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Rotor Enigma K
The Japanese Enigma
- wanted item
Enigma T, codenamed Tirpitz, was an
Enigma cipher machine
made during WWII by Heimsoeth und Rinke (H&R) in Berlin
(Germany) especially for use by the Japanese Army.
It was based on the commercial Enigma K,
but came with eight cipher rotors, three of which were in the machine.
In addition, each rotor had five turnover notches, which caused in an
irregular stepping behaviour.
All rotors plus the entry disc (ETW) and the reflector (UKW)
were wired uniquely for the Japanese.
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The machine was intented for communication between the Japanese Navy
and the German Navy (Kriegsmarine).
The agreement for this was signed on 11 September 1942
by German Vice Admiral Erhard Maertens and Japanese Admiral Tadao Yokoi.
At the time, Maertens was Director of the German Naval Communication Service and
Yokoi was the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin. This followed the earlier
Japanese-German Military Agreement of 18 January 1942 [2].
All German-Japanese communication would be encrypted
with a machine that was referred to as Enigma T.
The Germans called the operating procedure TIRPITZ,
whilst the Japanese named it TIRUPITSU.
The US Navy referred to the machine as OPAL whilst its traffic was named
JN-18 [2].
The official name for the machine system was Japanese-German Joint Use
Code No. 3.
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The machine was used with an operational procedure – TIRPITZ –
and a key list – GARTENZAUN (garden fence). The procedure (Tirpitz)
came into effect on 1 August 1943 and was used for the remainder of the war.
The key list (Gartenzaun) was divided into two periodes: 1 August 1943
to 31 December 1943 (Gartenzaun 1) and 1 January 1944 to the end of the war
(Gartenzaun 2).
Most of the information on this page is based on Frode Weierud's
article TIRPITZ and the Japanese-German Naval War Communication Agreement
in Cryptologia of July 1999 [2].
It is not exactly known how many Enigma T machines were actually built.
The Japanese ordered 800 machines, but for various reasons this
quantity was never delivered. There were delays in design and manufacture,
and it became increasingly difficult to get sufficient supply of materials.
Furthermore, the Germans had their doubts about the security of the
machine. In the meantime, the Japanese used two manual systems:
Sumatra (later: Sumatra 2)
and TOGO (later: TOGO 2).
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The Enigma T is based on the design of
Commercial Enigma K (A27) and not
the more common Steckered Enigma I
that was used by the German Armed Forces.
As the machine was intended for encrypting the wireless communication
between the German and Japanese Navies, a strong cipher was mandatory.
At the same time, the German didn't want to share their most secret
machine (Enigma I). As a compromise,
they took a commercial Enigma K and improved it in several ways.
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The entry disc (ETW) was wired differently from all other machines —
not in the order of the alphabet or the keyboard.
In addition it came with 8 rotors, 3 of which were placed in the machine.
In addition, each rotor had 5 turnover notches, as shown in the
image on the right.
It caused a more frequent turnover of the rotors and increased the
cipher period (as 5 is a relative prime of 26). 1
Additional complexity was sometimes added,
by instructing the user to advance the settable reflector (UKW)
by one position by hand after each fifth 5-letter group (25 letters).
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The first order for Enigma T machines was for 400 units, but this order was
never fully delivered. Due to material shortages, only small batches
of machines were supplied to the Japanese. Some shipments got losts whenever
the carrying U-boat was sunk and one machine was compromised in Guadalcanal
on 15 February 1943. German codebreakers experimented with the machine and started
doubting its security, especially when it was used for large volumes of traffic.
In June 2009 we were allowed to photograph an Enigma T rotor III.
This rotor belongs to the Tirpitz Enigma with serial number T47,
which is part of the internal collection of the British Intelligence
Service GCQH.
Shortly afterwards, GCHQ unexpectedly donated the Enigma T with
serial number T244 to the Bletchley Park Museum,
which has since been on public display.
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It also introduced a weakness as the number of notches on each rotor
now share a common factor (five).
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Proposal for a new Enigma
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Apparently, the Japanese had acquired the manufacturing rights for the Enigma T,
as on 18 May 1943 they cancelled their order.
Around the same time, the Germans proposed a new type of machine for joint
communication use: the 02562-A-Enigma.
According to a report, this is a Steckered machine, most likely based on the
standard Service Enigma. The Germans proposed to replace the remainder of
the order (another 400 machines) with this new type.
Part of the initial batch of 400 machines had already been delivered however,
and some were still in production. After the Japanese Naval Attaché
expressed his concern about this, the Germans guaranteed that the new machine
would be interoperable with the old one. Using the new machine without plugs
(Steckern) would make the machine compatible with the Enigma T.
If this was the case, the machine would cryptographically be considerably stronger
than the Service Enigma. It would combine the strength of the
plug board with more frequent turnovers and an increased cipher
period. Had it been possible to deploy this machine widely, it might have
defeated the American and British codebreaking efforts.
However, at this point during the war, the material shortages
made it impossible to build large quantities of any machines.
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From then on, small batches of the new machine were delivered to Japan, whilst
the initial order for Enigma T machines was also (partly) fulfilled.
In August 1944, a large batch of Enigma T machines was captured by the Allied
Forces in a warehouse in the vicinity of Lorient. Although there are conflicting
accounts, it is likely that some 70 machines were captured there.
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When Bletchley Park
was first opened as a museum, around 2000, they had an
Enigma on display that could be touched by the public. It was part of the
so-called Crypto Trail that allowed visitors to follow the flow of an
Enigma message.
At the end of the trail was a real Enigma.
Researchers discovered however, that the machine on public
display was an extremely rare Enigma M3 — the standard machine
used by the Kriegsmarine (German Navy), of which very few have survived.
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The machine was removed from the hands-on exhibition in 2007 and was locked
away in BP's safe. Since 2011 it is back on public display again — as part of
the main Enigma display — but this time protected by bullet-proof glass.
As they wanted another machine for the hands-on experience, BP director
Simons Greenish asked GCHQ in mid-2007 for a spare Enigma machine of which
they had more than one available. He assumed to be given a standard
German Army 3-rotor Steckered Enigma, but instead in October 2007
he received a surprise.
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The machine that GCHQ had given BP was
a non-Steckered machine with 4 adjustable rotors.
After a closer examinition it turned out to be the extremely rare Enigma
T, with serial number T-244. The machine was in pretty bad condition and its
wooden case was missing completely.
Furthermore, there was no serial number plate on the machine's body and
the paint had deteriorated somewhat. Nevertheless it is probably one of the
best unexpected gifts that Bletchley ever received.
The machine has since been restored and is now part of the permanent
Engima display in B-Block.
Another Enigma T machine is on public display at the NCM.
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The table below shows the wiring of the Enigma T rotors,
the entry disc (Eintrittswalze, ETW) and the
reflector (Umkehrwalze,
UKW) [1]. The rightmost column
shows what letter is visible in the window when the rotor
causes a turnover of the rotor to its left.
Please note that these positions are different from the
actual position of the notches on the circumference of the rotor.
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Rotor
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ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
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Notch
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Turnover
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#
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ETW
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KZROUQHYAIGBLWVSTDXFPNMCJE
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*1
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I
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KPTYUELOCVGRFQDANJMBSWHZXI
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EHMSY
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WZEKQ
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5
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II
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UPHZLWEQMTDJXCAKSOIGVBYFNR
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EHNTZ
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WZFLR
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5
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III
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QUDLYRFEKONVZAXWHMGPJBSICT
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EHMSY
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WZEKQ
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5
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IV
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CIWTBKXNRESPFLYDAGVHQUOJZM
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EHNTZ
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WZFLR
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5
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V
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UAXGISNJBVERDYLFZWTPCKOHMQ
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GKNSZ
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YCFKR
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5
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VI
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XFUZGALVHCNYSEWQTDMRBKPIOJ
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FMQUY
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XEIMQ
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5
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VII
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BJVFTXPLNAYOZIKWGDQERUCHSM
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GKNSZ
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YCFKR
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5
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VIII
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YMTPNZHWKODAJXELUQVGCBISFR
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FMQUY
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XEIMQ
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5
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UKW
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GEKPBTAUMOCNILJDXZYFHWVQSR
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Note that this is the only machine with a different wiring for the
ETW. All other Enigma machines have an ETW that is wired either in
the order of the alphabet (ABCDEF...) or the order of the keyboard
(QWERZU...).
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JN-18 traffic (i.e. messages encrypted on Enigma T) was rarely intercepted by the
Americans and was therefore very difficult to break.
At the end of the war, Enigma T was used by the Japanese Naval Attachés and even
for diplomatic traffic after the Japanese had destroyed their PURPLE machines.
It is known to have been used between stations in Tokyo, Berlin, Stockholm and Bern.
The exact operating procedure is still unknown.
In 2009, Frode Weierud published four original Enigma T messages on his website,
all of which have since been broken [3].
The image above shows a real Japanese Enigma-T message as it was intercepted
on 10 March 1944 by the US Navy's signal intelligence and cryptanalytical
group OP-20-G. More sample messages and historical backgrounds are available from
Frode Weierud's website [3].
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Enigma T Manufacturer type number T-Enigma Variation to the above Tirpitz Codename used by the Germans Tirupitsu Codename used by the Japanese OPAL Codename used by the Americans JN-18 Allied identifier for Enigma T traffic No. 3 Japanese-German Joint Use Code
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T47 GCHQ, UK T209 NCM, USA T212 NCM, USA T214 NCM, USA T215 NCM, USA T216 NCM, USA T244 Bletchley Park (BP), UK T259 NCM, USA T314 NCM, USA T315 NCM, USA T318 GCHQ, UK T1436 NCM, USA
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- David Hamer, Geoff Sullivan and Frode Weierud,
Enigma Variations: An Extended Family of Machines
Cryptologia, July 1998, Volume XXII, Number 3, pp. 211-229.
- Frode Weierud, TIRPITZ OPAL
TIRPITZ and the Japanese-German Naval War Communication Agreement.
Cryptolog, July 1999, Volume XX, Number 3, pp. 6-10.
- Frode Weierud, German Enigma T (Tirpitz) Messages,
used for Japanese-German Intercommunications.
- Daniel J. Girard, Breaking "Tirpitz":
Cryptanalysis of the Japanese-German joint naval cipher
Cryptologia 40:5, January 2016, pp. 425-451
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Tuesday 11 August 2009. Last changed: Saturday, 03 August 2024 - 09:40 CET.
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