breslau/Klettendorf: Crypt-analysis of diplomatic cyphers and GESTAPO matters. Collaboration with the Navy lately still only on fundamental questions of research." Ticom Document 240 item 32, Jueterbog, 2 January 1945 lists nine members of FA 9 who moved registered materials from "Klettendorf" to Jueterbog.

64 IF 15 p 16.

Rentschler, and Schapper, IF 15, and Seifert, I 54, give approximately the same figures.

66 IF 15, I 54.
special section was created in Berlin to deal with the closing down of the Breslau Forschungsleitungstelle and all members released for duty were to be immediately reported available to FA 3. Administrative officers were shifted and trained evaluators were reassigned during the Kaufbeuren period but the details need not be given here. In addition various minor personnel were shifted from Kaufbeuren to Berlin. The personnel of the FA were reputedly (enviously?) well paid. At Kaufbeuren the personnel section was concerned with such matters as their soap ration and arrangement of laundering facilities in Kaufbeuren.

67 Ticom Document 240 Item 22.

68 Ticom Document 240. See Appendix 2 for Summary of contents.

69 Werther, I 121 p 12.

70 Ticom Document 240 Item 23.
B. Operational Organization of the FA.

Organization of the Main Bureau.

a. Main Section I (Administration and Security).
b. Main Section II (Personnel).
c. Main Section III (Interception, Sorting, and Examination).
d. Main Section IV (Codes and Ciphers).
e. Main Section V (Information, Collection, and Evaluation).
f. Main Section VI (Technical).

War-time expedients, the Branch Office Berlin and Reporting Center Seifert.
The Liaison Officers.
The Intercept Stations and Regional Offices of the FA.
Persons named as members of the FA or concerned with it but not assignable in its organization.

8. Organization of the Main Bureau. The following operational organization of the FA is intended to represent its structure while in Berlin. What historical changes can be determined will be indicated in the specific section involved. At the head was the Director (Ministerial Direktor) responsible for the management of all official business, and under him was the Main office at Berlin as well as the liaison offices, Regional Offices and intercept stations.71 The main office was composed of six main sections, Hauptabteilung, which were subdivided into fifteen sections, Abteilung, which in turn were broken down into various sub-sections. As it was in the Hauptabteilung and Abteilung that the actual work of the FA was accomplished the best method of appraisal of its operations is to present the assignment, strength and history of each of these units with what little can be learned of their respective successes and personnel.

a. Hauptabteilung I - Administration: This main section was the administrative headquarters being charged with organization, established personnel and administration. At

the head was Principal Specialist Bergeren. There were about 50 persons divided among two sections, Abteilung 1 with a Senior Specialist (ORR) Rosenhan at the head and Abteilung 2 under Senior Specialist (ORR) Kunsemueller. Section 1, the "Central Abteilung," was responsible for the official correspondence, the basic problems of personnel administration and budgetary matters, Civil Service Personnel (the higher officials, job descriptions etc.) and Security. This security included the guards, the electric eye system, passes and identification, and cover names and camouflage measures necessary to safeguard the secrecy of the organization and the nature of its work. The various administrative directives found at Kaufbeuren emanated from Main Sections I or II in general. They typify the nature of the functions of the section. They range from an order concerning the drill of an FA Volksturm company at Kaufbeuren, through details of work shifts, Air Raid Precautions, and soap rations, to reissue of exhortasache (SECRET and TOP SECRET) classifications. This last memo, dated Berlin, 25 February 1945, declared that the Fuehrer had been greatly displeased to learn that Reuters (The British News Agency) had published a German SECRET paper.

No hard and fast hierarchy in the rank of German civil servants can be drawn. The three ranks most commonly referred to in the FA are Ministerial Rat or Principal Specialist (Min. Rat.), Oberregierungsrat or Senior Specialist (ORR), and Regierungsrat or Specialist (Reg. Rat.). Variations, as in the case of Oden, whose title is Reg. Rat. Dipl. Ing. -- Regierungsrat with Engineering Diploma, also occur. Schapper, as Ministerial Director, is above this hierarchy. Schroeder's Rank, Minister Dirigent, has no equivalent. A rather involved and not too relevant comparison to the F ratings of our own civil service is possible. Fenner, of The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), was both Min. Rat. and Oberst (Colonel). It would thus be possible to equate ORR with a Lt. Colonel and a Reg. Rat with Major. Civil Service here rates a Major as equal to a F-5.

Document 240 item 45. The nature of the Reuters story is not known. For further examples of these directives see Appendix 2.
Section 2 was the Administrative section.\(^7^4\)

b. Hauptabteilung II - Personnel: Personnel, presumably records etc., was the responsibility of this main section and its only section, Abteilung 3. Senior Specialist (ORR) Kempe was in charge of this section which consisted of from 80 to 100 persons.

c. Hauptabteilung III - Intercept: Senior Specialist (Min. Rat.) Breuer was in charge of this Main Section which was responsible for intercept, including intercept control and the actual intercept stations, and sorting and preliminary examination of the intercepted materials. The department was composed of about 200 persons and was divided into two sections. Section 4, under Specialist Popp, was responsible for all FA intercept. This included intercept control, determination of cover priorities, location of stations (described by Schapper as "employment of intercept forces") and actual administration of the intercept personnel. Section 5 was under Specialist Harrius who was relieved of duty and replaced by Specialist Dr Henke on 9 March.\(^7^5\) This section served as a "message center" receiving

\(^7^4\)Except where specifically cited as from other sources, this and the following paragraphs dealing with the organization of the FA are based on IF 15, 132, 135; I 25 and 54, and Ticom document 240. The statement of Schapper, which can be checked by the captured directive written by him and the interrogations of Seifert, Oden, Paetzel, Fingerhut and Klautachke-from which last the personnel strength figures are taken—are the most important and contain few if any contradictions. The interrogation of Rentschler, on the contrary, is incomplete and he appears to have consciously withheld or evaded giving information. The interrogation of Guenther is also incomplete but he appears to have been a minor worker and consequently poorly informed. The information taken from Weekly Intelligence Summary #12, IF 132, is often unique. So statements about the use of electric eyes and that Hauptabteilung IV developed codes and ciphers for the use of the FA are not indicated in the Ticom materials available. (IF 132 is based on the interrogations of Georg Schroeder and a "Report from Captured Personnel and Material Branch Military Intelligence Division," United States War Department, 25 June 1945, neither of which are in the possession of Ticom.)

\(^7^5\)IF 135, Corrected as of 14 March. The 29 March order is available on Film 34 (Ticom Doc. 240).
all intercept and sorting and distributing it to the proper section of Main Section IV or Main Section V. This sorting does NOT appear to involve traffic analysis but is merely an identification of traffic type and a preliminary sort, as by language and system. Clear text material, including private and commercial messages, press broadcasts, the results of telephone monitoring and the like, were sent direct to Hauptabteilung V for evaluation. Code and cipher text was sorted as to type, e.g., military, diplomatic, and commercial. Military intercept was passed to The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and diplomatic traffic was shared according to previous arrangement between the Foreign Office, The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and the FA. (Rentschler states that this could be done by sorting on "the first group of the message which reveals the type.")76 That material which was to be worked on by the FA was sent to the appropriate section of Hauptabteilung IV. According to Flicke, Pokojewski and Hatz the FA received duplicates of messages from all intercept sources and was the only agency to receive these facilities.77

d. Hauptabteilung IV - Codes and Ciphers: This Main Section of some 150 persons under Ministerial Dirigent Georg Schroeder was concerned with cryptanalysis of all codes and ciphers. Because of the preponderant interest of the Ticom teams in cryptanalytic activities most of the FA information obtainable from the Interrogations of working personnel is concerned with cryptanalysis. According to Kurt Sauerbier78

76Rentschler, IF 46.

77I 85 p 3.

78I 162: "Sauerbier is 41 years old, neat and anxious to impress. He joined the FA in its infancy in 1935 on the strength of a knowledge of Swedish and some English. He has no special mathematical training or qualifications and was an ordinary bank clerk in a Hamburg bank who was out of a job and heard that the FA was looking for men who knew languages. His poor manner of expression and the lack of conciseness and detail of his answers combined to give a total impression of distinctly mediocrity ability and of an attitude typical of the entrenched civil servant, proud of his own little pew but seeing very little beyond it."
there were only about a dozen cryptanalytic personnel in the FA when he joined in 1935. Sauerbier took a short course in the fundamentals and then went to work on commercial code traffic. The head of the cryptanalytic section (which later became Hauptabteilung IV) was then, and remained, Principal Specialist (later Min. Dirig) Schroeder. With the outbreak of the war the office was reorganized and this may have been the time at which the Hauptabteilungen were created. Late in 1943 various sections of the FA were forced to move to Breslau due to bomb damage to their Berlin quarters. Sauerbier has stated that the quarters in Breslau were inadequate and that production accordingly suffered.79 We know that the Breslau Branch was under the direction of Schroeder as a Directive from him to II, III, IV, V, I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and "AW Schule" (the School for Evaluators - Auswertung Schule?) of 30 September 1944 is available. (The directive circulated a photcopy of a communication from the Breslau Abwehr Officer (Wehrkreiskommando VIII Abwehr) on the danger of Russian and Polish agents increasing their activity in Breslau.)80 From Breslau Main Section IV moved to Juetzberg where, with III and V, it came under the direction of Seifert. Schapper appears at Luebbenah and Sauerbier and presumably additional personnel of IV returned to Berlin or fell casualties to the movement. The movement to Juetzberg was completed by 2 February 1945 as a letter of that date exists which names nine members of FA 9 who assisted in transporting classified materials from Breslau.82 The date of the move to Kaufbeuren is not known nor or any details of the subsequent move to Rosenheim available. At Kaufbeuren the Main Sections, less FA 15, were reunited under Schapper. FA IV included sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 but by the end of March FA 6 does not appear on the routings of FA memoranda. Paetzol, deputy head of FA IV and head of FA 6 was at Kaufbeuren on 5 March but was taken prisoner at Flensburg with various fugitives from Berlin. His presence at Kaufbeuren

79I 162, p. 4.
80Ticom Document 240, item 37.
81Ticom Document 240 items 22 and 29.
82Ticom Document 240 item 33.
in March is known from two directives concerned with air
raid precautions, one originated by him and one naming him,
Senior Specialist Waechter, Wenzel, and Schulze, Specialist
Kroeger, and three other Specialists, Lehr, Kagelka, and
von Stubenfauch who are otherwise unknown but may be assumed
to be members of FA IV.83

Section 6 was a "Research" section. Paetzel stated that he:

Was head of this Abteilung which came into exist-
ence only in 1941 and had fewer members than the others,
in fact about 30. Whereas the other Abteilungen dealt
with material which he described as "Aktuell", Abt. 6
worked on problems which could not be dealt with by the
others currently and was also in the nature of a research
section to work on new systems. They dealt in the main
with diplomatic traffic of America, England, Japan,
Free France, Spain and Spanish America. Their main
machine success was with the Swiss Enigma as long as
the same machine setting was used over a longish period.
He also said that they had been able to break the Finnish
Hagelin on a single message if they had 4,000 letters
or more of text. He knew no details of the method as he
had not worked on it himself. That had been done by RR
Kroeger. They could also break it, of course, on a
compromise. When asked if they had solved other machine
systems, he replied that they had broken a Japanese
system in '41-'42 which was thought to be a machine
system though their solution was not mechanical but
employed simply paper strips. They had worked also on
an American strip system where 30 out of a matrix of
50 strips were employed in a setting. This traffic was
America-Europe but whether Washington-London or Wash-
ington-Paris was not known. Paetzel also described a
Spanish additive system on which he had been working
shortly before the end. The systems differed according
to traffic link. Each link had 10 tables, with 100
four digit groups on each table. The indicator was the
serial number (He did not know how it worked). It came
in the 2nd or 3rd place and he believed that it was
unenciphered as it caused no trouble. No other Spanish

83Ticom Document 240 item 30.
traffic was known to Paetzel, some links, however, had more tables than others.\textsuperscript{84}

During the interrogation of the "Flensburg Contingent" of the FA, Oden, the "machine branch" representative (see Hauptabteilung VI) was questioned about IBM equipment. The question was answered, however, by Paetzel, who enumerated the following machines:

1. Alphabetic Tabulator
2. D.II Calculating Tabulators
3. or 4 Sorters
4. Reproducer
5. "Many" Punchers\textsuperscript{85}

They did not have a "Kartenmischer" [Collator]. It has been estimated that the equipment listed would have required ten to fifteen key punches. The personnel strength of the research section is sufficient to have operated this IBM equipment in conjunction with their other duties and the various statements about the compartmentalization of the FA and the isolation of the cryptanalysts in particular support the assumption that IBM was not in a separate section.\textsuperscript{86}

Schroeder is quoted to the effect that the FA developed its own codes and ciphers although no evidence of this is to be found in the available materials.\textsuperscript{87} However, Kroeger, "[Cipher] machine specialist" of the research section is named as the representative to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) Code and Cipher Committee set up by Theile and Gimmler with Huettenhain as chairman.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{84} I 54, p 2.
\textsuperscript{85} I 25, Passim.
\textsuperscript{86} Sauerbier, I 162, states that the cryptanalytic section merely forwarded the untranslated text of its decodes to Evaluation and never heard what action or interpretation was taken on them. IF 132, presumably based on an interrogation of Schroeder which is not available to TICOM, also indicates this isolation, stating that the various sections were enveloped in extensive security regulations.

\textsuperscript{87} IF 132
\textsuperscript{88} Huettenhain and Frick, I 84. It is stated that Kroeger was unable to attend all the meetings as the FA had moved to Breslau.
It is probable that the success with a Russian Teletype machine, attributed to the FA by Buggisch, although the information was admittedly second hand with him, was achieved in this section. This is further supported by the fact that Sauerbier, who worked in the section dealing with Slavonic languages, did not know of any major Russian success and specifically mentions abandonment of work on a Russian Diplomatic system.

The exact history of Abteilung 6 is not clear. Paetzol states that the section came into existence in 1941. According to Rentschler it remained in Berlin. Paetzol, however, names Kroeger as a member of the section and Huettenhain states that he was unable to attend the Code and Cipher Committee meetings regularly because of the move of the FA to Breslau. The directive found at Kaufbeuren, moreover, carries Paetzol as head of Abteilung 6 and makes no indication that either he or the section were not at Kaufbeuren. Support for Rentuchler's statement, none the less, comes from the fact that Paetzol was found at Flensburg with Seifert, Cden, Klautschke, and Fingerhut, all of whom were in the "northern section."

Section 7, Overseas and Southwest, was under the direction of Senior Specialist Waechter and consisted of from 60 to 70 persons. Their work included USA, England, Latin America, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Egypt, and the Far East. In the "Far East" besides Japanese and Chinese traffic Manchurian systems

Buggisch quotes Doering and gives considerable information on the process involved. Even though second hand the story appears reliable. 1 64 p 2, I 176 p 6.

IF 15 p 19.

See I 84, of IF 132.

Speculation over this point is unnecessary. It is clear that there was a special research section which worked on machine traffic and it is also clear that Kroeger was a machine specialist. Sauerbier, I 162, says that section IV moved to Breslau in 1944, working conditions were not good and the work suffered, and that all sections of the office were scattered after Breslau was evacuated.
were studied and evidence of work on a Thai system was found. Only one Japanese translator is known to have been available, Dr Erfurt, who also translated Chinese and Turkish. Senior Specialist Waechter is mentioned several times as the expert on American systems although this may have been partially due to a desire of Paetzel to avoid specific questioning. This section scored one of the more timely successes of the FA when it (or the predecessor of it in the pre-war FA) read Chamberlain's message to London for Hitler at the time of Munich. As responsible for English and United States systems, it also dealt with the messages of Harrison (U.S. Charge d'Affaire) from Berne and for cooperation with the Navy on British Interdepartmental cipher and various consular systems.

Section 8, West and South, under Senior Specialist Schulze, was composed of 30 to 40 persons. It worked on France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Rumania. Major successes were achieved in the case of France. At the time of the Anschluss decodes were furnished Hitler (the code had apparently been "secured") which revealed that France would take no military action because of the refusal of England to back her. In the opinion of Rentschler Vichy systems were the easiest to break of all worked on by the FA. Rentschler, however, was not a cryptanalyst himself.

Section 9, East, Southeast, Middle and North, under Senior Specialist Wenzel, was composed of 60 to 70 people according to Paetzel but according to Sauerbier, who was a member of it, of 45 during the war. For the strength of FA 9 at Haufebeuren a partial listing is possible based on a list of names, headed FA 9, with the signatures of those present or an indication of their transfer. This list is given in appendix 2. None of the names on this list are otherwise known nor has any check of these persons been made. The proportion of men to women is of interest (21 men - three with a Doctor's degree - and 12 women). Section 9 was divided into at least three sub-sections as Sauerbier was the head of Referat 9-C. This sub-section appears to have been a catch-all for assorted problems that did not fit into any other section. Its commitments were; the diplomatic and consular traffic of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway; the commercial traffic or neutral countries; the ship traffic of Northern European countries; the secret messages of detained persons; Russian Agents Traffic. Among the successes...
with commercial codes claimed by Sauerbier are the code of INTABANK, a code of the Skoda Works, and Turkish shipping codes. 9-A is stated to have solved a Polish code and either 9-A or 9-B may be presumed to have dealt with the Russian commercial traffic received by Seifert.

Sauerbier's evaluation of the cryptanalytic section and its heads in particular is worth quoting, although it is not felt that his statements are to be taken at their face value:

Sauerbier gives a general picture of a highly bureaucratic organization dominated by red tape and procedure, so that no department knew what the others were doing. Schroeder was old and fussy, liking quiet and disliking innovation. Paetzel was also very petty and academic in his outlook.

This narrowness affected relations of the FA with the Auswaertiges Amt, OKW, and OKH. Liaison was handled by a single representative and never involved any exchange of visits by operations personnel. Sauerbier said he did not know one single person in any of the other organizations.

Similarly there were no close relations between solution and evaluation work. The crypt sections simply did their work and handed the untranslated product over to the evaluation section without ever knowing what became of it thereafter.\(^3\)

There is evidence that Sauerbier is either deliberately misleading his interrogators or was considerably misinformed. Lt. Schubert, the expert on Agent's traffic for the Russian Section of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command, stated that "in January 1945 a RR Wenzel was sent to me from the FA by the WNV Fu III which was in charge of Agents systems to collaborate on Polish Resistance Movement traffic." Schubert knew that the FA had worked on Polish

\(^3\) Sauerbier, I 162, p 4. These statements probably reflect more a "sour grapes" (or sour hops?) attitude of Sauerbier himself rather than an accurate picture of the Hauptabteilung. For fuller discussion and evaluation of the liaison between FA and the other agencies see below.
systems, but as far as he knew had not read any.\textsuperscript{94} This is evidence not only of an exchange of working personnel but involves the head of Sauerbier's own section in connection with Sauerbier's self claimed specialty.\textsuperscript{95} It further shows a coordination of cryptanalytic work on Agent's traffic by the authorized agency, The Radio Defence Corps (WWV FuIII), of the work of the FA and the Army High Command. Finally among the Kaufbeuren directives is a letter from the Reich main Security Office to FA 9 requesting that an agents message be deciphered.\textsuperscript{96}

Details of all systems worked on by the FA with all TICOM references discovered are given in Appendix I and it was not felt necessary to duplicate this material in this organizational outline.

e. Hauptabteilung V - Evaluation: Principal Specialist Seifert, the head of this Main Section, had 400 people under him, the greatest number in any of the sections of the "Bureau" proper. Seifert himself was captured at Flensburg and proved one of the most cooperative and talkative of the prisoners. The information releases of this section represented the finished product of the FA. Seifert was head of the temporary Jueterbog Branch and then became head of a reporting center in Berlin known by his name. He himself states that his presence at Flensburg was to organize the receipt of press and broadcast traffic. Senior Specialist Dr. Kurzbach, the head of Section 11, was alternate for Seifert in charge of V at Kaufbeuren. Seifert's statement of the objective of his department is as follows:

The object of the department was the production of a purely objective and scientific picture of the worldwide political and commercial situation.

\textsuperscript{94}I 26 p 7.

\textsuperscript{95}I 164 is a study by Sauerbier of his special field, Russian Agent's Traffic.

\textsuperscript{96}Ticom Doc. 240 Item 11.
The new material provided by its sources was forwarded after processing to the ministries concerned under three different categories viz.:

1) The individual items of current interest ("Aktuelle Meldungen").
2) Collected items on a given single subject ("zusammengafasste").
3) Consolidated reports ("Synthesen") e.g., Japanese-Russian relations.

The bulletins of the FA were "Braun Meldungen"-Brown Reports (or the "Braunblaetter"-Brown Sheets). These were sent to the highest officials only; Keitel (Chief of Armed Forces), Jodl (Chief of Operations Staff), Goering, Ribbentrop (Foreign Minister), and Dönitz (Grand Admiral) admit having received them and they were of course also sent to Hitler himself. Special reports with an even more restricted distribution were sent:

... only to Goering and to Hitler; it depended on the subject and the existing circumstances, some of them might subsequently be passed by Hitler to the minister for Foreign Affairs. Typical examples were the Berlin-Rome telephone conversations between Mussolini and Ciano.

Hitler's view of the products of the FA was that they were very reliable; the material had to be presented factually to Hitler with no argument or appreciation, only the verbatim conversation or actual deciphered text. Editors were given very definite orders not to make guesses where there were gaps; if any portion were missing or was not clear, a row of dots had to be inserted and the appreciation, if any, inserted within parentheses. There was a special courier service with particular dispatch boxes of which only Goering, Hitler and Ribbentrop possessed the keys. The couriers had to travel in special motor cars and not in railway trains. All the reports had to be returned and sometimes there were difficulties because odd single sheets had been extracted and retained. In such cases a reminder was sent asking for the missing sheets. There were special
security regulations to prevent the reports being handed on from person to person.99

The best description of the routing of material to Hauptabteilung V and its processing there is given by Rent- schler:

Material which reached Main Abteilung V for evaluation came either from Abteilung 5 or Main Abteilung IV, depending upon whether it had been received in plain language or in code or cipher. Material from the decoding Abteilungen came to Abteilung V already translated while clear text material came as it was received except for Japanese and other non-European languages which also were translated into German by experts ... .

Most of the material sent to Main Abteilung V was obtained from plain language sources; foreign radio, foreign press, telephone and telegraph messages to and from both foreign and occupied countries and internal communications. The quantity of decoded material varied with the various sections of Main Abteilung V; in Abteilung 11 perhaps 30% of the total was decoded traffic; 40% clear text, and another 30% came from radio broadcast and the press, in Abteilung 12 a considerably smaller percentage consisted of decoded material; in Abteilung 13 only about 7% or 8% of the total came from decodes.

99I 143 p 15. In regard to Hitler's opinion of Signal Intelligence, however, Ribbentrop, in the same interrogation (I 143) attributes a divergent view: "Ribbentrop, on being asked how valuable Signal Intelligence was to him and which countries provided the best material he hesitated for a long time; the value of this intelligence did not amount to very much -- Hitler had a queer, rather particular view about it -- he did not like this type of intelligence very much and said it was unreliable and often misleading; it was better to use one's own common sense. Ribbentrop said that occasionally a really important piece of intelligence was produced but even when pressed could not recollect a single specific example." Ribbentrop was described by the interrogators as highly suspicious and uncommunicative in distinction to Goering, who needed no prompting, and to Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl. See discussion of these points under FA Liaison below.
Most decoded traffic was read about 2-3 days after it was sent with some up to a week old. Apparently only Japanese traffic was read up to four or five weeks old. Rentschler professed almost complete ignorance of the workings of Hauptabteilung IV which was guarded by very rigid and strictly enforced security regulations.

On 31 May Rentschler was taken up on specific points of the previous days interrogation. Abteilungen 11-13 reported on an average 80 messages a day, including decodes and PL (Klärtext). They were given all texts, and then separated reportable from non-reportable. Abteilung 11, the one dealing with traffic of interest to the Foreign Office, reported perhaps 20-30 messages a day. This is interesting in view of Schapper's statement that this office put their main cryptographic effort on diplomatic ciphers.100

Goering thought that his organization had been able to deal with 32 different languages. His interrogation revealed:

The virtues of the organization lay in the fact that they did not confine themselves to any particular field of intelligence and had no political axe to grind, nor ideology to follow; they were just given the technical requirements to intercept and break traffic and to disseminate intelligence. When they made an intelligence resume of some particular subject, for example that of aircraft production in the USA or the Yalta and Teheran conferences they produced an accurate factual account with no political bias. Reports such as these, often covering quite considerable periods, were frequently produced.

Goering's main principle had always been to keep the FA free from outside influences; Admiral Canaris, the Gestapo, and the Foreign Office had continually tried to interfere but he had managed to head them off. At one time the head of the FA had formed the idea that they should also deal with agent's traffic. Goering had found this out in about 1934 and had strictly forbidden any such action; such matters should be left to the concern of the Secret Service, and in any case the intelligence was generally unreliable.
Goering said that the recipients of the daily bulletins, the "Brown Sheets" (Braunblätter) always emphasized the quality and reliability of the service. In 1940-1941 the selected file of reports which was passed to him daily contained as much as two hours reading. This report included intelligence from both types of FA; he was unable to say what proportion consisted of decoded. [However] The intelligence resulting from decoded telegrams was not always useful, they often consisted of absolute rubbish. The extent to which members of the diplomatic corps spread and retailed fantastic rumors was surprising. He himself had often made arrangements to have rumors planted and within a few days he observed them being passed on and spreading.

The work of the FA comprised two almost completely separate activities, firstly that of telephone monitoring, and secondly that of interception and cryptanalysis. As regards the first commitment this had originally been limited to listening to telephone conversations to and from Foreign Embassies and those of important visiting foreigners -- in order to obtain political and economic intelligence. At a later date Hitler laid down that all telephone monitoring was to be Goering's responsibility, as far as he remembered this was at the end of 1933; hitherto internal telephone monitoring had been handled by the police. Inevitably the Reichspost were also concerned for a while since their cooperation and assistance were necessary for working out the technical side and for arranging special connections; the FA dispensed with as much of this liaison as possible as soon as they found their feet. It was laid down that the post office had to obtain a specific permit from the FA if for any reason they wished to carry out monitoring themselves; later on, however, the Gestapo introduced themselves into the business and worked independently and without authorization from Goering, they worked clandestinely and for their own purposes; he thought it extremely probable that latterly all of his own telephone conversations
had been monitored by them...

Hauptabteilung V was divided into four sections. Section 10, under the direction of Specialist Dr. Melis was named as "Information Dissemination" by Schapper's directive. According to Rentschler it served as the library, archives, and registration center, also confirmed by Fingerhut. Also according to Rentschler, it included five or six translators.

The files of the library have been described as:

...voluminous files of practically every type of information from every country. It maintained very complete cross-reference indices, recordings of intercepted phone and radio messages and transcriptions of public broadcasts of important world figures. In addition this section possessed a huge library of textbooks, maps, telephone directories, city plans, newspapers, and periodicals. All in all this section provided the material that all other sections needed in evaluating properly the messages intercepted by the field stations.

This is a typically thorough example of the needs of the information section of any intelligence agency. Section 11, Foreign Policy Evaluation, under Senior Specialist Dr. Kurzbach (both Rentschler and Fingerhut were former members of this section) has left no specific record of its activities. Section 12, Economic Evaluation, was under Acting Head Brieschke. At Kaufbeuren, replaced on 20 March by Rautenkranz. Among the reports prepared by them were, in peace time, stock market "tips" based on examination of brokerage reports etc., which were used by the various

101
143. The statements based on the interrogation in the document cited have been slightly rearranged in the above paragraph. Note that the date given by Goering for the taking over of all telephone monitoring by the FA would allow sufficient time for those monitoring activities to have been important in connection with the Blood Purge mentioned earlier in this paper as having been connected in some way with the FA.

103IF 132
German economic agencies in purchase and sale of foreign securities. Presumably these reports were utilized by the various individual members of the Nazi party receiving them (according to Guenther all Nazi Officials down to Gaulieter received FA reports) to their own profit. The head of this section is given by Rentschler as Dr. Rautenkranz but his name does not appear on the Kaufbeuren document. Section 13, Internal Affairs Evaluation, was under Specialist Rentschler. He states that he became head of the section in 1944 and that while still in Berlin it employed about 80 people. By the time the remnants of Hauptabteilung V reached Rosenheim, however, only 16 men and 4 girls were left in all of V. A special school for "Evaluators" in the headquarters and in the Aussenstellen was set up in 1943 under Specialist Heinz Fingerhut. He stressed, however, that this school did not train new personnel since they had no intake but instead lost people to the armed forces, but existed mainly to provide refresher courses for Auswerter who by the nature of their work required a high degree of expert knowledge. 104

f. Hauptabteilung VI, Technical. The Main Section was in charge of Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Stabenow. His alternate at Kaufbeuren was Senior Specialist Dr. Ruppertsburg, the head of Section 14. This section, the only one shown, is called Technical by the Kaufbeuren document. Rentschler gives two section, 14 Development of Own Machines, and 15, Comparison and Evaluation of captured Machinery. Oden, however, a member of Main Section VI, gives the following description of his section:

Hauptabteilung VI, O's own department, had two subsections, a) Prüfung und Entwicklung and b) Betrieb. He was the head of the latter subsection. He was thus responsible generally for the maintenance of all RLM/FA's communications but was not concerned at all with devising or developing new apparatus which was the

104 I 54 p 3. Ticom Document 240 item 36 is the order transferring Specialist Dr. Rautenkranz from the School of the FA to FA 12 as head, effective 20 March 45 and also transfers Dr. Fingerhut to the Reporting Center Selbert. Item 37 includes a Schule AW (School of Evaluators?) in its routing.
task of Abteilung a. When questioned about his connection with OKW on cipher security matters, he said that this was purely ad hoc. He was present only at discussions on the security of the T 52 and attended more by virtue of his previous employment with Siemens und Halske than by his present position with RLM/FA. They had no liaison with Wa Preuf VII except in connection with such apparatus as was supplied them by this body.105

As Oden remained in Berlin and Dr. Huppertsburg went to Kaufbeuren a reorganization in the course of which Abteilung 15 was dropped is a reasonably presumption. In his earlier interrogation Oden stated that he had joined the FA in 1936, having previously been an electrical engineer, and was responsible for the equipment of the intercept stations, their maintenance, and for certain personnel matters. In this interrogation he stated that some of the employees of Army Ordnance, Developing and Testing Group, Signals Branch had been classmates of his at school.106 Both Huppertsburg and Oden are specifically mentioned by Boner of the German Air Force as concerned with telephone monitoring. Boner stated that the last known location of the telephone monitoring station, under Dr. Huppertsberg, was at Glueckstadt (Holstein) and that Oden would be able to give details.107 There were approximately 200 persons employed in Hauptabteilung VI. It may be assumed that the FA, alone among the Signal Intelligence Agencies, ran its own communications. The communications of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, (OKW/Chi) of the Air- force (OKI/Chi) and Navy (OKM 4 SKI/III) Signal Intelligence Services, of the Radio Defence Corps (OKW/WNV/FJ III), of the Abwehr, and of the Foreign Office were all run by section V of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.108 The absence of the FA in

105 I 54 p 1.
106 I 25 pp 4 and 8.
107 I 17 p 3.
108 DF 9, Activity report of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for period 1 Jan 1944 through 28 June 1944.
this company is significant. It appears to reflect the antipathy of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the FA towards each other. Security of FA ciphers is thought to have been within the functions of section 6, which see.

Among the documents received by Ticom is a telephone directory containing names of members of the FA and of the Air Ministry as well as key officials in other government ministries. The document appears to refer to the official (government) telephone net in Berlin. A tracing attached to the document shows direct telephone communications from Dr Huppertsburg (whose name appears) to Luebben, Constance, Cologne, Templin, Breslau and other known locations of FA installations on the one hand and to the Air Ministry and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) on the other. Through the switchboard of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces connections could be made with the Army High Command (and its field telephone nets), The Reich Main Security Office, The Foreign Office, The Navy High Command, the Prussian State Ministry, the Reichapost and the Elite Gaurd Headquarters (SS Fuehrungshauptant). Through the Air Ministry switchboard connections were possible with all branches of the Air Ministry and Air Force and a connection to Goering's estate at Karinghall is shown. Telephone numbers for all connections are given. (Some of the names of officials given in the directory will be discussed at the conclusion of this chapter). It may be assumed from the appearance of Dr Huppertsburg's name on the tracing that he was responsible for maintaining telephone communications for the FA.

9. War Time Expedents. The Branch Office Berlin and the Reporting Center Seiffert. An administrative nucleus of undetermined strength was always maintained in Berlin in addition to various monitoring stations located there. The administrative documents captured at Kaufbeuren have revealed what is known of this administrative organization.

D 22. The directory is said to be undated. It was found at Berchtesagaden by Ticom Team 1. All names appearing in the directory have been included in Tab A. In the case of members of the FA their inclusion in the directory is indicated by the citation of D 22 in the entry under their name.
A directive of 9 March 1945, signed by Schapper, set up the Branch Office Berlin (Zweigstelle Berlin). Its functions appear to have duplicated those of FA I and II to a considerable extent and in addition the Branch Office Berlin would seem to have assimilated FA 15. Its functions were of an administrative nature, including security, correspondence, administrative detail, personnel matters and, in addition, technical maintenance of equipment and communications. The head of the Branch Office Berlin was Senior Specialist Stabenow and he exercised administrative control over the Reporting Center Seifert and the various Liaison Offices. A member of FA 9, Dr Neuenhoff, otherwise unknown, was named as a requested liaison man between Branch Office Berlin and his section. A Specialist ProIch of the Inebben intercept station was also assigned additional duties as liaison man with the Branch Office. Specialist Henke, named head of FA 5 on 9 March 1945, was assigned to the Branch Office Berlin on 20 March. An example of the personnel work handled in Berlin is a request from FA 9 that Frau Helene Gertz, born Sponholz, be assigned to work in an intercept station. She is described as having a good knowledge of French and a reading knowledge of Russian. This request is addressed to Czwalinna at Marchstrasse 25 b on 27 March 1945 suggesting that the Branch Office Berlin was not, or was not all located in the Schillerstrasse.

Even less is known of the Reporting Center Seifert (Diensatstelle Seifert) than is known of the Branch Office Berlin. The directive setting up the Branch Office Berlin

110 Ticom Document 240 item 34.
111 Ticom Document 240 item 14.
112 Ticom Document 240 item 36.
113 Ticom Document 240 items 19 and 35.
114 Ticom Document 240 item 18.
also created the Reporting Center Seifert. Seifert remained the head of Main Section V and had previously been the head of the Jüterbog Branch of the FA. The administrative documents reveal the assignment of various persons to Seifert but there is no indication of the nature of their duties. On 13 April an Erna Lange (otherwise unknown) and Liselotte Brott of FA 9 were assigned to Seifert. On 20 March 1945 Specialist Dr. Fingerhut was assigned to the Reporting Center.

10. The Liaison Offices of the FA. To assure liaison with other departments of the governmental agencies Liaison Officers to the various departments were set up. The officials charged with these responsibilities worked in the ministry to which they were assigned and were in telephonic communication with the FA (either with the Main Bureau, or, after it had evacuated Berlin, with the Branch Office Berlin). Liaison with the Foreign Office (AA) was directed by Dr. Gerstmayr, that with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) by Dr. Klautschke; that with the Reich Main Security Office (RSMA) by Specialist with Engineering Diploma Scholz; that with the Propaganda Ministry (RMVP) by Herr Severitt; and that with the Economic Ministry and Ministry for War Production (RWiM) by Specialist Dr. Hilligardt. Dr. Hilligardt was replaced on 1 April 1945 by Brieschke, who had previously served as head of FA 12, to which section Hilligardt was assigned although not in an administrative capacity. Details of the nature of this liaison are known from the interrogation of Dr. Klautschke whose statement follows:

Klautschke was the liaison officer (Verbindungs- nabb) to OKW and also OKM, OKL, and OKH. Although a member of the FA, he had his office in OKW. It was

115 Ticom Document 240 item 34.
116 Ticom Document 240 item 29.
117 Ticom Document 240 item 7.
118 Ticom Document 240 item 35.
119 Ticom Document 240 item 34.
120 Ticom Document 240 item 36.
his job to receive material from the FA and pass it on to the section concerned at OKW etc. At OKW he supplied Keitel and various departments, for example WFST/Amt Gr Ausl, Feldwirtschaftsamt, Attache Abteilung, Abwehr, and AWA. At OKM besides Doenitz he supplied SNKL and Marinereutungsamt. At OKL Milch, LW Fuehrungsstab I C, Chef Technische Ruest (Genmaj. Diessing). At OKW General Staff, Fremde Heere West and Fremde Heere Ost.

There were similar liaison officers with the other ministries such as Dr. Hilligardt at Ruestungsministerium and Reichsratschaftministerium and Dr. Gerstmeyer with the Auswaertiges Amt.

His liaison duties were concerned solely with the passing of intelligence from FA to OKW etc. and of particular intelligence requests in the other direction. As far as he knew there was no liaison on cryptanalytic matters between the two. Certain raw material, however, which was not worked on at FA was passed regularly to OKW, for example military traffic. When asked if his connection with the OKW/ATT. Amt meant that the FA jandled attache ciphers he said no, that only the telephone conversations of their Allies' attaches in Berlin were concerned. These were mostly about their girl friends, and never contained anything of importance because the attaches knew they were monitored.

This intercept traffic furnished by the FA to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces constituted about 1/3 of all intercept coming to their crypt section.

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122 DF 9. An Activity Report of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was captured in the Strub barracks near Berchtesgarden and contained this information. ZIP/SAC/ Paragraph 10, p 3.
11. The Intercept stations of the FA and its Regional Offices. The operational functions of the entire organization were carried out by intercept stations of five different types. These stations were known as Forschungsstellen and were categorized as follows:

- **A Stations**: Telephone Intercept
- **B Stations**: Wireless Intercept
- **C Stations**: Radio Broadcast Monitoring
- **D Stations**: Teletype and Telegraph Intercept
- **F Stations**: Mail Censorship

A listing of all places at which FA installations were or had been maintained with indication of the nature of such installations is included in Tab A in as far as such a list can be determined.

The A stations were scattered all through Germany and later in the occupied countries. These stations were equipped with one or two interceptor switchboards which enabled the operators to cut in on any conversation at any time. The tapping was done at the main telephone exchange of the post office and piped directly to the station, which was usually located in a private building. Included in the equipment of each listening post was a wiretype recorder, which could be brought into use whenever desired.

The operations of the A stations underwent a change with the advent of the war. Prior to September, 1939, the telephone intercept stations were most valuable in providing information from the many international lines then operating in Germany. Berlin, of course, had a huge A station to tap the conversations of the diplomatic corps. The capital station had a staff of more than a hundred people, including fifty to sixty interceptors. After war broke out, this source of information was completely eliminated and the A stations turned their attentions largely to the problems of war production bottlenecks, attitudes of various large industries, and other domestic affairs.

123 IF 132 p 3. This information is presumably derived from Schrroeder and possibly from other prisoners not available to Ticom.
The B stations were usually outside of towns at points of good wireless reception, not being faced with the problem of necessary proximity to telephone or cable lines. Radio messages were intercepted by short wave and then were relayed in written form to the headquarters of the FA. After war started, this type of intercept became increasingly important insofar as foreign information was concerned because of the end of telephonic communication from Germany to other countries.

Only one C station existed. This performed a pure monitoring service of public broadcasts from other countries. The three D stations were located at Berlin, Vienna, and Dortmund, the chief centers of cablegrams leaving Germany. The functions of the D stations were also greatly diminished after the outbreak of the war. The F stations were organized after Germany was at war and they were never very extensive in their operations. Censorship offices were operated by OKW and later by the RSHA. The F stations consisted of small groups attached to these censorship posts.

In addition to the stations operating in Germany, the FA was quick to set up operational units in occupied countries. In Holland and Poland, for example, A stations were installed by task forces operating with front line troops. In Vienna, an A station was functioning two days after the occupation. Both A and B offices were quickly established in the Balkans, in Belgium, and in the Baltic countries. In Danzig a station had been installed secretly even before the annexation. Mobile units were also used during the Polish campaign but they are reported to have been largely unsuccessful, chiefly because of lack of cooperation from the army.  

That the FA was concerned with postal censorship is confirmed by documentary evidence recently made available to TICOM.  

Ibid. Part of this information is confirmed by interrogations available to Ticom. Guenther, IF 46, states that a special Giftkuschche for tapping the conversations of Nazi officials was located in Berlin.

TF 29, Sapp 12, 38, and ANLAGE 9.
A German publication, Die Überwachung des Nachrichtenverkehrs im Kriege, which provides for the censorship organization to cover all forms of communication and gives full details of the duties and responsibilities, is available. These regulations make careful distinction between peace time, when the FA and the Gestapo are specifically named as active in censorship and time of war when all censorship functions devolve on Abteilung III of the Abwehr. The regulations provide considerable detail on liaison and cooperation between Abwehr III units and the FA and contain complete directions for forwarding all pertinent information obtained from censorship to all parties interested. These censorship regulations are undated but it is presumptive that they were drawn up before the war as the Abwehr is clearly distinguished from the Reich Main Security Office.

Oden states that there were from 100 to 150 sets at the Templin and Luebben stations and from 20 to 30 at Cologne, Konstanz, Eutin, and Gols. Traffic was forwarded by cipher teleprinter, the T. 52, c,d, and e. The FA usually did not develop its own intercept equipment, using that of the Army, the Reichspost, or industry except in cases where they felt they were not getting what was wanted. 126

Insight into the organization of the Regional Offices and Intercept Stations (Forschungsleitstellen and Forschungsstellen) has been derived from the administrative papers found at Kaufbeuren. In particular an order of 26 January 1945 closing down the Breslau Forschungsleitstelle is important. 127 Effective with close of business 26 January, the Forschungsleitstelle Breslau and its subordinate Forschungsstellen were closed. These Forschungsstellen were listed as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forschungsstelle</th>
<th>&quot;A&quot; Breslau with &quot;D&quot; functions.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Breslau-Deutsch Lissa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;C&quot; Breslau-Deutsch Lissa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Litzmannstadt (Lodz)</td>
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<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Kattowitz (Katowice)</td>
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<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Posen (Posnan)</td>
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<td>Forschungsstelle</td>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Leba</td>
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127 Ticom Document 240 item 22.
In addition, the Forschungstelle "A" Danzig was instructed to move as quickly as possible to Berlin and unite with the Forschungsleitstelle Berlin. The head of Forschungsleitstelle Breslau was relieved and Schmidt was appointed head of a "closing down section" of Forschungsleitstelle Breslau in Berlin and instructed to send all personnel released from duty to FA 3 for reassignment. (Specialist Niedermeyer, the relieved head of Forschungsleitstelle Breslau, was appointed chief of staff for the Jüterbog Branch of the FA on the same date and on 9 March he was made head of the Forschungsleitstelle Munich, entering on duty on 20 March). The directive for the reorganization of the FA at Kaufbeuren of 9 March revealed the existence of four Forschungsleitstellen at that time. These were:

Forschungsleitstelle Berlin - Specialist Thiem
Forschungsleitstelle Hamburg - Senior Specialist Kirbach
Forschungsleitstelle Vienna - Senior Specialist, engineering diploma Fleischmann
Forschungsleitstelle Munich - Specialist Niedermeyer

As may be seen from the above, the FA regional offices were so located as to provide area coverage of Germany and of the occupied countries. The Breslau Forschungsleitstelle covered Eastern Germany and Poland, the Munich Forschungsleitstelle covered Southern Germany, the Vienna Forschungsleitstelle covered Austria, the Hamburg Forschungsleitstelle covered Western Germany (and possibly Denmark), and the Berlin Forschungsleitstelle covered Central Germany. This monitoring service, particularly the telephone monitoring ("A") stations, was probably chiefly involved in liaison with the Abwehr and (later) the Reich Main Security Office. Unfortunately no details of the channels for this liaison and cooperation are known. An order of 14 April 1945 gives evidence of the Copenhagen and Stettin Forschungsstellen. On this date the Copenhagen "A" Forschungstelle had moved from its former location to Nyropsgade 17/11 in Copenhagen. The new telephone number is given as Palæ 9469 extensions 35, 8, 9, and 30

128 Ticom Document 240 items 34 and 35.
129 Ticom Document 240 item 34.
130 Ticom Document 240 item 10.
and the "Armed Forces liaison telephone" is said to be unchanged. Palæ is one of the central exchanges in Copenhagen. The same order stated that the Stettin "A" Forschungsstelle had moved to Griefwald, Banahoffstrasse 16/47, telephone Griefwald 3307, on 29 March. No strength figures for these regional offices, nor for the intercept stations, are available. A member of FA-9, Frau Helene Gerta, who was unwilling to remain at Kaufbeuren after the first of May, was suggested to the personnel section as suitable for employment at the Luebben intercept station. Her qualifications were said to include a knowledge of French and a reading knowledge of Russian. The existence of a "D" station (telegraph and cable intercept) in Berlin is confirmed by a request from this Forschungsstelle for the forwarding address of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren. This request reveals that the Berlin station was designated D-2.

12. Persons named as members of the FA or concerned with it but not assignable in its organization. Finally there remain to be mentioned several persons whose names have been associated with the FA but whose connection can not be definitely explained either with the above exposition of the history or of the organization. Such persons fall into two categories, apparent members of the FA and officials of other organizations recipients of FA material or concerned with its operations. The captured telephone directory of the FA is the chief source of the names involved. In this directory a "Becker" is carried as "RLM/FA/VI/3" and a "Senior Specialist Boettger" is given as merely "RLM/FA" but their names are otherwise unknown. A man by the name of "Kell" is given as "Research Office A1/2 Berlin. Exploitation Center (RLM/FA/ANKopf)" and is presumably a member of the Berlin Forschungsleitstelle. One other man is named as a member of the FA in prisoner interrogations. This is the former Austrian cryptanalyst, Rudolf Bailovic. Bailovic was a member of the Austrian Cipher Section before the Anschluss and refused to surrender the keys of his department to the Nazis at the time of the Anschluss. He was relegated to a minor position in the

131 Ticom Document 240 item 18.
132 Ticom Document 240 item 28.
133 22, Ticom Doc. 249, found at Berchtesgaden.
134 I 84, I 118, IF 126.
Austrian civil service but Generals Fellgiebel and Theile brought him to Germany to employ his services as a cryptanalyst. He is said to have worked for the FA for a few months when he quit the FA and was then employed with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command and finally at the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as head of a section dealing with Balkan traffic. Towards the end of the war he is stated to have served more as an administrator than as a cryptanalyst. He is further said to have lived a quiet life with his wife, making no concealment of his strongly anti-Nazi views and refusing to wear German decorations when in uniform. In view of the attested strong anti-Nazi views of Bailovic it seems possible that his short association with the FA (where, incidentally, the nature of his duties are unknown) was due to the "Nazi taint" of Goering's organization. Finally the identity of one other of the members of the Reichswehrministerium Cipher section who went over to the FA upon its creation has been discovered. In the correspondence of the Austrian Cipher Bureau, found among the archives of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, is a letter from the well-known Austrian cryptanalyst Andreas' Figl written upon his retirement to his friends and collaborators in Germany.* The letter refers to members of the Reichswehrministerium (cipher section) who: "have aided in establishing today's collaboration: Merser v. Buschenhagen and v. Rezniczek". A pencilled note after v. Rezniczek states "now with FA".

In the second category of recipients of FA material are Koerner, Secretary of State in the Prussian State Ministry, who has been identified previously as controlling the FA finances; Principal Specialists Drape and Legler of the Prussian State Ministry and connected with the Four Year Plan; in the Air Ministry, Colonel Bokelburg, Group Leader of the Monitoring Department (RLM/Z.A./UEWA.), General der Flieger Bodenschatz, Head of the Office of Ministers, Lt. Gen. v. Doering, Group Head of the Equipment Department, Field Marshal Milch, Secretary of State for A1r and Inspector General of the G.A.F., and Colonel Simson, Commandant of the Air Ministry. In the Reichssicherheithauptamt Schellenberg is given as head of Amt IV and the names of Lt. General of Police SS Gruppenfuehrer Mueller (head of the Gestapo), Senior Specialist Bock, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer, Head of the State Police Central Office in Berlin, and "Krim.Komm" Ebeling, SS Obersturmfuehrer of the State Police Central Office Section IV N. Two members of the Reichspost are also included in the directory, Postrat Hofmann, head of "work connected with service matters" (RPZ/We-E), and Principal Specialist Wichmann, Head of the office of ministers and Department VII of the Reichspost.

* D 74, p. 17. This item was brought to the writer's attention after the completion of the paper. As it is believed to be significant evidence it has been inserted here. Neither the name of v. Rezniczek nor D 74 appear in Tab A.
Chapter III - Evaluation of the FA

Effectiveness of the FA and its liaison with other cryptologic and intelligence agencies in the opinions of various high Nazis.

13. Effectiveness of the FA and its liaison with other cryptologic and intelligence agencies in the opinions of various high Nazis. The above outline of the organization and operations of the FA, taken in conjunction with Appendix I, the listing of FA cryptanalytic successes, is believed to be ample evidence for stating that the FA was a highly successful intelligence producing agency. These concluding remarks will attempt to evaluate its functions as appraised by the persons receiving its results and associated or working in rivalry with it.
From the account given above, it is obvious that the FA received a vast amount of material, processed it, and passed it on to all persons who could make use of it. The actual amount of cooperation between the FA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Airforce High Command, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command, and the Cryptanalytic Section of the Foreign Office, is difficult to estimate. The statements of individuals employed in the various agencies are remarkably defeatist in tone but this is little cause for wonder. FA personnel complain that they knew nothing of their operational counterparts in the other agencies and personnel in the other agencies raised the same complaint and charged that the FA was peculiarly exclusive and stand-offish in its relations with them. Yet examination of activity reports, yearly reports, captured workbooks, and memoranda reveals an active exchange between even the smallest operating sections of technical data, coordination, and sharing of assignments, and exchange of personnel.

At the highest level of the Nazi Reich there was appreciation of the value of Signal Intelligence and at times a surprising knowledge of technical details and evaluation of the various agencies. Generaloberst Jodl, Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, Grand Admiral Doenitz, Commander in Chief of the Navy and later Reich Chancellor, Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces, von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister, and Field Marshal Goering were interrogated by TICOM. Their testimony is summarized in the following paragraphs.

135. The interrogators stated that "all the prisoners, with the exception of Ribbentrop, appeared willing to answer the best of their ability the questions put to them. It was clear to the interrogators that the prisoners found the subject of signals intelligence a welcome relief in contrast to that of responsibility for war crimes. It must be borne in mind that these interrogations required a somewhat different handling from the previous norm of TICOM procedures. Because of the potential security danger inherent in the forthcoming war guilt trials, when these men will be publicly prosecuted and will speak from the box, it was impossible to exploit them to the full. Many significant "leads" thus had to be neglected by the interpreters."
a. Jodl recalled various specific successes, among them information derived from an American official in Cairo in 1942 whose messages were read by a German Army intercept unit in Italy which stopped when the key changed and messages from Harrison in Berne which he attributed to the FA. Jodl did not know the names of any cryptanalysts and was unwilling to discriminate between the work of the bureau. He knew of the Foreign Office bureau and described the FA as large and efficiently organized but "Goering's special affair." He received copies of FA results which were selected for him from a larger amount of such FA reports by Keitel.

b. Keitel knew very little about the FA beyond the fact that it was "the third competitor" whose so-called Brown reports" he used to receive. He "was never able to fathom the special and rather mysterious selection which had been made specially for him; it appeared to him to be on an erratic and irrational basis." Keitel hoped that there had been adequate liaison and remarked that Goering and Ribbentrop had been completely against any suggestion of a combined intelligence agency (and admitted that he himself would have been reluctant to give up his own agencies).

c. Dönitz was much more familiar with the activity of the Navy Signal Intelligence Agency. He knew of such cryptanalytic details as "depth" and "key changes". He knew the names of several of the leaders of the Navy organization but denied receiving the reports of any other organization and knew very little about them.

d. Ribbentrop was described as the most difficult of the prisoners to "prime" for talking on the subject of signal intelligence. It was very hard to reduce the statements of his interrogation to coherent form. However, Ribbentrop stated that when he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938 he discovered that practically nothing existed in the way of a political intelligence organization and that nearly everything was in the hands of the Wehrmacht and SS (Armed Forces-Abwehr?-and Elite Gaurds). He stated that "this was unfortunate because everything went to Hitler and there was no clearing house." It seems clear that Ribbentrop was at first talking about "political intelligence" as something distinct from signal intelligence as the subsequent statements concern cryptanalysis and it may be assumed that
he had discovered where the interests of his interrogators lay. He knew that "the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section Pers ZS was under Herr Selchow who had been engaged in this work during the first world war." He did not know the details of the organization but he stated that Selchow "liaised closely with the RLM/Forschungsamt, the organization which produced the 'Brown Reports.' He saw between one and three of these Brown Report decodes everyday and remarked that in general the FA produced their decodes more quickly than the Foreign Office but their texts were far less clear and tended to be inaccurate." The FA "covered precisely the same field as Pers ZS and there was unfortunately almost complete duplication" which he believes he may have once tried to correct and also coordinate intelligence activities in general. He stated that Selchow maintained a "liaison on technical matters with OKW/Chi and probably compared notes with them" and believed that there was some sort of "technical exchange between OKW/Chi and the Forschungsamt". His reason for failing to achieve coordination of intelligence services is of interest: "as the system in force was for everyone to go privately and directly to Hitler it was scarcely worth trying." By comparison Keitel recalled that Ribbentrop was exceptionally jealous if anyone gave Hitler a diplomatic decode directly instead of passing it through the Foreign Office.

e. Goering was of course fulsome in his praises of the FA and has been cited in considerable detail for its history and accomplishments. He stated that he did not control the work program of the cryptanalysts and therefore should not be expected to know too much technical detail although he mentions the use of special cipher keys or a change of key when something important was happening. Specific examples recalled by Goering were the "messages of the American Minister in Berne" and the "Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reporting home." In the matter of liaison he stated that the FA did not deal with purely military traffic which was handled by the bureau of the Army, Navy and Air Force with whom the FA maintained liaison and exchanged intercepted traffic. He knew that the Foreign Office and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces also worked on civil ciphers and that there was a very close liaison with the Foreign Office to avoid unnecessary duplication.
6. Hitler's opinion of signal intelligence is mentioned by both Goering and Ribbentrop and the opinion expressed is completely divergent at first glance. Ribbentrop stated:

   Hitler had a queer, rather particular view about it—he did not like this type of intelligence very much and said it was unreliable and often misleading, it was better to use one's own common sense.

   Goering, however, declared that:

   Hitler's view of the products of the Forschungsamt was that they were very reliable; the materials had to be presented factually to Hitler with no argument nor appreciation, only the verbatim conversation or actual text.

   Goering's remarks came in a context where the telephone monitoring and broadcast monitoring activities of the FA were clearly in his mind. In connection with diplomatic decodes Goering had previously remarked that:

   The intelligence resulting from decoded telegrams was not always useful, they often consisted of absolute rubbish; the extent to which the members of the diplomatic corps spread and retailed fantastic rumors was surprising. He himself had often made arrangements to have rumors planted and within a few days he observed them being passed on and spreading.

   Ribbentrop's remarks about the opinion of Hitler were immediately preceded by discussion of diplomatic decodes exclusively. It is likely that Hitler was familiar with FA results from the period before the war. Keitel refers to an unfortunate instance of Himmler passing a single message to Hitler without collating it against other information and stated that Hitler had his own liaison officers to each agency in any case.

14. Extent of liaison at the operational level between the FA and other signal intelligence agencies. At the operational level it is possible to reconstruct a satisfactory picture of liaison and cooperation between the FA and the
other signal intelligence agencies. In many cases the personnel of the other agencies express opinions and prejudices or repeat rumors about the FA which can be positively refuted or revealed as prejudice and misinformation. Much of the evidence for FA success has been derived from the archives and records of the other organizations—no trace of the official archives of the FA has been found. The picture so reconstructed shows active and detailed cooperation, its details are set out in the following paragraphs and in the listing of FA successes in the appendix.

a. Liaison between the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and the FA is known to have existed. A special liaison officer of the FA was assigned to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces although not to the Signal Intelligence Agency. This man, known from the Kaufbeuren directive, was Dr. Klautschke, and he has himself testified on the form which his liaison took the form of passing intelligence to the Supreme Command and answering specific requests from them. He did not concern himself with cryptanalytic matters and states that liaison on these matters did not exist. 136 As has been amply documented in the sections of this paper dealing with the early history of the FA considerable ill feeling existed between the FA and Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces cryptanalysts. Instructions to exclude the FA from Foreign Office and Defense Ministry Cipher Section cooperation, references to ill feeling by Fenner for Schapper, and refusal of Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces IIB developments to the FA have been mentioned. All of these cases can be derived from the ill feeling between Schapper and Fenner. It seems clear that intercepted traffic was exchanged, indeed the Activity Report of the service organization, signed by Kettler, the head, shows that one third of all intercept received by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces came from the FA. 137 Mettig refers to attempts of the FA to take over the broadcast

136 See above para. 5 and Cf I 54.

137 DF 9
monitoring of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The unwillingness of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to give up their monitoring is understandable but in view of the interest and activity of the FA in this field it would seem that the duplication was unnecessary.

In Security matters there was an effort at cooperation; Kroeger, the cipher machine cryptanalytic expert of the FA was a member of Huettenhains cipher security committee and Huettenhain knew enough of his activity to explain that he was unable to attend all meetings because his section had moved to Breslau. It should be noted that the FA, as running its own communications, was in a position to ignore Huettenhain and the willingness to have a permanent member of the committee may be accepted as a symptom of willingness to cooperate. Finally a typical example of ignorance of the FA may be cited. Fricke, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, was told that the FA employed over 2000 people and remarked: "For their deciphering they should have needed a handful. They must have had other work to do but what the devil could they have done with 2000 people!"

b. As in the case of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, cryptanalysts of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command were not too well informed on the organization or operations of the FA. However, it is evident that considerably greater liaison existed between the FA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command than had existed between the FA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This liaison took the form of actual division of tasks and sharing of personnel as well as liaison over IBM developments. What would appear to have been one of the most important cryptanalytic achievements of the FA is known only from the testimony of Buggisch of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command who testifies (and the information was so important that two interrogations refer to the subject although in considerably less detail than might be

\[\text{References continued on next page.}\]
desired) that the FA was able to break and read Russian
teletype traffic.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{140} I 64 p 2: "Buggisch heard in 1943 that the FA had claimed
some success on a Russian teletype machine and had recon-
structed the machine. It was a machine with a very long
cycle being not prime but the product of several smaller
cycles—like the SZ 42. Buggisch did not know the cycle of
all of the individual wheels or any other details. He heard
this from Doering who was then doing his research on the
T 52 but liaison with FA was bad anyway (Major Mettig was
particularly opposed to the SS taint) and the next he heard
was that the traffic found by the FA had stopped. Buggisch
remembered only that the cycle of one of the wheels was 37;
the others he thought varied widely, from 30 to 80." This
testimony is admittedly at second hand where it concerns the
construction of the Russian machine. However, the indi-
cation that Mettig distrusted the FA because of an SS taint
is of interest in evaluating his evidence quoted previously.
Buggisch was questioned a second time on what specifically
"were the results of the FA mentioned in connection with
Russian cipher teleprinter" and his answer reveals addi-
tional liaison between the Signal Intelligence Agency of
the Army High Command and the FA, I 176 p 6: "The FA
(Forschungsamt) had analysed a Russian cipher teleprinter
system in 1943 and recognized that it must have been based
on a machine having certain similarities with the German
SZ 40. After a short time the Russians altered the system.
The FA then communicated its results to my unit and was
given as a kind of recompense a report on the solution of a
German cipher teleprinter. This was one of the very rare
cases where FA and In 7/VI exchanged results. I did not
study the FA results at that time, as I was not responsible
for work on cipher teleprinters, and hence can give no details.
At all events the Russian machine (just as in the German types
SZ 40, SF 42, but in contrast to T 52 a, b, c, and d) gave only
32 different substitution alphabets, the succession of which
became periodic only after an astronomically large number of
steps. This succession was given by a system of pin wheels,
the peripheries of which were prime to each other and at an
estimate lay between 30 and 90. In any case there was no
complicated mutual influence of the pin wheels on each other
(as for example in the T 52 D)."

\textsuperscript{63}
There is yet another example of FA liaison with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command on Russia. Lt. Schubert, the officer in charge of the section of the Army High Command Signal Intelligence Service on the Eastern Front responsible for agent traffic, reported that the Radio Defence Corps (WNV/Fu) sent Specialist Wenzel of the FA to work with him on Polish Resistance Movement Traffic.\(^{141}\) In the case of Turkish diplomatic traffic (the specific system is not known) complete cooperation is revealed. The FA gave the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command the mission of covering and reading all traffic. Traffic "was intercepted by Kona 4 and relayed to In 7/VI, referate of Bailovic."\(^{142}\) Only decoded messages were furnished to the FA. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command took the lead among the German agencies in the development and application of IBM machinery to cryptanalytic work. This machinery was made available to the other agencies. Tranow, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command stated:

> About March 1942 we paid a visit, in conjunction with the German Air Force and the FA, to the OKH Hollerith department in Berlin, Victorlastrasse. . . .\(^{143}\)

This is in marked contrast to the policy of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces reported by Huebbenhain and cited above. A somewhat peculiar reference to the effect of the creation of the FA on the cipher section of the Defence Ministry by personnel of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command needs no discussion as it can not be determined whether the Defence Ministry or the Signal Intelligence Agency

\(^{141}\) See also the discussion under Wenzel's section of Main Section IV above.

\(^{142}\) If 126 p 8. See further discussion of IF 126 in note 145 following.

\(^{143}\) If 146.
of the Army High Command are involved and the meaning is ambiguous. An equally unverified statement by two former members of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command declared that:

OKH in 7/VI worked for the FA in the field of diplomatic codes (for instance, they broke the Turkish code when the FA was having trouble with it.) FA received reports from the Signals Intelligence Evaluation section of the Army High Command from the Navy High Command, from the Armed Forces High Command and from the Foreign Office.145

144I 85 p. 3. Flick, Pokojewski, and Hatz; b) the expansion of OKH/Chi. As a result of the situation created by the advent of the FA, General Schleich, in the summer of 1935, began to lay plans for the expansion of OKH/Chi. This involved the setting up of three new stations ... to cover Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Progress was very slow .... By July 1939 the necessity for intercepting Czech traffic had ceased and it was decided to place the interception of diplomatic traffic under OKW, just created. It is barely possible that this reveals a division of labor under which the "OKH/Chi" group was to cover the Balkans diplomatic traffic while the FA concentrated on commercial traffic. This hypothesis might account for the Turkish diplomatic traffic handled by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command although Rentschler, IF 15, claimed FA success with "high grade Turkish Diplomatic" but he cites no date. The only Czech commercial traffic of Skoda, claimed for 1935 by Sauerbier, IF 162. Such a division seems unlikely, however, and Paetzol, in I 25, mentions Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Hungarian and Greek traffic worked on by the FA.

145IF 105 B. This report, and IF 126, are based on interrogations of Heinz Bosheinen and Walter Kotschy. IF 105 B is a special PW interrogation carried out by a US Third Army Signals officer. The cover letter of this officer's
Finally, Dettman, and Samsonoff, the heads of the Russian referate on the Eastern Front for the Signal Intelligence
continuation of footnote 145.

report states that the original notes of the interrogation had been destroyed for security reasons. This interrogation
took place on 29 November 1944. In the cover letter from
Col. Bicher submitting the interrogation it was stated that
the whereabouts of the prisoners was unknown but that they
would be sought for further questioning. Actually Boscheinen
and Kotschy were then (15 December) in the hands of CSDIC
in the U. K., and the results of CSDIC interrogations
were issued as SIR 1326 (equals IF 126) and SIR 1335 (equals
IF 105). IF 126 is an interrogation of a general nature
and corresponds essentially to the 29 November interrogation.
What differences exist between IF 105 B and IF 126 are presum­
bly due to misapprehension and condensation by the writer of
the former. IF 105 is a "follow up" interrogation to IF 126
which concerns a training school for Turkish translators which
seems to have been operated by the Abwehr or Mil. Amt.
Unfortunately it was not at first recognized that IF 105 B
was a separate document and it was thought to be a duplicate
of one of the two CISCIC interrogations. It was accordingly
mistakenly marked as a duplicate, and as a duplicate of IF
105 rather than of IF 126 which it does resemble in material
covered. References to both IF 126 and IF 105 B have been
corrected in the present volume and it is hoped that errors
in citation arising from the faulty identification as a
duplicate of IF 105 have been discovered else where. Both
IF 105 B and IF 126 discuss the Army High Command Signals
Intelligence organization and the details of Kona 4 in partic­
ular. Both state that the Army High Command broke and read
Turkish diplomatic for the FA. In both interrogations the
FA is identified as being a part of the Air Ministry but it
is confused with the Signals Intelligence Agency of the Air-
Force High Command. As there are references to agent ac­
tivity in both interrogations it seems clear that the prisoners
had confused the FA with either the Abwehr of the Mil. Amt.
IF 126 states that the FA received and sent Evaluation re­
ports to the Army High Command while IF 105 B states that
the FA received them. In IF 126 a chart shows the FA
receiving the results of telephone monitoring of a telephone
intercept company of the Balkan command as direct liaison
while other reports to the FA go from Kona 4 through In 7/VI.
Agency of the Army High Command stated that there had been no relations with the FA after 1944 when the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command linked up with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.146

c. The position of the FA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Airforce High Command under Goering should have facilitated an exchange between them. The absence, in the interrogations, of any reference to ill feeling between them indicates that such was the case. There are a few specific references to an exchange of technical information on specific problems. The functional division between them, however, precluded any need for constant liaison, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command was concerned with air traffic which, as such, was no concern of the FA. The FA, on the contrary, did supply an undetermined amount of diplomatic and general intelligence to the Air Force High Command and to its Signal Intelligence Agency. The head of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command, Friederich, stated:

He did not work with them (the RLM/FA) except to the extent that Voegele (the chief cryptanalyst) sometimes met with cryptanalysts from this and other agencies to discuss general problems. The FA furnished the GAF

146 II 116 p 2: "Subjects did not know whether RLM/FA worked on machine and/or Bendot traffic. OKH/Chi had no connections with the FA after 1944 when the former organization linked up with OKH/Chi. However, as a matter of opinion, they do not believe FA did." It is curious that Dettman and Samsonoff were ignorant of the Russian cipher teleprinter which the FA reported on and which was known to Buggisch. It is to be presumed that there had been relations between the two agencies prior to 1944 (Buggisch dated the teletype matter to 1943, it may be noted) from their statement that there were none after 1944. The lasting antipathy of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to the FA again stopped any liaison, it appears.
with appropriate traffic on occasion. We asked what was the function of the FA. He said its purpose was really hidden from the services, who were not allowed entry to the establishment. Only Voegele had any contact with them and that only with cryptanalysts....

Voegele, the chief cryptanalyst of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command, in "homework" he prepared for TICOM, referred to an exchange of additive for the (British) Inter Departmental Code with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command, and the FA in 1940/42. Zetsche (Hauptman in charge of Groupe A of Foreign Air Force West under Chef 1c) reported that the FA reports contained a great deal of significant information concerning economic and political matters. The reports from foreign broadcasts, as those of the BBC, were

147 I 29 p 3. Friederich knew that they carried out monitoring of telephone and telegraph for Goering and the Nazis. He thought that Goering had founded it personally. "It was completely political, not military. When it worked on foreign systems it worked only on rear area traffic, such as industrial traffic it thought the Army might not be handling adequately. They worked particularly on inner Russian traffic. Asked if he could name any FA personnel he said they are always changing. There was a Min. Rat Schaper (with one P) who was not a soldier but a civilian official." Friederich appears to be well informed on the FA when compared to some other prisoners. His mention of inner Russian traffic is interesting, as Seiffert (I 25) stated that this was the outstanding FA success.

particularly important, especially for the period between the invasion and the collapse when they were often the only source of reliable information on the war situation.\textsuperscript{149}

d. Liaison between the FA and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command is documented by references to the FA in Yearly Progress reports prepared by the Navy and by the interrogation of the chief Navy cryptanalyst, Tranow. As seen in the preceding paragraph, the FA and Air Force cooperated with the Navy on the British Inter-Departmental Cipher:

\begin{quotation}
I informed the FA, the OKW, and the GAF of the existence of this cipher in 1940 and the FA and the Navy worked on it. The OKW and the GAF restricted themselves rather to receiving the cipher data when worked out. The GAF did a little work on it, however, and passed any recovered keys on to us.
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{149}I 159: "6. Of special interest and value were the broadcast links between the news agencies and their correspondents in the various capitals of the world. Of broadcasting stations, the B.B.C. and Swiss stations were considered the most reliable, Daventry in particular being appreciated for its figures concerning Allied sorties and losses. Indeed, during the period between the invasion and collapse, B.B.C. reports were often the only source of reliable information on the war situation. 7. Radio monitoring was done by OKW/Chi, its Naval counterpart, the Seehaupenst, and the FA, the results being sorted out and distributed by Ic/Luftwesen...\textsuperscript{9}. Intelligence concerning foreign diplomatic exchanges was received from the FA (subordinated directly to Goering) through Ic/Luftwesen/Abwehr, and was given a restricted distribution. It consisted of intercepted Allied radio telegrams (e.g., London-Stockholm), ordinary radio reports (e.g., Atlantic Radio) and intercepted traffic between diplomats and ministers over certain links, e.g., Ankara-Moscow (Turk), Berne-Washington (American), and London-Washington (Poles). 10. The last mentioned source was of great value before and during the invasion and after the breaking off of German-Turkish relations. In general the FA reports contained a great deal of significant information concerning economic and political matters."
The cypher went out of use in December 1942. That was the last of it. I believe it was afterwards still used occasionally at a few stations. I stopped work on it for the navy about the end or middle of December 1942. The FA continued to send us occasional results. In particular these consisted again and again of information about our U-boat losses and the British shipping losses etc. 150

According to Tranow 2 to 3% of all Navy traffic came from the FA who supplied the German Navy with traffic from commercial links. 151 A Yearly Progress Report of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command refers to traffic in "Bentley's Code" which was supplied by the FA. 152 However, it should be noted that Tranow, when told by the interrogators that a number of messages dealing with North Russian convoy personnel matters were passed over commercial circuits, stated that the Navy had never seen them--"This material would have been done by the FA, if any such material was intercepted it was not passed to us." 153 Tranow did not mention receipt of reports based on broadcast monitoring. However, he did refer to "five FA men under Stabenow who had been doing press broadcast analysis" turning up at Flensburg after the war ended. 154 This presumably refers to Seifert, Paetzol Oden, Kleutschke, and Fingerhut who were found and interrogated by Ticom at Flensburg where they were continuing to issue a "news bulletin" based on broadcasts

150 I 147 p 11.
151 I 93 p 18.
152 p 17.
153 I 93 p 18.
154 I 93 p 18.
e. The status of liaison between the FA and the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section is more fully known than that between any other of the agencies. Ribbentrop stated that Selchow, the director of the Foreign Office bureau, "liaisoned closely" with the FA. The extent of this liaison can be learned in detail in the chapter on liaison in the discussion of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Volume VI) and in the appendix of FA successes at the end of this volume. As specific examples of the knowledge of the FA possessed by Foreign Office Personnel and of actual liaison a few instances will suffice here. The Foreign Office cryptanalysts from whom TICOM Team 1 first learned of the existence of the FA created an outline of the FA and knew the names of many of the section heads in Department IV (Hauptabteilung IV - Codes and Ciphers) with which they were immediately concerned. The Yearly Report for 1942 of the Foreign Office, inter alia, reveals an exchange of code book recoveries. The name of Senior Specialist Waechtedt of the FA appears in this document, and the names of other FA personnel occur in reconstructed code books in the Foreign Office archives.

155 Stabenow, from this evidence, seems to have been at Flensburg. He was the head of the Berlin Branch Office (see the Kaufbeuren directive) and could certainly have escaped from Berlin along with the other FA people. However, Ticom did not find and interrogate him. It is not known why this "lead" of Tranov's to his presence was not followed up.

156 The interrogators of Ribbentrop (I 143) stated that he was the most poorly informed and hardest to extract information from of the high Nazi's questioned at Nuremburg. For this reason his statement that there was close liaison is apt to be disregarded. The evidence for liaison between the FA and Foreign Office, however, adequately bears out his statement and suggests that he was better informed on the matter than the interrogators had assumed.

157 IF 15.

158 D 16. Other examples are cited in the appendix with source reference.
The existence of technical cryptanalysis liaison between the FA and the other cryptologic agencies cannot be denied and the categorical denial that technical liaison existed must be seriously questioned. Certainly there is good evidence for close liaison between the FA and the Foreign Office, Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command. Close cooperation with the Elite Gaurds and Abwehr is to be inferred. Only in the case of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces is there direct evidence that cryptanalytic liaison did not exist. Even here, however, there was liaison on security matters, an exchange of codes, 159 interchange of intercepted traffic, and a definite agreement that the FA would not work on military traffic. 160

159 Cf. Goering, I 145, who said he "saw OKW/Chi decodes..." and Ribbentrop, who "saw 2 or 3 Brown Reports a day.

should no longer have been concerned in telephone monitoring) the remains of a card index based on telephone conversations was found. In the light of all the evidence available the FA must be recognized as a highly successful source of intelligence in the fullest sense of the word. So important was the intelligence produced that careful arrangements were made for furnishing it throughout the final stages of the war. The relationship between the FA and the Abwehr, Gestapo, and Police in general censorship operations and in counter-measures against agents can only be indicated. The FA does appear to have served the Abwehr, and so the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in telephone monitoring in Germany and in occupied territory, and it served the Elite Guards, the Reich Main Security Office, the Regular Police, and the Radio Defense Corps as a crypt-analytic agency for agent traffic. Any attempt to evaluate its ability in collecting and evaluating press broadcast and similar material is invidious due to the lack of information on the achievements of the other agencies performing this function, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Office (the Seehausdienst), and the Propaganda Ministry.

161 IF 15 p 16 (appendix 2).
Appendix I.

Alphabetical Listing by Country of Systems Worked on by the FA.

This appendix presents the available information on the cryptanalytic phase of the FA's operations. Only eighty odd references to traffic worked on have been gleaned from the available material concerning the FA. Many of these references are vague and tend (especially when FA personnel were being questioned) to statements that traffic of such and such a country was only sorted according to link or that the diplomatic traffic of a country had been identified but not read. The archives and reports of the Cryptanalytic Section of the Foreign Office, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command, and even the Signals Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces reveal considerably more detail as to just which systems were worked on by the FA in liaison with the other German agencies. It should be noted that there is considerable evidence that the FA possessed copies of a surprising number of code books although there is no indication in Ticom Interrogations as to how the FA procured these items or even a hint that they were in the FA's possession. The following summary reveals six cases in which code books or ciphers were in the possession of the FA. In this appendix all available references to traffic worked on by the FA have been collected and the source indicated.

American (United States) Systems

American Strip System.

Paetzel stated that "we attempted a strip system and read it here and there but not currently. We finally gave it up as it took too many personnel." He did not remember any of the originators. Traffic was America to Europe but whether Washington-London or Washington-Paris he did not recall. The system employed 30 out of a matrix of 50 strips in a setting. (I 25 p 3; I 54 passim). FA ability to read this system may have been due to liaison with the Foreign Office although there is no indication that such is the case.
American Five Figure System with Monoalphabetic and Bigram Substitution.

Pastzel stated that US plain systems were read and subsequently a US system consisting of a five letter book enciphered by monoalphabetic and bigram substitution. This system was not solved currently as they only read back material several months to a year old. The tables changed within the message and this change was shown by an indicator. The successor to this system was not broken because there was no indicator in the middle of the message to show where the tables changed. (I 25 p.3.)

American State Department System used by Harrison from Berne.
The messages of Harrison in Berne were mentioned as examples of signals intelligence by Jodl and Goering and by cryptanalysts of several agencies. These messages were sent in the compromised Brown code and Rentschler stated that they had been "read up until quite recently". (I 143, IF 15).

Joint American and British Systems.
Pastzel refers to FA success with American and British unenciphered codes but knew of no instance of an important message being sent in a low grade system. Rentschler knew that American and British commercial messages were read, some of which concerned ship movements. These were mainly concerned with individual ships; convoy information was not dealt with by his section (Evaluation). Tranov, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command, referred to commercial messages supplied to the Navy by the FA. (I 25 p.4; IF 15; I 95).

Belgian Systems

Belgian Unenciphered books.
Pastzel stated that the Belgians used one book with and without substitution encipherment. It was read in both cases. (I 25 p.2.)
British Systems

British Consular Systems.
Rentzschler stated that a message from the British consul at Cairo gave some information and Jodl recalls important information having been gained from this source. (The reference by Jodl is presumed to be to a FA decode.) In the Pers Z5 Yearly Report for 1942, British Empire Section, there is reference to a statement by ORR Waechter of the FA of a fruitless attempt on a Teneriffe-Las Palmas Consular code. He also reported that a system used between Teneriffe and Las Palmas had been worked on by the FA in February 1942 which proved to be a case of transposed plain text. (IF 15, I 143, D 16).

British Diplomatic Systems.
Schroeder stated that Hitler delayed his discussions with the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, during the Bad Godesburg [Munich] Conference for several hours while a message sent to London by the Prime Minister could be decoded. Seifert states that work on British Diplomatic cipher systems was useless and no success was obtained. "There was an occasional physical compromise. We captured clear text and a basic book in Norway but had no success with them cryptographically." He did not remember whether the clear text was ever available to Hauptabteilung V but did remember the basic books. In regard to low grade systems Seifert stated that un-enciphered books were attacked and read. Rentzschler stated that second, third, and fourth grade British Diplomatic Codes could be read. (IF 132; I 25 p. 2; IF 15).

British Interdepartmental Cipher and/or Code.
Tranov, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command, stated: "From the middle of 1942 results fell off because of less material. However, we continued to decipher a very good percentage of what material came in. The military situation had now changed. Russia had entered the war. Traffic with Ankara and Stockholm was very heavy but actual Navy traffic dropped considerably. I informed the FA, the OKW, and the GAF of the existence of this cipher in 1940 and the FA and the Navy worked on it. The OKW and the GAF restricted themselves rather to receiving the cypher..."
data when worked out. The GAF did a little work on it, however, and passed any recovered keys to us. The cypher went out of force in December 1942. That was the last of it. I believe it was afterwards still used occasionally at a few stations. I stopped work on it at the Navy about the end or middle of December 1942. The FA continued to send occasional results. In particular these consisted again and again of information about our U-Boat losses and the British shipping losses etc. This was in the first months of 1943 up to the summer of that year. "Pasetzel merely thought that the FA worked on Interdepartmental cipher. Voegele, chief of Section "E" of Chi Stelle (OKL/LM Abt 350) stated that there was an exchange of recyphering book results for the Interdepartment Code [italics mine] with OKW, OKM, and the FA in 1940 up to 1942". The British Empire Section of the Pers ZS Yearly Report for 1942 stated that the work on this system was stopped in the summer of 1942 because the traffic received was slight and in consequence the additive sequences, which were received only late from the Ministry of Aviation (FA) revealed fragments of a text which was generally uninteresting. Miss Hagen, the head of the Pers ZS English Group, stated "there was no liaison with the FA except on the subject of the Interdepartmental Ciphers". (I 147; I 25 p.3; I 112 p. 9; D 16 reports 3 and 4; I 172 #13).

"Code 'B-30'".

The British Empire Section of the Pers ZS Yearly Report for 1942 refers to FA liaison in that year: "In February 1942, at the request of ORR Waechter of the FA, an attempt was made to establish contact with the FA, which however, did not get beyond a general exchange of ideas. The only concrete results were that the FA placed at our disposal a list of approximately 50 'B-30' recovered groups". (D 16 report 4 page 1).


Sauerbier states that a Bank of England Code was broken in 1941 (See INTABANK below. I 162).

Bulgarian Systems.

Bulgarian Codes.

Pasetzel stated that Bulgarian systems were basically a few five digit-codes with repaginations or relineations. A 1940 report from the Pers ZS Bulgarian Group mentions that
the FA had furnished them with photocopies of two Bulgarian codes. (I 25 p. 8; T 2038, Report of Bulgarian Group 1 January 1940). Ticom Doc. 240 (Film 34) has a list of Bulgarian material in the possession of the FA. It is not known whether this material was at Kaufbeuren or not. The list contained some twenty entries, including Dictionaries and Work Books, and was marked "To be Destroyed".

Chinese Systems

Chinese Traffic.
Chinese traffic was worked on at one time, according to Paetzel, but not towards the end. Some progress was made but nothing was read. (I 25 p. 7.)

Clandestine Traffic.

Clandestine Traffic of Detained Persons.
Clandestine traffic of detained persons, according to Sauerbier, was mostly scattered messages in individualistic systems which were rarely solved. (I 162.)

Czechoslovakia Systems.

Skoda Company Commercial Code.
According to Sauerbier one of the major undertakings in the prewar FA was the code used by the (Czech) Skoda firm to Iran and Iraq in 1935. This was concerned almost entirely with bridge building projects. (I 162.) Ticom Document 240 Item 42 is a cover letter for "Czech Messages" to be sent to the "Sta Poleit, Prag".

Danish Systems.

Danish Diplomatic Code.
Sauerbier said that about 50% of the traffic in the old Diplomatic code was read up until 1940. Nothing was solved thereafter except an occasional message in the old code on some minor commercial matter. (I 162.)

Ethiopian Systems.

Ethiopian Code.
Paetzel said that the FA had "done a little work on an Ethiopian Code". (I 25 p.8)
Finnish Systems.

Finnish Machine Ciphers.
Paetzel said that the FA at one time had cribs for the Finnish (or Swedish?) Hagelin and broke in. He subsequently stated that it was possible to break the Finnish Hagelin if they had 4,000 letters or more of text. (I-25, I-54).

French Systems.

French Diplomatic Ciphers.
Goering stated that "the ciphers of the French Foreign Office at the Quai d'Orsay had been obtained" but he did not remember the details nor give the date of this compromise. An Associated Press story, based on Goering's personal copy of his own telephone conversations at the time of the Anschluss, indicates that the ciphers mentioned above may well have been a very high grade system. Goering was reasonably guarded in his telephone conversation and the newspaper translation itself is not technically perfect from our specialized viewpoint. The conversations reveal Goering telephoning Hitler (in Austria to celebrate the triumphal of the Anschluss) that no action by France was to be feared because England had refused to back her in display of force. Goering assured Hitler that the information was certain because it was based on information from the Brown Reports taken from decoded telegrams of the French Foreign Office. The mention of the Brown Reports indicates that the FA was involved. The conversation was as follows: "Tell the Fuehrer that the Brown Reports have just come which are completely clear because they were seized [?] Clear because the ciphers were "seized"??? . . . The French indeed wanted to go into action without any reservation and so pressed most hard on the British. I can send you all the decoded cables. And only because England declined the whole action has blown up . . . Today France tells its ministers in the various countries it can do nothing because England refused . . . " (I 143, IF 188).

French Code.
Pers ZS records referred to work in 1941 on a 10,000 group figure code designated as "19". The first solution was said to have been achieved by the FA using captured tables which were later turned over to Pers ZS. Dr. Brandes, the head of the French Language Section in Dr. Paschke's sub
section of Pers.ZS, stated that he was responsible for liaison with the FA for the group. According to Seifert, the FA had success with all French unenciphered books ("This was particularly predictive because the French used a large number of these books"). (D 54, p. 13, report 8, page 18; I 25 p. 2).

Vichy French Code.

Rentschler stated that the easiest system to break of all of those worked on by the FA was "French (Vichy period, De Gaulle used Allied codes and consequently his diplomatic traffic is not read) since Vichy changed its code only about every four weeks. (IF 15). [This statement of Rentschler appears contradictory. It would be expected that Vichy codes would be available to the Germans without necessity for breaking, and the reference to "captured tables" in the paragraph above would support this belief. However, it may be that the FA and Foreign Office did not receive diplomatic codes or ciphers through the German Armistice commission which may not have been interested in such liaison.]

German Systems.

Commercial Codes.

Sauerbier said that in peacetime he was concerned almost entirely with commercial codes in the German language. This involved the traffic of German firms to foreign countries during the four year plan. (I 162.)

Greek Systems.

Greek Codes.

Paetzel said that just two Greek plain codes were read. (I 25, p. 8.)

Hagelin Machines.

Paetzel said that Hagelin messages were never broken because they were never long enough. He estimated that perhaps 5000 letters would be needed. However, in a second interrogation he contradicted himself in connection with Finnish and Swedish systems where he stated that ciphers had been secured and the Hagelin read. He also stated that "it could be read on 4000 letters. (I 25 p. 6; I 54.)
Hungarian Systems.

Additive System.
Paetzel stated that the Hungarians used an additive changing with the message which was not solved. (I 25, p. 8.)

Intabank System.

Intabank Code.
Sauerbier described the solution in 1944 of the code used by Intabank, the International Bank at Basle, as a major effort of the section. The code used was an old Bank of England code which had been solved in 1941. The pages were shuffled and an encipherment added but solution was achieved by the use of cribs and common form messages of which the best was a statement of the daily exchange rates between the various countries. The detail of the encipherment was as follows: the basic system was bigram substitution from a table different for each link and changing each three months. The text was divided into segments of three or four groups, and the plain text bigrams for encipherment were prearranged pairs as 1 and 15, 2 and 14, 6 and 10, etc. Very long depths and near-depths were produced on closely similar number values and this was the entry. The whole solution took about six months, starting with 1942-43 and working up to 1944. The interception of the traffic was not systematized at any time and Sauerbier did not believe that more than 50% of all the traffic was read as a result of the solution. (I 162)

Irish Systems.

Enciphered Code.
Paetzel said that FA/7 worked on Irish enciphered codes with considerable success up to the end of the war. Interrogation of Pers ZS prisoners referred to the Government Telegraph Code, which "was used by the Irish government for diplomatic communications, with an encipherment by two substitution alphabets. The FA solved the keys used on the Berlin and Madrid links in 1943. Pers ZS took over the keys from the FA in 1944. (I 54; I 172 p. 11)
Italian Systems.

Enciphered code.

Rentschler claimed some success on high grade Italian diplomatic systems. The Annual Report of the Italian Group of Pers ZS for 1940 indicated a fairly extensive Pers ZS-FA cooperation on Italian systems. Intercept of the FA was made available to the Foreign Office and from 1939 through 1940 there was a regular exchange of encipherment tables. In September 1940 and in November 1940 there was a mutual exchange of book groups on two codes "AR 38 and RA 1". (IF 15, T2252.)

Japanese Systems.

Diplomatic Systems.

Rentschler claimed some success with Japanese diplomatic. Goering remembered that information was obtained from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin reporting home. Paetzel described a Japanese main diplomatic system which employed a code book enciphered by a combination of transposition and Raster. They were successful with this up until the last phase of the war. He also mentions a transposition with nulls over two and four letter code. This had a complicated indicator system. It was worked on in the middle of 1943 and again in January 1945 when it was believed to be the same system. (IF 15; I 143; I 25, p. 7; I 54.)

Machine System.

Paetzel stated that a Japanese system was broken in 1941-1942 which was thought to be a machine system although their solution was not mechanical but employed simply paper strips. (I 54).

Latin American Systems.

Paetzel stated that the FA read all Mexican (traffic) and some smaller countries like Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Venezuela. They were usually periodic substitution but Mexico had codes." (I 25, p. 8.)

Manchurian Systems.

Paetzel said that Manchurian traffic was worked on but he knew nothing about it. (I 25, p. 7.)
Paezel stated that the FA had success with Yugoslav traffic which he thinks was Mihailovitch. It was five digit or five letter with diphone substitution of the corresponding position of pairs of code groups. (I 25, pp 7-8).

Norwegian Systems.

Diplomatic Code.

Sauerbier said that an unenciphered five letter code was read completely up to 1940. Nothing was read after the Norwegian government moved to London. Sauerbier had a vague impression that they had gone over to a machine. (I 162).

Polish Systems.

Polish Diplomatic code.

The FA was interested in Polish systems between London and Washington, Berne, Cairo, and Jerusalem but had only sorted them by link. In describing the work of FA/9, Sauerbier only recalled the solution of a Polish diplomatic code in 1940-41. This he remembered as using one additive of specific length, which after 1943 became too long to produce depths, so after that date it was not solved.

This sounded to the Interrogator more like a Polish Home Office System than a Foreign Office system]. The Situation report of the Pers ZS Polish Group dated 1 January 1940, revealed that at that time both the FA and Pers ZS were working on a secondary consular system and that Pers ZS received Polish intercept from the FA. (I 22, I 162, T 2038.)

Polish Agents' Systems.

Seifert remembered traffic of Polish Agents in Czecho- slovakia. Paetzel described these systems as numerous aperiodic systems employing many cover names but was unable (or unwilling?) to give any information about the key.

Lt. Schubert, in charge of work on Agent Systems on the Eastern Front for the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/In 7/VI) mentions Wenzel of the FA as an expert on Polish Resistance Movement traffic although he does not know if any of this traffic had been read by the FA. (I 25, I 54, I 26.)
Portuguese Systems.

Portuguese Codes.

Paetzel said that the "Portuguese were very conservative. They used a five digit code plus substitution. It was very, very simple. (I 25 p. 8.)

Russian Systems.

Diplomatic Code and Additive.

Sauerbier mentions "a few people who were engaged in a fruitless attack on Russian diplomatic traffic. This attack culminated in the belief that the system was a code with a non-repeating additive. (I 162.)

Commercial Systems.

Seifert mentions work by the FA on economic traffic passing between various points in Russia. "Our greatest success was obtained on internal Russian traffic which enabled us to discover the various bottlenecks in the Russian supply organization." Paetzel said that this traffic comprised several hundred messages a day and was cleartext mixed with cover names and was used by industrial plants, foundries, armament works, plane factories and so on." (I 25, pp1-5)

Russian Teletype Traffic.

Buggisch (a specialist at both the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and at the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command on machines and Russian) "heard in 1943 that the FA had claimed some success on a Russian teletype machine and had reconstructed the machine. It was a machine with a very long cycle being not prime but the product of several smaller cycles—like the SZ 42." Buggisch did not know the cycle of all the individual wheels or any other details. He heard this from Doering "who was then doing his research on the T 52 but liaison with the FA was bad anyway (Mettig was particularly opposed to the SS taint) and the next Buggisch heard was that the traffic found by the FA had stopped. Buggisch remembered "only that the cycle of one of the wheels was 37; the others he thought varied widely, from 30 to 80." Buggisch was again questioned about this teletype machine success of the FA on what specifically were the results
of the FA mentioned in connection with the Russian cipher teleprinter and answered in written homework that: the FA had analysed a Russian cipher teleprinter system in 1943 and recognized that it must have been based on a machine having certain similarities with the German SZ 40. After a short time the Russians altered the system. The FA then communicated its results to my unit and were given as a kind of recompense a report on the solution of a German cipher teleprinter. This was one of the very rare cases where the FA and In 7/VI exchanged results. I did not study the FA results at that time as I was not responsible for work on cipher teleprinters, and hence can give no details. At all events the Russian machine (just as in the German types SZ 40, SZ 42 but in contrast to the T 52 a, b, c, and d) gave only 32 different substitution alphabets, the succession of which became periodic only after an astronomically large number of steps. This succession was given by a system of pin wheels, the peripheries of which were prime to each other at an estimate lay between 30 and 90. In any case there was no complicated mutual influence of the pin wheels on each other (as for example in the T 52 d)." (I 64 p. 2; I 176 p. 6)

Agent Traffic

Sauerbier, who worked on Russian Agent Systems for the Ordnungspolizei (Orpo) and wrote a lengthy paper on the type of systems involved, stated that he was approached by the Orpo in 1941 with a request for cryptographic advice on the systems used by the Russian agents. They gave him copies of systems that were captured with agents, and he grouped these by categories. Analysis was limited almost entirely to a study of characteristics and recognition signals with a view to advising on the possibility of a "Gegenspiel" ([Counter-game--employing the agent after capture or pretending to be the agent]). This work was done first in Sauerbier's own time. Wenzel, his chief, opposed his involvement in it but was powerless to prevent it as the requests later came down through proper channels directed to Sauerbier. It was a one man job entirely with only occasional help of a girl file clerk. It generally took about one half of Sauerbier's time. He estimated that a total of 1500 different keys passed through his hands, mostly hand substitution systems, mostly in Russian but many in German (Sauerbier himself did not know any Russian). Of these only 4 or 5 were solved without a completely captured key. One of the
achievements of which Sauerbier was proudest was the use of an ordinary book left behind by an agent to solve his traffic. Sauerbier was never concerned with radio procedures, but purely with the cipher systems used. He was able to give advice on the probable group to which an agent belonged and could then consult his records for an account of the success or failure of a particular technique of "Gegenspiel" against this group. (I 162; I 164.)

A possible additional example of FA "success" against the Russians was chanced upon after the completion of this paper and has been inserted here without evaluation. While going through an inventory of the various boxes of material recovered by TICOM from the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers ZS) the following item was noted: "Box 13, Item 18. Green folding box containing: a) Pink folder marked 'Russisches Beutematerial (Ueber FA)' containing, (1) Photostats of Russian book of additive tables (including instructions for use), dated 1940. (2) Some photostats of 5 figure Russian traffic. (3) Blue folder containing photostats on 'Instruktion für die Behörden des NKWD zur Führung der Chiffre-Arbeit.' This material is available as TICOM DOCUMENT 6 on Film 1.

**Saudi Arabian Systems.**

**Saudi-Arabian Code.**

When asked if the FA had done any work with Arabian codes, as Saudi-Arabian, Paetzel expressed surprise and asked if Saudi Arabia had a system of its own. (I 25 p. 8.)

**Scandinavian Systems.**

Dr. Mueller of Pers ZS stated that he "had some unofficial liaison with the people in the FA who were working on Scandinavian" but specified no date for the collaboration. (I 22 #182.)

**Spanish Systems.**

**Spanish Additive System.**

Paetzel described a system of additives differing according to traffic link. Each link had ten tables, with 100 four digit groups on each table. The indicator (unenciphered) was the serial number and came in the second or third place. Paetzel stated that this was the most recent thing he had worked on personally. (I 25, p. 6.)

**Spanish Code.**

The Pers ZS Yearly Report for 1942 mentions a Spanish "04" Code which was not worked on by Pers ZS because of a lack of traffic. The FA worked on it and believed it was a machine system. It was a four digit code with 04 the indicator. (D 16, Report 4, p. 4.)
Swedish Systems.

Swedish Consular Traffic.
Although Rentschler stated categorically that there was no success with Swedish systems Sauerbier mentions a 4 or 5 digit non alphabetic code especially used on the link between Stockholm and Tokyo. Almost all of the other links went over to machine in 1939 but Tokyo was unable to convert. The machine was Swedish made and was called the "KRYTAA". Sauerbier thinks it had 15 numbered wheels. [This sounded to the interrogator like a thoroughly garbled version of either the KRYHA or Hagelin machine. Sauerbier did not seem sensitive on the point or to be garbling deliberately]. He stated that none of the main consular links to Washington, London, or Paris were ever read nor was there any success with Swedish diplomatic in FA/9-C. (I 162.)

Swedish Hagelin.
Peetzel stated that they had this type of traffic. See the discussion under Finland for his statement that either the Swedish or Finnish Hagelin was broken and contrast Sauerbier immediately preceding. (I 25, p. 6; I 54.)

Swedish-Turkish Commercial.
Sauerbier stated that commercial traffic between Turkey and Sweden was attacked particularly and solved but yielded none of the expected information on shipping possibilities. [It is not clear whether this is Swedish or Turkish traffic.]

Swiss Systems.

Swiss Enigma Machine.
Peetzel stated that the Swiss Enigma was formerly broken for a while, but only when it was improperly used. The same internal settings were used for a long time. After the inner settings changed we did not have any more solution. At first we reconstructed the wheels from cribs and from the fact that the inner settings remained the same. In his 1941 Report Dr Brandes of Pers ZS mentions solution of the Swiss Enigma. Apparently the FA furnished Pers ZS with a partial solution which Dr Kunze was able to complete. Thereafter there was an exchange of keys between the two agencies. (I 25 p.3; D 54 report 8, p. 8.)
Swiss Three Letter Code.

The Pers ZS Yearly Report for 1941, Report Nr. 8, mentions a 2304 group, three letter code. Its tables were first solved by the FA and later by Pers ZS. (D 54 report 8)

Thailand Systems.

Thailand Code.

At the beginning of 1942 Pers ZS turned over a Thailand code to the FA to copy. (Pers ZS Yearly Report 1942, D 16, report 4, page 3.)

Turkish Systems.

Turkish Commercial—see Swedish-Turkish Commercial.

Turkish Diplomatic Systems.

Rentschler claimed some success with high grade Turkish diplomatic systems. Kotschy and Boscheinen stated that "OKH In 7/VI broke the Turkish Diplomatic Code when the FA was having difficulties with it" and subsequently stated that the FA turned over Turkish diplomatic to Kona 4 in the Balkans, receiving only decoded traffic from In 7/VI. (IF 15, IF 105B, IF 126.)

United States Systems—see American Systems.

Vatican Systems.

Vatican Code.

In a captured Pers ZS reconstruction of a Vatican Code Book the signature of a Fraulien Titschak appears with the date of August 1939 and a notation that she had copied out values at that time for the FA. (Fraulien Titschak was a member of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Bureau). The Annual Report of the Italian Group of Pers ZS for 1940 indicates that while Pers ZS did some work on Vatican systems most of the identifications on Vatican systems were received from the FA. (T 93, film F; T 2252.)

Yugoslavia Systems—see Mihailovitch.
APPENDIX II

Translation of a Forschungsamt directive signed by Schapper, found in the quarters occupied by the FA at Kaufbeuren on 9 May 1945 by Ticom Team 1. Ticom document 240 item 34, IF 135.)

GEHEIME REICHSSACHE  
(Secret State Document)  
1-29/45 grs (14/3/45-in ink)* Kaufbeuren, 9 March 1945

to: I, II, III, IV, V, VI  
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14  
Service Post Seifert  
Branch Office Berlin  
Curtation Berlin  
" Hamburg  
" Vienna  
" Munich  
Liaison Office Foreign Office  
" " Ministry of Economics  
" " OKW  
" " Reich Security Office  
" " Propaganda Ministry

Subject: Organization; Present Reorganization of the Bureau and Branch Organization.

1. I have determined on the following organization of the Bureau:

Bureau Director: Direction of Bureau Operations Ministerial Director Schapper

Main Section I: Organization; secrecy;  
(Hauptabteilung) gards; security; official correspondence; Civil Service Personnel; basic problems of  
Personnel administration and budgetary transactions.

I/c Principal Specialist Bergeren  
Section I  
(Abteilung) Central Abteilung gards;  
Security; Air Raid Defence;  

*Crossed out in ink, apparently a correction as of 14 March.
Organization; Correspondence; Secrecy; Camouflage, Special problems.
Senior Specialist Rosenhahn
Administration
Principle Specialist Kunsemueller

Main Section II:

Personnel
Senior Specialist Kempe
Personnel
Senior Specialist Kempe

Main Section III:

Interception, Sorting and Examination
Principal Specialist Breuer
Interception
Specialist Popp
Sorting
RR Dr. Henke

Main Section IV:

Codes and Ciphers
Minister Dirigent Schroeder
Research
Senior Specialist Dr. Paetzel
Overseas, Southwest
Senior Specialist Waechter
West and South
Senior Specialist Schulze
East, Southeast, Middle, North
Senior Specialist Wenzel

Main Section V:

Information collection and Evaluation
Principal Specialist Seifert
While Principal Specialist Seifert heads the Service Post Seifert (as is mentioned below) Senior Specialist Dr. Kurzbach replaces him in Kaufbeuren.

Information Dissemination
Specialist Dr. Mews
Section 11
Foreign Political Evaluation
i/c Principle Specialist Dr. Kurzbach
Section 12
Economic Evaluation
i/c Acting Head Brieschke
Section 13
Internal Affairs Evaluation
i/c Specialist Rentschler

Main Section VI:
i/c Technical
Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Stabenow
While Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Stabenow heads the Branch Office Berlin (see paragraph 2 below) he will be replaced at Kaufbeuren by Senior Specialist Dr. Huppertsberg
Senior Specialist Dr. Huppertsberg

Section 14
i/c Technical
Senior Specialist Dr. Huppertsberg

Service Post Seifert
in Berlin
(Dienststelle Seifert)
i/c Information Head, Special instructions of the Bureau branches.
Principal Specialist Seifert

2. Subordinate to the Bureau are:
a) The Branch Office Berlin
(Zweigstelle Berlin)
i/c Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Stabenow
I have determined on the following organization of the Branch Office Berlin:

Work Section 1:
(Arbeitsgebiet)
i/c Security: ARP; Gaurds;
Camouflaging ("Cover") of special correspondence;
special assignments; Passes (Badges?) special supplies, courrier service.
Civil Servant Dr. Gerth

Work Section 2:
Administration
Section 3:

Work Section 3: Personnel Administration
  i/c Specialist Henke

Work Section 4: Technical Development
  i/c Specialist Czwalinna

Work Section 5: Technical Maintenance
  i/c Acting Head Specialist Truebenbach

b) The Outstation Berlin of the Forschungsamt
   (Forschungslieitstelle)
  i/c Specialist Thieme

The Outstation Hamburg of the Forschungsamt
  i/c Senior Specialist Kirbach

The Outstation Vienna of the Forschungsamt
  i/c Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Fleischmann

The Outstation Munich of the Forschungsamt
  i/c Specialist Niedermeier

c) The Liaison Office-foreign Office
   (Verbudungstelle)
  i/c Civil Servant Dr. Gerstmeier

The Liaison Office-OKW
  i/c Civil Servant Dr. Klautschke

The Liaison Office-Reich Security Office
  i/c Specialist Dipl. Ing. Scholz

The Liaison Office-Economic Ministry and Ministry for
War Production
  i/c Specialist Dr. Hilligardt

The Liaison Office-Propaganda Ministry
  i/c Civil Servant Severitt

3. Postal Address
For the convenience of all concerned I give the following
Postal address of the Forschungsamt:
  For the Branch Office Berlin, Outstations Berlin and
  Hamburg, and the Liaison Offices:
    Reichsluftfahrtministeriums-Forschungsamt
      (1) Berlin-Charlottenburg 2
          Schillerstrasse 116/124

For all higher offices:
    Reichsluftfahrtministeriums-Forschungsamt
      (13b) Kaufbeuren/Allg.
The courier service between Berlin and Kaufbeuren continues, at this time it is the quickest possible connection.

4. Administrative Relation:
   a) The Reporting Center Seifert is administratively subordinate to the Branch Office Berlin.
   b) The Liaison Offices are administratively subordinate to the Branch Office Berlin.

5. Authority
   a) The head of the Reporting Center Seifert has essentially the authority of a Main Section head conformable to Standing Orders.
   b) The head of the Branch Office Berlin has essentially the authority of the head of an Outstation conformable to standing orders.

signed
Schapper
witnessed: Eulenberg
author
### Description of Ticom Document 240 (Film 34)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Place of origin</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10/9/43</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>List of equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Hand drawn chart showing floor plan of IBM room, presumably made by Ticom Team 1 at Kaufbeuren.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 A-B</td>
<td>17/4/45</td>
<td>Kempe</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Notice of drill schedule for FA Volksturm company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10/4/45</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Notice of movement of two Forschungsstellen. Copenhagen A station has moved from its previous address to Nyropagade 17/11, telephone number Palace 9469 extension 35,8,9, and 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/1/45</td>
<td>Gestapo</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>The Wehrmacht liaison did not change (phone did not?). The A Station at Stettin moved on 29 March to Griefwald, Bahnhof Strasse, 16/47. Telephone Griefwald 3207.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/1/45</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Letter from Amt IV A-5a of the Reich Main Security Office to the FA with an agents message to be deciphered. Cover letter forwarding the above to Kaufbeuren.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/4/45</td>
<td>Kuebblor Kempe</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Kuebblor, of FA 9 requests permission to stay overnight with his family at Hirschzell. The request is refused on the ground that his family, residents of Hamburg/Salle, should have evacuated to Saxony and Thuringia, not to South Bavaria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Memoranda on interdepartment phone service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/4/45</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Request that Dr. Neuenhoff be appointed a special liaison man to Berlin for FA 9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/45</td>
<td>Schmidt</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Memo on laundry service with example of form to be filled out.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>ILLEGIBLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>List of personnel of FA 9, with signature or notation of transfer:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Arnold, Moritz
Brott, Liselotte
Degau, Juergen
Gertz, Helene
Grothe, Edith
Guelle, Otto
Gottschalk, Gottfried
Graudus, Alexander /Berlin
Jentsch, Julius 5.4.45 to
Rubpler
Kiewadt, Ilse, transferred
to FA 373
Kirstein, Karl
Krenzke, Georg
Kuebbler, Ferdinand
Dr. Kuepper, Helmut
Lade, Karl
Lechner, Otto
Dr. Ludwig, Helmut
Matys, Georg
Mayr, Margarete, signed for
by Brett
Meinhard, Pauline
Nusbaum, Ingeborg
Dr. Flagens, Hermann
Remwerts-Lukjansky, Dimitri
Richter, Helga, signed for
by Remwertz
Roth, Liselotte, 5.4.45
to Ruffler
Ruffler, Georg 5.4.45 to
Berlin
Siemon, Fritz
Scheitingen, Josef
Schirajeff, Erika
Schubert, Walter
Steffens, Gerda
Thomas, Hildegard
Walger, Egon

Note to Czwalinna, Berlin,
Marchstrasse 25 b. Frau
Helene Gertz, born Spon-
holz wants a transfer. A
Forschungastelle is suggested.
She is good in French and
reads Russian.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>9/3/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Order replacing RR Harrius with RR Dr. Henke as leader of FA 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>20/3/45</td>
<td>Rosenhahn</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Memo showing official seal for 2nd quarter of year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>12/2/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Note on transport for move from Breslau to Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>A-D26/1/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Luebben</td>
<td>Order closing down the Forschungsleitstelle Breslau and its branches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>6/3/45</td>
<td>Kempe</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Order on military service and Volksturm drill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>5/3/45</td>
<td>Meyer</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Meyer, for FA 2, passes a notice on quarters for members of the FA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>5/3/45</td>
<td>Paetzel</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Memo to IV, 7, 8, and 9 on Air Raid Precautions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>A ?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Handwritten note from Forschungsstelle D-2 wanting to know the correct address for FA 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>B 6/3/45</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>FA-9 answers that its address is Kaufbeuren, Allg. 13 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-C26/1/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Luebben</td>
<td>Order of Schapper setting up Berlin, Luebben and Jueterbog branches of the FA after the move from Breslau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 A-B 5/3/45 ?</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Barely legible directive from FA IV to 7, 8, 9 on special air raid precautions, working schedules, evacuation of material. Names mentioned are: RR Lehr, RR Kagelka (?), RR von Stubenfauch, RR Kroeger, ORR Dr. Martin Paetzel, ORR Waechter, ORR Schulz, ORR Wenzel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 A-B 31/1/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>OKW/WNV/Chi</td>
<td>Teletype message addressed to RLM/FA for ORR Wenzel with cipher keys for February use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 A-B 1/3/45</td>
<td>Mayer</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Forwarding a memo on air raid precautions from a Major Esgele of the Kaufbeuren airfield.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 2/2/45 ?</td>
<td>Jueterbog</td>
<td>Jueterbog</td>
<td>Memo from FA 9 to FA 3 stating that the following persons assisted in moving classified materials from Breslau to Jueterbog: Karl Kirstein, Alexander Graudes, Juergen Deggau, Erika Schirajeff, Georg Krenzke, Karl Lade, Fritz Simon, Otto Lechner, Egon Walger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 A-D 9/3/45</td>
<td>Schapper</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Directive reorganizing the FA with the main bureau at Kaufbeuren, less FA 15.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Setting up of a Berlin Branch Office and a Reporting Center under Seifert. Assignment of control of the Forschungsstellen and Liaison officers. (Translated as first part of this appendix. Note item 19, of the same day, which emends the above order.)

Order giving dates for entrance on duty of various officials named in item 34: RR Niedermeyer enters on duty at the Forschungsleitstelle Munich on 20/3/45; RR Henke reports at the Branch Office Berlin on 1/4/45; and ORR Kunsmueller in Kaufbeuren on 10/4/45.

Additional assignments and transfers of personnel: Item 34 is again emended with RR Dr. Rautenkranz transferred from the School of the FA to head of FA 12 as of 20 (corrected to 22) /3/45; Erieschke is relieved as acting head of FA 12 and appointed Liaison Officer with the Ministry for War Production as of 1/4/45; RR Dr. Hilligardt is relieved as Liaison Officer to the Ministry for War Production and assigned to FA 12/4; RR Dr. Fingerhut is transferred to Seifert's Reporting Center in Berlin 22/3/45; RR Progich(?), while retaining his present position at the Waldlager, Luebben, is also a liaison official with the Berlin Branch Office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 A-C30/9/44</td>
<td>Schroeder</td>
<td>Breslau</td>
<td>Schroeder forwards a memo on agents (Polish and Russian, &quot;Kundschafter, Spione, Saboteure&quot;) from the Abwehr Officer of Wehrkreis Kommando VIII. Photocopy was made by Schroeder and circulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 13/1/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>OKW/WFSt/AgWNV/Chi III A sends official key for March to the FA. Signed by Major Metzger. Address of Metzger is Dresden N 31, Hindenburg-kaserne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 3/2/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>Same as above, key for March, a new emergency key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 26/2/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>Same as 37, key for April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 28/3/45</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Hardly legible, is to FA 6, 7, 8, 9 with FA 6 marked as for information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 23/3/45</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Handwritten, not very legible, seems to refer to Stapoleit, Prag. Copies of Czech messages are to be sent to Herr Rummel of the Stapoliet at a Prague address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 1/2/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>A new cipher key for February from OKW/Chi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 26/3/45</td>
<td>Metzger</td>
<td>Halle/Salle</td>
<td>Cipher key for April, a new key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 A-C 4/4/45</td>
<td>Rosenhahn</td>
<td>Kaufbeuren</td>
<td>Memos on security circulated for information of FA departments. B refers to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
publication by Reuters of a matter with Secret classification and repeats Hitler's orders on handling Secret and Top Secret (C).

46 A-B 12/4/45 Bergeren Kaufbeuren

Directive from Bormann forbidding party members (Gauleiters) to try to correspond with old party friends in occupied (Allied occupied) territory, circulated by Bergeren.
Appendix III

Autobiography of Gottfried Schapper, last head of the FA. Prepared by Ticom and included as appendix 2 of IF 15.

Curriculum vitae of the former Ministerialdirektor Gottfried Schapper.

Born 16/12/1888 in Groszmoeringen, Kreis Stendal, son of the Evangelical Pastor, Dr. Karl Schapper.

Schools: Elementary school, Classical high school, matriculation certificate 1910.
1910 Fahnenjunker and Lieut. in Railway Regt No 2.
1913 Transferred to Signals.
1914-1918 In the First World War: O. C. Heavy W/T Station 15 in the west with AOK 5 (Crown Prince).
In the east with G.K.X., (Emmich)
I Inf Div (Konta)
11th Bavarian Inf Div (Kneupel)
AOK Linsingen
Southeast (Balkans) with O.K. Mackensen as O. C. Deciphering Station Balkans.

1916-1917: O. C. Wireless Section High Command of the Army at GHQ and Director of the Cryptographic Bureau (Geheimwissenschaft 1. Abt.) of the High Command of the Army. (Interception, Deciphering, Intelligencing of all military and political signals interceptable by technical devices).
1918: Divisional Signals Commander with various divisions in the west.
1919: Discharged with rank of captain.
1919-1920: Married, fell into the hands of revolutionary swindlers, without work or food, harried by Communists, sold newspapers and other things on the streets, did odd jobs to ward off starvation.
1920: Secretary of the National Society of Berlin for Rescuing the Reich from the Revolution. Took part in the Kapp-Ludendorf Putsch. Persecuted by Communists, moved to Munich.
1920-1927: In Munich. Various jobs as business manager of National organizations, of clubs, businesses, and newspapers.
1920-1923: Member of the N.S.D.A.P. resigned after the Putsch of 1923.
1927-1933: In Berlin: Administrative officer and head of department in the cryptographic bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry. Resigned 1933, as I could not agree with the thoroughly incompetent methods of the cryptographic bureau. Therefore,

1933-April 1945 I went over to Goering, whom I knew well from the first world war; founding of the Forschungsamt (see my report on the Forschungsamt): head of sub-section, then head of section, and from 1944 director of this bureau.

1933: Joined the Nazi party and remained a simple member of it until April 1945.

1933-1937 or 38: Member of the Allgemeine SS, from which I resigned, as they refused to recognize my Christian philosophy of life.

1934: A Son was born to me.

1939-1945: Employment of the Forschungsamt in the second World War, under my direction, first as deputy head, then independently from 1944: at first in Berlin, after the bombings out, in Breslau and subsequently in Kaufbeuren.

April 1945: Release and residence in Soellbrun-Niederwall near Rosenheim.

May: Arrested by CIC, interrogation in Rosenheim, imprisonment and interrogation in Salzburg, then captivity in Augsburg.
Abteilung. Section, Indicated by Arabic numerals.
Abwehr. Military Intelligence and counter espionage section of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Taken over by RSHA in 1944.
Air Force High Command (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe q. v.).
Amt Ausland. Amt VI of RSHA q. v.
Arnold, Moritz. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.
Arbeits Gebiet. Work Section, Subdivision of Branch Office Beru.
Army High Command - see Oberkommando des Heeres.
Bailovic, Senior Specialist Rudolf. Bailovic is an Austrian and is reported to be violently anti-Nazi. He was a member of the Austrian cipher bureau (Austrian Chancellery Secret Section) and at the time of the Anschluss he refused to hand over the key of the secret cabinet. He therefore fell into disgrace and was relegated to an inferior position in the government. Fenner and Fellgiebel brought the best Austrian personnel to Germany and Bailovic was first given to the FA. No details of his stay there are known but he next appeared in the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command where he headed a Balkan section. Later he transferred to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Recently he has been employed more in an administrative capacity than as a cryptanalyst. He was said to have refused to wear any German medals while in uniform and lived quietly with his wife.
Becker, Holder of an FA telephone number as a member of Main Section V-3, whatever that may be.
Bergeren, Principal Specialist. Head of Main Section I of FA.
Berlin: The Main Bureau (April 1933-November 1943), the Service Post Seifert and the Forschungsleitstelle Berlin were located here. The Main Bureau was in Charlottenburg, a SW suburb of Berlin. The address was Berlin, Charlottenburg 2, Schillerstrasse Nr 116/124.
In addition a telephone monitoring station (including a special "Poison Kitchen" for monitoring the conversations of Top Nazi officials), and two radio intercept stations at Templin and Luebben (q.v.) were located here. Forschungsstelle D02 was also in Berlin.

Bock, _____, Senior Specialist. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer, Head of State Police /Gestapo/ Central Office, Berlin.

Bodenschatz, _____, General der Flieger. Head of the Office of Ministers.

Boettger, _____, Senior Specialist. Given as a member of the FA and having a FA telephone number, otherwise unknown.

Bokelberg, _____, Col. Group leader of the Monitoring Department of the Air Ministry (RLM/S. A. UEWA.)

Boscheinen, Heinz: Non Commissioned Officer. Turkish Interpreter. Member of Bailovic's section of In 7/VI. Worked in Evaluation.

Branch Office Berlin.--Zweigstelle Berlin.

Brandes, Dr. Wilhelm, Senior Specialist (Oberregierungsrat), in charge of Language Groups France, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland at the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section.

Breslau. 41°07"N 17° 00" E. Location of a Forschungsleitstelle and of a radio intercept station. After the 1943 bombing of the Berlin headquarters a part of the Main Bureau was located in the Hartlieb barracks in Klettendorf.

Breuer, _____, Principal Specialist. Head of Main Section III of FA.

Brieschke, Herr. Acting head of Section 12 at Kaufbeuren. On 20 March he was relieved as head of FA 12 and appointed Liaison Officer with the Economic Ministry and Ministry for War Production.

Brotz, Liselotte. Member of FA 9 transferred to Seifert in Berlin.

Buggisch, Dr. Otto. Cryptanalyst of In 7/VI.

Burgscheidungen. Final location of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers Z S). 51°13"N 11°47"E.

Canaris, Admiral. Head of the Abwehr, executed for involvement in 20th July Plot.

Charlottenburg: see Berlin.

Cologne. 50° 56' N 06° 57' E. Location of a Forschungsstelle for radio intercept.

Constance. 57° 39' N 09° 10' E. Forschungsstelle, radio intercept.

Control Station for Signal Intelligence of the Army High Command — Oberkommando des Heeres Leitstelle der Nachrichtenaufklärung. Became Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command after November 1944.

Copenhagen 55° 41' N 12° 35' E. Site of an "AA" station, Nyropsgade 17/11, telephone Palae 9469, local 35, 8, 9, and 30.

Criminal Police. See Kriminalpolizei

CSDIC. Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Center.


D-17. OKM 4/ SKL III Yearly Progress report for 1/12/43 - 1/11/44.


D-22. Translation (and chart) of telephone directory giving Forschungsamt numbers.

D-54. Translations of Pers Z S reports on cipher systems of various countries.

Danzig. Forschungsstelle. 54° 21' N 18° 40' E.

Deggau, Juergen. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren, assisted in transferring materials from Breslau to Jueterbog.

Dettmann, Alex, 1st Lt. Head of Cryptanalysis at HLS 057; later head of Section 3, Group IV, GdNA. Specialty: Russian systems.

Deutsch Lissa. 51° 08' N 16° 53' E. Town in Prussia between Breslau and Poznan. Site of a B and C station.


DF-17. Translation of T 3273, letter of Dr. Paschke and other Pers Z S personnel. Translated by Dr. Pettengill. (T-165).

Dienststelle Seifert. Service Post Seifert.

Dietzing, General Major (Brig. Gen.). Supplies FA information to Klautschke.

Dipl. Ing. Graduate Engineer.

Doenitz, Grand Admiral, Commander in chief of German Navy, Reich Chancellor.

Doering, Dr. Mathematician with In 7/VI, later GdNA. Specialty: machine cipher, mathematical research.

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von Doering, Lt. General. Group Head of Equipment department (D 22), Air Ministry.
Dortmund. Forschungsstelle for cable intercept. 51° 31" N 07° 27" E.

Drape, MinRat. Prussian State Ministry and 4 Year Plan.

Ebelling. Krim Komm SS Obersturmfuehrer. State Police Central Office Section IV N.

Egert, Herr. Translator for Chinese, Turkish, Japanese mentioned as released 10/5/45.

Eulenberg. This name appears on the Kaufbeuren directive as the secretary who prepared it for Schapper's signature. Name is not legible.

Eutin. Forschungsstelle for radio intercept. 54° 09" N 10° 37" E.

FA. Forschungsamt q. v.

Fellgiebel, Lt. Gen. Erich. Chief Signal Officer of Army and Armed Forces High Commands from beginning of war until he was executed, 1944.

Fenner, Principal Specialist. Chief of Section IV of OKW/Chi.

Fingerhut, Otto, Specialist. Member of the FA since 1937. He was employed in Main Section V and in 1942 became head of a school for Evaluators, giving refresher courses to members of the branch offices and station. In civil life he was Wissenschaftlicher Assistent at the University of Greifswald, a philologist in Scandinavian languages. He specialized on Italy, Russian, and the Far East in Main Section V. He was assigned to the Reporting Center Seifert on 20 March 1945.

Fleischmann, with Engineering Diploma. Senior Specialist, Head of the Forschungsleitstelle in Vienna.

Flensburg. 54° 56" N 09° 27" E. Final location of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command (OKM 4 SKL III).

Flicker, Specialist. In charge of technical matters at OKW intercept station at Lauf.

Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers Z S.)

Forschungsamt. The Goering controlled Nazi intelligence agency, responsible for radio, telephone and cable monitoring and cryptanalysis of encoded or enciphered messages.

Forschungsleitstelle. Outstation.

Fricke, Technician (Lieutenant Grade) Dr. Walther. Head of IIb, OKW/Chi: Development of systems, etc.

Fricke, SS First Lt.: Liaison Officer, RSHA - OKW.
Friederich, Lt. Col. Chief of Division 7 of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the German Air Force and chief of the Chi Stelle (Chiffrierstelle) of the Oberbefehlsabteilung der Luftwaffe, which after November 1944 became LN Abt 350.

Gaenzer, Major Johannes. Member of Section IIIF (counter espionage and penetration) of Abwehrstelle Berlin.

GEHEIMESTAATSPOLIZEI, (Gestapo). Secret State Police. Part of the Sicherheitspolizei q.v.

General Leutnant.--Major General (Rank held by Schapper in Luftwaffe as head of FA).

Gerstmeyer, Dr. Liaison officer with the Foreign Office.

Gerth, Dr. Head of Section I of the Branch Office Berlin.

Gertz, Frau Helene, born Sponholz. Member of FA 9, had reading knowledge of French and German. Suggested for assignment to the Forschungsstelle Luebben.

Gestapo. Geheimaatapoliizei q.v.


Glueckstadt (Holstein) Telephone monitoring. 53° 8' N 09° 25' E.

Goebbels, Dr. Paul. Propaganda Minister.

Goering, Hermann, Field Marshal. Commander in Chief of Air Force Air Minister.

Goering's Research Bureau.--Forschungsamt q.v.

Gols. Radio intercept station, near Vienna. 47° 51' N 16° 56' E.

Gottschalk, Gottfried. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.

Grauds, Alexander. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren. Assisted in transferring material from Breslau to Jüterbog.

Greifswald. 54°41' N 13°23' E. The Stettin A station was evacuated to Greifswald in April 1945.

Grothe, Edith. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.

Guelle, Otto. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.

Guenther, Lothar. A member of the FA until some time towards the end of 1943 when he was drafted. Taken prisoner, his interrogation was one of the first sources of information on the FA (Interrogated 29 January 1945) although the information did not reach TICOM until later. Was a jurist in civil life. May have been a member of Main Section V.

Hamburg. 53° 33' N 10° 00' E. Forschungsleitstelle and a Forschungsstelle.
Hanson. A subordinate of Canaris in Abwehr, executed for involvement in 20th July plot.

Harrius, Dr. Head of Section 5 of the FA. The Kaufbeuren directive gives his name, which is crossed out in ink in a correction of 14 March 1945.

Hatz, Heinrich, Staff Director. In charge of administration, OKW intercept station at Lauf.

Haupt Abteilung. Main Section, indicated by Roman Numerals.

Henke, Dr. Named as alternate to Harrius in Section 5 of the FA, and carried as head of that section by the 14 March 1945 correction of the Kaufbeuren directive. On 1 April 1945 he was to report to the Branch Office Berlin.

von Hesse, Prince Christoph. The second head of the FA. He was succeeded by Schapper in 1944 at which time he either "died" (Schapper and Guenther) or "returned to the Air Force" (Goering).

High Command of the Armed Forces. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.

Hilligardt, Specialist, Dr. Liaison Officer with the Economic Ministry. Relieved by Brieschke on 20 March when Hilligardt was assigned to FA 12.

Himmler, Heinrich. Reichsfuehrer SS, Minister of the Interior, Head of the Elite Guard, Head of the Reserve Army. Chief of German Police, in which capacity he controlled both the regular police force, the Constabulary (ordnungspolizei through the Ordnungspolizei Hauptamt) but also the Security Police, Sicherheitsdienst and Sicherheitspolizei (SD and Sipo) through the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) which took over the Abwehr into its Amt VI.

Hitler, Adolf. "Der Fuehrer".

Hofmann. Postrat, head of work connected with service matters. Reichspost.

Huettenhain, Senior Specialist Dr. Erich. Chief cryptanalyst for OKW/Chi from 1937.

Huppertsburg, Senior Specialist, Dr. Head of Section 14, alternate head of Main Section VI.

I-1 "Final reports of TICOM group 3 on final exploitation of BURGSCHEIDUNGEN." A TICOM publication.


I-20 "Interrogation of Sonderfuehrer Fricke of OKW/Chi, formerly of OKH/Chi at the OKM Signals School in Flensburg on 16-17 June 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-21 "Preliminary interrogation of Col. Kettler, R. R.
Dr. Huettenhain, Sdf Dr. Fricke (OKW/Chi) and Lt. Schubert
(OKH/Chi) at Schloss Glucksburg near Flensburg on 14 June
1945." A TICOM publication.
I-22 "Interrogation of German cryptographers of the Pers ZS
of the Auswärtiges Amt in the U. K. at seven meetings
during May 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-25 "Interrogation of five members of the FA at Schloss
Glucksburg on 15 and 21 June 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-26 "Interrogation of 1st Lt. Schubert (OKH/Chef HNW/Gen&NA)
on Russian military and agents systems at OKM Signals
School, Flensburg on 17 June 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-29 "Third Interrogation of Lt. Col. Friedrich at Beaconsfield
on 4 July 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-31 "Detailed interrogation of Dr. Huettenhain at Flensburg
on 18 - 21 June 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-54 "Second interrogation of five members of the RLM/Fors-
chungsam at Dustbin Kransberg near Frankfurt on 28
July 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-64 "Answers by Buggisch of OKH/Chi to questions set by
TICOM." A TICOM publication.
I-84 "Further interrogation of R. R. Dr. Huettenhain and
Sdf. Dr. Fricke of OKW/Chi on questions set by Mr.
Friedman." A TICOM publication.
Pokojejiski, and Stabsintendant Hatz." A TICOM publication.
I-86 "Interrogation of Lt. Col. Mettig of OKH and OKW/Chi on
the highest direction of German Cryptanalytic Work."
of Communications of the Ordnungs Polizei. A TICOM
publication.
I-93 "Detailed interrogation of members of OKM 4 SKL III at
Flensburg." A TICOM publication.
I-108 "Interrogation of Goering on the RLM/Forschungsam."A TICOM publication.
I-112 "Preliminary interrogation of Regierungserat Voegele and
Major Feichner of the GAF Crypt. Bureau, (OKL)." A TICOM
publication.
I-116 "Report of Interrogation of Lt. Dettman and Oberwacht-
meister Samsonow of OKH (Gen d NA) at Oberursel, Germany,
during August 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-121 "Translation of homework by Obltn W. Werther, company commander of 7/LN Regt. 553." A TICOM publication.
I-131 "Lt. Col. Mettig of OKW/Chi on Wa Pruef 7 and RLM/-Forschungsamt." A TICOM publication.
I-143 "Report on the interrogation of five leading Germans (Jodl, Doenitz, Keitel, Ribbentrop, and Goering) at Nuremberg on 27 Sept. 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-146 "Detailed interrogation of members of OKM 4/SKL III at Flensburg." A TICOM publication.
I-147 "Detailed interrogation of members of OKM 4/SKL III at Flensburg." A TICOM publication.
I-159 "Report on GAF intelligence based on interrogation of Hauptman Zetsche." A TICOM publication.
I-162 "Report on interrogation of Kurt Sauerbier 7 RLM/ Forschungsamt, held on 31 August 1945." A TICOM publication.
I-164 "Homework by Kurt Sauerbier of RLM/Forschungsamt, on Russian Agents' Traffic." A TICOM publication.
I-172 "Interrogations of Hagen and Paschke of Pers ZS." A TICOM publication.
I-176 "Homework by Wachtmeister Dr. Otto Buggisch of OKH/Chi and OKW/Chi." A TICOM publication.

IF-15 Final Report of TICOM Team 1 on the exploitation of Kaufbeuren and the Berchtesgaden area. From TICOM.
IF-46 Interrogation of Lother Guenther, dated 29 January 1945. CSDIC, MC 500, Hq 7th Army, NM. 708.
IF-105 CSIDIK (U.K.) SIR 1326. Interrogation Report on POW Heinz Boscheinen and Walter Kotschy.--Continuation of IF 126, 105 B--summary of preliminary interrogation of these prisoners in the field. Received through Col. Bicher.
IF-126 CSIDIK (U.K.) SIR 1335. Interrogation report on Kotschy and Boscheinen.
IF-143 Weekly Intelligence Summary # 15 (25 Oct. 1945); (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater), # 15 (25 Oct. 1945). This contains information on FA wire tapping given by a Major Johannes Gaenzer of Abwehrstelle Berlin/ III F.
Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, Brigade Fuehrer and head of Amt VI of RSHA.

Four Stories by Daniel DeLuce of Associated Press, Berlin, 4, 5, 6, and 7 November 1945 based on material found by him in the rubble of the Air Ministry.

The German Intelligence Service. (SHAEF, Counter Intelligence war room; London; April 1945).

"Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst." Ultra/Zip/Fal 4, 1/1/44.

Glossary of German administrative and political Terminology for use by officers and officials of the American Armed Forces of occupation (Hq 7th Army, APO 758).

German-English Dictionary of German Administrative Terms. Civil affairs guide. War Department Pamphlet Nr. 31-16a, 3 July 1944.

Glossary of German administrative and political Terminology for use by officers and officials of the American Armed Forces of occupation (Hq 7th Army, APO 758).

German-English Dictionary of German Administrative Terms. Civil affairs guide. War Department Pamphlet Nr. 31-16a, 3 July 1944.

German Army and Air Force abbreviation, NU CX/MSS/S. 168 IN 7/VI Control Station of Signal Intelligence of the Army High Command, Inspectorate 7. After November 1944 this became the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.

Inspectorate 7/VI Control Station of Signal Intelligence of the Army High Command, abb In 7/VI. Became Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command after November 1944.

Jentsch, Julius. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren. May have gone to Berlin with Ruffler.

Jodl, Alfred, Colonel General. General Oberst, Chief of armed forces operation staff.

Juterbog. 51°59'N 13°40"E. Temporary location of a branch of the FA in early 1945. Also a location of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.

Kagelka, Specialist. Member of FA IV?

Katowice (Kattowitz) 50°16'N 19°01"E. Site of an "A" station in Upper Silesia (Poland).

Kattowitz. See Katowice.

Kaufbeuren. 47°53'N 10°37"E. The Main Bureau was located in barracks at the Kaufbeuren airfield. The postal address was Kaufbeuren/Allgemeine.

Kaltenbrunner. Himmler's head of RSHA.

Keitel, Wilhelm. Field Marshal. Chief of the Armed Forces.

Kell, _ . Given as a member of the FA in the telephone directory: "Research Office A1/2 Berlin. Exploitation Center. (Rlm/FA/AW - Kopf)." This may mean he was in the Berlin Forschungsleitstelle.
Kempe, Specialist. Head of Main Section II and Section 3 of FA.
Kiewadt, Ilse. Member of FA-9, transferred to FA 3 on 7 March 45.
Kirbach, Senior Specialist. Head of Forschungsleitstelle in Hamburg.
Kirstein, Karl. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren, assisted in transferring material from Breslau to Jueterbog.
Klautschke, Specialist Dr. Heinz. Liaison Officer with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW not just OKW/Chi). Stated that he had "university training in Economics and Politics."
Koenigsberg, 54°42'N 20°30'E. Forschungsstelle (IF-15).
Koeln. See Cologne.
Koerner, Dr. Paul. Prussian Secretary of State. Financial control of the FA. Reported to have negotiated with Schellenberg to hand over the FA to Schellenberg.
Konstanz. See Constance.
Kotschy, Walter. Noncommissioned officer. Hungarian Interpreter. Member of Italian Section of Afrika Korps. Trained in "encoding and decoding" at In 7/VI.
Krenzke, Georg. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Assisted in moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog.
Kriminalpolizei (Kripo). Criminal Police. Part of the Sicherheitspolizei q.v.
Kripo. Kriminalpolizei q.v.
Kroeger, Specialist. Member of Section 6 of the FA "Machine" specialist of the FA, presumably cipher machines. Probably responsible for success with Russian Teleprinter. Stated to have broken Finnish Hagelin. A member of Huettenhain's Cipher Security Committee.
Kuebler, Ferdinand. A member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. He requested permission to visit his family at night at Hirschzell but was refused on the grounds that his family, residents of Hamburg/Saale, should not have evacuated to Bavaria but to Saxony or Thuringia.
Kuepper, Dr. Helmut. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.
Kunsemueller, Senior Specialist. In charge of Section 2 of the FA. Was to report in Kaufbeuren on 10 April 1945.
Kunze, Werner, Dr. Senior Specialist (Oberregierungsrat) head of Pers ZS mathematical cryptanalytic subsection.
Kurzbach, Senior Specialist Dr. Head of Section 11 and alternate head of Main Section V of the FA. Was last seen in Kaufbeuren by Rentschler.

Lade, Karl. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren, assisted in moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog.

Lange, Eran. Member of FA transferred from Kaufbeuren to Berlin. Her previous section is unknown.

Leba (Pomerania). 54°45'N 17°33'E. Forschungsstelle.

Lechner, Otto. Member of FA 9, assisted in transferring material from Breslau to Jueterbog - was at Kaufbeuren.

Legler, MinRat. Prussian State Ministry and 4 Year Plan, D 22.

Lehr, Specialist. Probably a member of FA IV. Liaison Office. Verbindungsstelle.

Litzmannstadt. See Lodz.

Lodz (Litzmannstadt). 51°46'N 19°26'E. Poland. Site of an A Station.

Ludwig, Dr. Helmut. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.

Luebben/Spreewald. 51°56'N 13°54'E. Radio intercept Forschungsstelle, 65 kilometres south of Berlin. Main Section. Hauptabteilung.

Marquardstein. 47°49'N 12°28'E. Near Rosenheim, location of Amt VI of RSHA at conclusion of hostilities.

Matys, Georg. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Mayr, Margareta. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Meinhard, Pauline. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.


Meyer, Author of a memo on quarters for FA personnel at Kaufbeuren.

Mews, Specialist Dr. Head of Section 10 of the FA, the library and archives. Was last seen in Kaufbeuren (Rentschler).

Milch, Field Marshal. Secretary of State for Air and Inspector General of the G. A. F.

Ministerialdirektor - untranslated non TICOM definition is: director i. e. a ministry, head of one or more divisions in a ministry. Schapper held this rank as head of the FA and claimed it was equivalent to General Leutnant Der Luftwaffe.

Ministerial Dirigent - untranslated German Civil Service Rank higher than Ministerial Rat (q.v.) and is possibly equivalent to Brigadier General or "P-8".

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Ministerialrat abbrev Min Rat — Principal Specialist (non TICOM translation is Superior Counsellor in a ministerial department (title of a Referent (Principal) in the first ministerial grade). This Civil Service Rank is approximately equivalent to Colonel or "P 7."

MinRat — Ministerialrat q. v.

Mueller, Lt. Gen. of Police, SS Gruppenfuehrer, Head of RSHA Section IV.

Muenchen. See Munich.

Munich, 48°08"N 11°35"E. Forschungsleitstelle and Forschungsstelle.

National Defense Forces. See Reichswehr.


National Ministry of War. Reichskriegsministerium q. v.

National Police. See Reichspolizei

Navy High Command. See Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine.

Neuenhoff, ______, Dr. Special Liaison man between FA-9 and Branch Office Berlin.

Niedermeyer, ______, Specialist. Head of Forschungsleitstelle Breslau to 26 January 1945 when he was relieved and appointed Chief of Staff for Seifert in Jueterbog. On 9 March he was appointed head of the Forschungsleitstelle Munich.

Nürnberg. See Nuremberg.

Nuremberg, 59°27"N 11°05"E. Forschungsstellen.

Nusbaum, Ingeborg. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine abbrev OKM — High Command of the Navy. (Combines military and administrative authority). Preceded (1889-1919) by Reichsmarineamt, (1920-1934) by Marineleitung in Reichswehrministerium; under the Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine.

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe abbrev OKL — Airforce High Command. (See Reichsluftfahrtministerium).

Oberkommando der Marine 4 Seekriegsleitung/III. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command.

Oberkommando des Heeres abbrev OKH — Army High Command or High Command of the Army. (under the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres; organization based on Wehrgesetz and edict of 4 February 1938.

Oberkommando des Heeres General der Nachrichten Aufklaerung. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.

Oberkommando des Heeres Leitstelle der Nachrichten Aufklaerung — Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (prior to November 1944).
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht abb OKW - High Command of the Armed Forces or Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. (Formerly Reichskriegsministerium, 1935-1938, previously Reichswehrministerium, 1919-1934. The Reichskriegsministerium was dissolved by the decree of 4 February 1938. At the head of the OKW is the Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht subject to Hitler himself who is Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht in consequence of the laws of 6 March 1935 and of 21 May 1935.

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Chiffrier Abteilung. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).

Oberregierungsrat, abb ORR - Senior Specialist (non TICOM definition is: Higher Government Counsellor of a Referent (Principal) in the second ministerial grade). Civil Service rank approximately equivalent to Lt. Col. or P-6.

Oden, Specialist with engineering diploma, Hoeckley. Head of Section 15 of the FA and head of Section 5 of the Branch Office Berlin. Had been employed by Siemens und Halske and classmate of various members of Wa Pruef 7 and therefore collaborated on production of T 52 e.

OKH - Oberkommando des Heeres q.v.

OKH/Chi. Loose Terminology for: The Signals Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command, OKH/GdNA, Oberkommando des Heeres/General der Nachrichten Aufklärung, after Nov. 1944, prior to then Inspectorate 7/VI (abb In 7/VI), Control station of Signal Intelligence of the Army High Command (OKH/LNA).

OKH/GdNA. Abbreviation for the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.

OKL - Oberkommando der Luftwaffe q.v.

OKL/Chi. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Airforce High Command. Properly OBd1/Chi or, after November 1944, OKL/LN Abt 350.

Sicherheitspolizei abb. Sipo - Security Police. One of the two main branches of the Police (Reichspolizei, q.v.) Organized in the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) it included the Kriminalpolizei (Kripo) and Geheime staatspolizei (Gestapo). The head of the RSHA was Kaltenbrunner who was responsible to Himmler.

Signal Equipment and Testing Branch (Wa Pruef 7) of OKH. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command. Chi Stelle of the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, which became Luftwaffe Nachrichten Abteilung 350 after November 1940.
OKM. See Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine.

OKM 4 SKL/III. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command.

OKW. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.

OKW/Chi. See Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

OKW/WNV/FU. Radio Defense Corps qv.

Ordnungspolizei abt Orpo - Regular Police, Constabulary.

Organized into a Main Office Constabulary under the Chef der deutschen Polizei (Himmler). Constabulary is divided into five sections; Schutzpolizei (abb. Schupo, the Security Police, which is divided into Inspektionen or Administrative police, Abschnitte or Section police, Reviere or Precinct police, and Wasserschutzpolizei or Harbor police; Gendarmerie (rural police); Technische Nothilfe (abb TN or Teno.-Office for Emergency Operation of Utilities); Feuerschutzpolizei (Fire Protection Police); and Verwaltungspolizei (who regulate traffic, public health etc). By regions the Constabulary has been subdivided into Landes-(regional), Kreis-(district), and Ortspolizei (local police).

Orpo. Ordnungspolizei, q.v.

ORR. Oberregierungsrat q.v.

Oschmann, , Captain. Official of Defense Ministry Cipher Section.

Outstation.-Forschungsleitstelle.

Paetzel, Martin, Senior Specialist Dr. Head of Section 6 and alternate head of Main Section IV of the FA.

Paschke, Adolf, Dr., Senior Specialist. Co-head or head of Pers ZS and head of the Linguistic-Cryptanalytic Subsection. Also in charge of Wehrmacht liaison, (Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section).

Patzig, , Corvette Captain. Official at Defence Ministry, cipher section.


Pflegens, Dr. Hermann. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Pokojejewski, Kurt, Technical Inspector. Subordinate to civilian in charge of OKW intercept station at Lauf; later became civilian in charge.

Polizei, Reichs. See Reichspolizei.

Popp, , Specialist. Head of Section 4 of the FA.
Posen. See Posnan.
Posnan, (Posen). 52°25'N 16°58'E. Poland, site of an A station.

Principal Specialist. See Ministerial Rat.

Progich, ____, Specialist. A member of the intercept station at Luebben. He was also assigned liaison functions with the Branch Office Berlin.

Rapp, ____, SS Standartenfuhrer. Named by Schellenberg as working with Sandberger to take over the FA into Amt VI of RSHA in February 1945. Head of a Northern Section of Amt VI at Flensburg.

Rautenkranz, ____, Dr. A member of the Danzig Forschungsstelle. Last known as a prisoner in the 7th Army cage at Augsburg but not questioned by TICOM. On 20 March 1945 he was transferred from the School (School for Evaluators) to head of FA-12.

Regierungsrat abb RR. Specialist (non TICOM definition is: Governmental Counsellor (title of a Referent (Principal) in the third ministerial grade). Civil Service rank approximately equivalent to Major or "F-5".

Regular Police. See Ordnungspolizei.

Reich Air Ministry Research Bureau. FA q.v.

Reich Main Security Office. The headquarters of Himmler, SIPO, and SD, (Security Police and Security Service) of the SS.

Reichskriegsministerium. German War Ministry (in charge of Army and Navy, 1935-1938, dissolved by decree of 4 February 1938(GB1.I,p.111); functions taken over by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.)

Reichsluftfahrtministerium, abb. RLM. National Air Ministry, established by decree of 5 May 1933. In consequence of the reorganization of the Wehrmacht the Air Ministry is also the Oberbefehlshaber des Oberkommandos der Luftwaffe. Including Austria, the whole German territory is subdivided into Luftflottenkommandos and Luftgaukommandos.

Reichsluftfahrtministerium/Forschungsamt. Forschungsamt q.v.

Reichspolizei. National Police. Established by edict of 17 June 1936 under Chef der deutschen Polizei within the jurisdiction of the Reichsinnenministerium. The whole police administration has been divided into Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei and Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei (see Reichsicherheitspolizei). Himmler is Chef der deutschen polizei.
Reichsicherheitshauptamt, abbr. RSHA. Reich Main Security Office, Main Office of the Sicherheitspolizei, q. v.
Reichswehr. National Defense (Land and Naval) Forces. Term used after the first world war during the time the Defense Act of 23 March 1921, imposed by Versailles treaty, was in force (1919-1935).
Reichswehrministerium. German Defense Ministry, in charge of army and navy (1919-1934), later called Reichskriegsministerium.
Remwettz-Lukjansky, Dimitri. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.
Rentschler, Erwin. Head of Section 13 of the FA, formerly a member of Section 11 as French expert. Joined the FA in 1934. Was interrogated by TICOM at Kaufbeuren.
von Ribbentrop, Joachim. Foreign Minister.
Richter, Helga. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.
Riga. 56'57"N 24'09"E. Forschungsstelle.
RLM. Reichsluftfahrtministerium q.v.
RLM/FA. Forschungsamt q.v.
Rohm, Ernst. Leader of SA, executed in "Blood Purge" 9 June 1934.
Rosenbahn, ___ . Senior Specialist. Head of Section 1 of the FA. Rosenheim. 57'52"N 12'08"E. Final location of the Main Bureau.
Roth, Liselotte. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Probably went to Berlin with Ruffler on 5 April 1945.
RR. Regierungsrat q.v.
RSHA. Reichsicherheitshauptamt q.v.
Ruffler, Georg. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. The notation, to Berlin with Ruffler, appears beside his name and that of several other members of FA 9 with the date of 5 April 1945.
SA. Storm Troops (Sturm Abteilung).
Samsonoff, M/Sgt. Sergins. Head of Section 32 of group IV of GdNA. Specialty: (Russian Secret Police Systems. NKVD).
Sandberger, ____. Head of Amt VI Kultur of RSHA and one of the key officials assigned job of taking over the FA in February 1945 by Schellenberg. Last known at Marquartstein near Rosenheim in charge of a southern section of Amt VI.
Sauertier, Herr Kurt. In charge of sub-section C of Section 9 of FA. A specialist on Agent ciphers. Formerly a bank clerk, he joined the FA in 1935.
Schade. Head of Forschungsstelle in Danzig.

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Schapper, Minister Director Gottfried. Head of the FA at the end of the war. Was associated with Schimpf, von Hesse and Goering in founding the FA. Had been in Signals Intelligence in World War I and a member of the cipher section of the Defense Ministry (predecessor of OKW/Chi) prior to founding of FA. Was third head of FA, holding rank equivalent to that of a General-leutnant of the German Air Force. Was interrogated by TICOM and furnished an outline of the FA, its history, and an autobiography (for which last see Appendix III).

Scheitinger, Josef. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Schellenberg, SS Brigadefuehrer Walter. Maj. Gen. of Police. Head of Amt VI of RSHA. Took over Abwehr as Mil. Amt of Amt VI, attempted to take over FA and did achieve control of it through an arrangement with Koerner. Also controlled OKW/Chi to some extent at the end.

Schimpf, Corvette Captain. First Head of FA, committed suicide. Had been liaison officer from Defense Ministry to the predecessor of OKM. Founded FA with Goering in 1933.

Schirajeff, Erika. Member of FA-9, assisted in moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog. Last known at Kaufbeuren.

Schlaka, Robert, General Major. Chief of Communications in the Ordnungspolizei.

Schmidt, __________. Appointed head of the closing down section of the Forschungsleitstelle Breslau in Berlin on 26 January. A Schmidt is author of a memo on laundry service from FA I.

Schmitz, __________. Member of RSHA, Amt VI.

Scholz, __________, Specialist with engineering diploma. Liaison officer with the Reich Main Security Office.

Schroeder, Ministerialdirigent Georg. Head of Main Section IV of the FA.

Schubert, 1st Lt. Horst. GdMA specialist on Russian Agents' systems.

Schubert, Walter. A member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Schulze, Senior Specialist. Head of Section 8 of the FA.

SD. Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service. The Nazi Party secret police, formed out of the SS. It was organized with the RSHA and included with KRPO and GESTAPO.

Section. Abteilung.


Security Service. See Sicherheitsdienst.

Secret State Police. Geheimestaatspolizei q.v.

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Seifert, Principal Specialist Walter. Head of Main Section V and of the Reporting Center Seifert in Berlin. He came to the FA from the cipher section of the Defense Ministry in 1933. (He should not be confused with the Austrian Hofrat Seifert who was employed in OKW/Chi after the Anschluss.) Seifert had been head of the Juterbog Branch of the FA.

Seifert, Hofrat, Dr. Head of the Austrian Cipher Bureau. Came to OKW/Chi after the Anschluss where he was the Specialist on known codes and broke Polish, Turkish, Greek, and Vatican basic books. Head of Greek sub-section OKW/Chi: V 6. Do not confuse with Walter Seifert of the FA.

Senior Specialist. Oberregierungsrat q.v.
Severitt, Herr. Liaison Officer with Ministry of Information and Propaganda.

Sicherheitsdienst, Abb. SD. Security Service, part of the SS.

Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe Luftnachrichten Abteilung 350 (OKL/LN 350). Its predecessor was, prior to November 1944, ObdL/Chi Stelle.

Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command. Oberkommando des Heeres/General der Nachrichten Aufklärung. (OKH/GdNA) Its predecessor prior to November 1944 this was Inspectorate 7/VI of the Leitstelle der Nachrichten Aufklärung of the Oberkommando des Heeres. (OKH/LNA/In 7/VI).

Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Chi Stelle, Oberbefehlsbaber der Luftwaffe.

Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command. Oberkommando der Marine 4 Seekriegsleitung III. abb. OKM 4 SKL/III.


Simon, Fritz. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren assisted in moving documents from Breslau to Juterbog.

Simson, Col. Commandant of the Air Ministry D 22, Sipo. See Sicherheitspolizei.
Sponholz. See Frau Helene Gertz.
Spreewald. See Luebben/Spreewald.
SS. Schutzstaffel-Elite Guard. The Armed SS (Waffen SS) and General SS, (Allgemeine SS). SS was responsible for the party security service, SD, and the RSHA.

Stabenow, ____, Senior Specialist. Head of Main Section VI of the FA. Head of the Branch Office Berlin. Possibly at Flensburg at the capitulation but not traced. (I 25, 54, 93, IF 135, D 22).

Steffens, Gerda. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

Stettin, 53°25'N 14°34'E. Forschungsstelle.

von Stubenfauch, ____, Specialist. Member of FA IV?

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. (This is the TICOM translation, official translation is High Command of the Armed Forces.)

Tallinn. 59°24'N 24°45'E. Forschungsstelle.

Templin. 53°07'N 13°30'E. Radio intercept Forschungsstelle. 70 kilometres north of Berlin.

TF 29. Die Ueberwachung des Nachrichtenverkehrs im Kriege. (The Supervision of Information Channels in War). German book containing regulations and organization for censorship of all communications. Responsibility given to Abwehr and cooperation of SS and SD and the FA, Deutsche Reichspost etc.

Thiele, Brig. Gen.: Chief of Staff to Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

Thieme, ____, Specialist. Head of Forschungsleitstelle Berlin.

Thomas, Hildegard. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren.

TICOM. Target Intelligence Committee. Loosely used in this paper for the entire project, for the committee members, and for the publications. Activities and materials of that committee according to context.

T-240. This is the film (Film 34-16 millimetre) of the administrative directives found by Team 1 at Kaufbeuren. A summary of the contents, and complete translation of item 34 is given in appendix 2. Item 34 is also available as IF 135.

Tranow, ____, Principal Specialist. Head of English Cryptographic Section (III-F) of OKM 4 SKL/III.

Verbindungsstelle. --Liaison Office.

Vienna. 48°12'N 16°22'E. Forschungsleitstelle and Forschungsstelle.
Voegele, Ferdinand, RR, chief cryptanalyst and chief of Section E of the Chi Stelle of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force.
Waechter,____, Senior Specialist. Head of Section 8 of the FA. Specialist on English and American systems concerning which he liaised with the cipher section of the Foreign Office.
Wa Pruef 7. Signal Equipment and Testing Branch of OKH.
Walger, Egon. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Assisted in moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog.
Wenzel,____, Senior Specialist. Head of Section 9 of the FA.
Wichmann,____, MinRat. Head of office of ministers and Department VII. Reichspost.
Wien. See Vienna.
Work Section. Arbeitgebiet q.v.
Zetsche,____. Captain in charge of Group A of Foreign Airforce West.